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ARTICLES
CONFRONTING THE RELUCTANT ACCOMPLICE
john G. Douglass*
The Supreme Court treats the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidence that excludes unreliable hearsay. But where the hearsay declarant is
an accomplice who refuses to testify at defendant's trial, the Court's approach
leads prosecutors and defendants to ignore real opportunities for confrontation, while they debate the reliability of hearsay. And even where the Court's
doctrine excludes hearsay, it leads prosecutors to purchase the accomplice's
testimony through a process that raises equally serious questions of reliability.
Thus, the Court's approach promotes neither reliability nor confrontation.
This Article advocates an approach that applies the Confrontation
Clause to hearsay declarants in much the same way it applies to testifying
witnesses. Rather than exclude unreliable hearsay, the Clause guarantees
fair adversarial testing of hearsay. Prosecutors cannot introduce accomplice
hearsay without using available means to bring about real confrontation.
Defendants cannot rely on confrontation rights that they are not willing to
exercise. And courts must take a harder look when accomplices assert a blanket right not to testify. Rather than j1itting hearsay against confrontation,
this approach embraces solutions which allow both hearsay and
confrontation.
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INTRODUCTION

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 1
[N]either side wants a co-conspirator as a witness. 2
In Lilly v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court held that Virginia violated Ben Lilly's right of confrontation when the trial judge admitted in evidence a tape-recorded confession of Lilly's accomplice. 3 In
that jailhouse confession the accomplice-Lilly's younger brother,
Mark-identified Lilly as the triggerman in a murder. 4 Later, having discovered the value of silence, Mark asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify at Lilly's trial. The trial court nevertheless allowed the prosecutor to introduce Mark's confession under the hearsay
exception for statements against ,penal interest. The Supreme Court
unanimously reversed, though it could not summon a majority for any
element of its Sixth Amendment reasoning. 5

l. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. United States v. Inacli, 475 U.S. 387, 397 n.7 (1986).
3. 527 U.S. 116, 139-140 (1999).
4. Over a two clay period in 1995, Ben and Mark Lilly, along with Mark's roommate,
Gary Barker, participated in a crime spree that included burgla1y, armed robbe1y,
kidnapping, and carjacking, and ultimately ended in homicide. Id. at 120. On the night of
the arrest, police questioned all three separately, and all gave statemenL~. Id. Ben Lilly
never mentioned the murder, and claimed that the other two had forced him to
participate in the other crimes. Id. Barker and Mark Lilly each identified Ben as the
mastermind and-most important-as the triggerman in the killing. Id. at 120-21.
Ben Lilly was charged with a host of crimes, including capital murder. The major
issue at Lilly's trial was his role in the shooting. The capital murder charge, and hence the
penalty of death, hinged on a finding that Lilly was the shooter. See Harrison v.
Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2cl 777, 779 (Ya. 1979) (noting that, under Virginia capital
murder provision dealing with killings in course of armed robbery, only triggerman can be
guilty of capital offense).
Barker pied guilty and became the principal prosecution witness at Ben Lilly's trial. At
the time of that trial, Mark still faced multiple charges himself. When called as a
prosecution witness, he asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify. Lilly,
527 U.S. at 121. The trial court declared him an unavailable witness and allowed the
prosecution to introduce his tape recorded confession, implicating Ben Lilly as the
murderer. Id. at 121-22.
5. The Court unanimously reversed Lilly's conviction and remanded the case to the
Supreme Court of Virginia to assess whether the Sixth Amendment violation was harmless
errnr. .527 U.S. at 139-40. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Scalia and Thomas each
wrote brief opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer added a concurring
opinion of his own. In the jumble of opinions, there is no five:Justice m~jority for anything
except a finding ofjurisdiction and the ultimate judgment. As a result, Lilly produced no
clear rule for determining when-or if-a nontestifying accomplice's "blame-shifting"
confession might be admitted against his criminal colleagues.
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Somewhere in a Virginia prison, 6 perhaps Ben Lilly appreciates the
irony at the heart of his case. Lilly won a new trial hecause of Mark's
absence from the witness stand. Yet neither prosecution 7 nor defense 8
really seems to have wanted Mark as a witness. At trial, and before trial,
both parties passed up opportunities to confront the reluctant accomplice. ln other words, the confrontation issue that perplexed the Court
seems, in retrospect, easily avoidable. The pretrial choices of prosecution
and defense suggest that both parties preferred a confrontation issue to a
real confrontation.
That contradiction-the parties' apparent disdain for real confrontation in the midst of a Confrontation Clause debate-may seem extraordinary. But Lilly is not unusual in that respect. lt is only the most recent in
a line of cases that have exposed, but seldom addressed, the uncomfortable irony of a Confrontation Clause doctrine that no longer seems con6. On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Lilly's conv1cuons for
ca1jacking, robbery, abduction, and related firearms offenses, finding that the
Confrontation Clause violation was harmless with respect to those charges. Lilly v.
Commonwealth, 523 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Va. 1999). It reversed the capital murder conviction
and remanded for a new trial. Id. Thereafter, Lilly entered a guilty plea to a charge of first
degree murder. In doing so, he avoided the death penalty and was sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole.
7. The prosecutor's pretrial strategy appears calculated to keep Mark off the witness
stand. The prosecutor made a quick deal to assure Barker's cooperation and testimony.
But he treated Mark differently. Shortly after Lilly's trial, Mark pied guilty to first degree
murder and received a sentence offorty-nine years. Bricffor Petitioner at 6, Lilly, 527 U.S.
116 (No. 98-5881). It seems likely that the prosecution chose to delay Mark's trial or plea
in order to deter him from taking the stand at Ben's trial, changing his story and
exonerating Ben. Sec Lisa K. Garcia, Slaying Suspect's Trial Starts Today, Roanoke Times,
Oct. 15, 1996, at Al (noting that the sequence of trials allowed "the state the option of
charging Mark Lilly as the trigger man if he change[d] his story during his brother's trial
and tric[d] to take the blame").
8. In his brief to the Supreme Court, Lilly argued that Mark was not truly unavailable
to testify, because the prosecutor could have tried and sentenced him before Ben went to
trial, thereby extinguishing Mark's Fifth Amendment claims. Lilly, 527 U.S. al 124 n.1;
Brief for Petitioner at 21. But Lilly cited nothing in the record to suggest that he raised
that o~jection al trial, that he ever questioned Mark's blanket assertion of a Fifth
Amendment privilege, or that he asked to explore tbe possibility of even limited crosscxamination.
It appears, then, that Ben Lilly made no effort at or before trial to explore
opportunities for real confrontation. Post-trial events suggest, however, that Mark might
have testified, at least about the homicide itself, with little real risk of selt~incrimination.
The record shows that Mark Lilly testified on his brother's behalf at a post-trial hearing.
Lilly, 523 S.E.2d al 212 (Kinscr,J., dissenting). Curiously, Mark's belated testimony about
the homicide included virtually nothing to suggest that-had he testified al trial-his
testimony would have created a substantial risk of self-incrimination. Mark recanted his
earlier statement implicating Ben as the killer. He claimed instead that he was vomiting at
the time and could not say who had committed the murder. Brief for Petitioner at 19,
Lilly, 527 U.S. 116 (No. 98-5881).
Of course, only the Lilly brothers know for sure whether Mark's apparent reluctance
to testify at trial reflected genuine fear of self-incrimination, or whether it was a choice
calculated to support Ben Lilly's trial strategy.
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cerned with confrontation. 9 Today's Confrontation Clause is essentially a
rule of evidence. It allows "reliable" hearsay even in the absence of incourt confrontation. 10 It excludes "unreliable" hearsay even though the
declarant may be available for such confrontation. This means that the
Court now protects the right of confrontation only through surrogates. 11
Judicial determination of reliability has become the surrogate for crossexamination. And categorical, "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are the
surrogates for any real assessment of reliability. 12
To see how far the Confrontation Clause has drifted from its moorings, consider what was debated-and what was ignored-in Lilly. In the
name of confrontation, the Court might have considered how the prosecutor could have encouraged or compelled Mark to testify without serious risk of self-incrimination, and without serious compromise to the government's future case against Mark. The Court might have considered
whether the government's pretrial tactics led to Mark's absence from the
witness stand in the first place. And, if confrontation really mattered, the
Court might have evaluated what a cross-examination of Mark would have
accomplished or whether the same information could have been produced for the jury through other means. But the Court never considered
those questions. Indeed, the parties themselves showed little interest in
9. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986) (holding that
coconspirator hearsay statements were admissible notwithstanding availability of declarant,
in a case where both prosecution and defense apparently chose not to call declarant as
witness); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 n.19 (1970) (noting that defense counsel
conceded that he could have subpoenaed declarant but had chosen not to do so); see also
Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1368-70 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant does
not waive confrontation right by declining to call available but adverse declarant to testify).
10. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court adopted the "general approach" which has guided iL~
confrontation-hearsay opinions ever since. 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). The Roberts Court
stated:
[A hearsay statement) is admissible [under the Confrontation Clause) only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in
a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. at 66. In other words, statements within "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions, like dying
declarations or business records, are automatically admissible under the Confrontation
Clause because their reliability is "inferred." Other hearsay may be admissible, but only in
exceptional cases. For a more detailed analysis and critique of the Roberts formula, see
John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination,
and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 203-19 (1999) [hereinafter
Douglass, Beyond Admissibility).
11. In many cases-like Lilly's-the Court begins with the unfortunate assumption
that confrontation is impossible where the declarant appears unavailable. See Lilly, 527
U.S. at 124 n.l. "Reliability" then becomes a surrogate for actual confrontation of the
hearsay declarant. In other cases, despite the availability of the declarant, the Court has
simply found confrontation unnecessary in light of tbe supposed reliability of the hearsay.
See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1992); Jnadi, 475 U.S. at 399-400.
12. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; see also supra note JO.

1802

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1797

themY-1 Instead, the Lilly opinions focus on the definition, limits, and
historical pedigree of the hearsay exception for statements against penal
interest. The debate over the right of confrontation was reduced to an
argument over hearsay labels. Confrontation, the procedural right expressed in the Sixth Amendment, was lost in the historical dust.
The Court unanimously reversed Lilly's conviction for capital murder, but produced no majority opinion on any Sixth Amendment issue. 14
The fractured Court reflects the decades long tension between the
Court's typically generous approach to hearsay under the Confrontation
Clause,''' and its suspicion of hearsay confessions by accomplices. 16 The
Court has addressed accomplice hearsay at least four times in recent history.17 Yet, if one were to ask the simple question, "Is an accomplice con13. Lilly's brief to the Supreme Court argued that the prosecutor's tactics were
designed to keep Mark off the witness stand. Brief for Petitioner at 22, Lilly, 527 U.S. 116
(No. 98-5881). But it does not appear that Lilly raised that o~jection at trial or before the
Supreme Court of Virginia. Lilly's petition for certiorari treated Mark as an unavailable
witness. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124 n.l.
14. In essence, the Lilly Court split in it~ effort to determine whether an accomplice's
statement~ against interest, which nonetheless implicate an accused, fall within a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception and thus can be admitted automatically under the Rolmts
formula. Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Stevens found that an accomplice's "blameshifting" out of court statements were presumptively unreliable and thus did not fall within
a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134 (plurality opinion).
Writing for three members, ChiefJustice Rehnquist contended that Mark Lilly's confession
was not a statement against interest at all. He held out the possibility that some "genuinely
self:inculpatory" accomplice confessions may fall within the firmly rooted exception for
statement~ against penal interest. le!. at 146 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in the judgment).
Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions. They argued that the
Confrontation Clause forbids use at trial of "testimonial material," including confessions to
police during custodial interrogation, unless the cleclarant is produced for crossexamination. lei. at 143 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 143-44 (Thomas,J.,
concurring in the judgment).
15. Under the formula announced in Roberts, the Confrontation Clause allows any
hearsay that falls within a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is never subject to cross-examination. 448 U.S. at 66. With the exception of
statements against interest, the Court has held-or at least suggested in dictum-that
virtually every categorical hearsay exception identified in the Federal Rules of Evidence is
"firmly rooted." See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 210 ("Except for
statement~ against interest, the Roberts formula effectively exempts from constitutional
scrutiny hearsay statement~ that bear the label of any exception recognizable by student~ of
the law of evidence.").
16. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) ("[T]he Court has spoken with one
voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that incriminate
defendants."); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968) (noting that
accomplice confessions implicating accused are "inevitably suspect").
17. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127-40; Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605
( 1994) (addressing admissibility of accomplice hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) and declining to reach Confrontation Clause issue); L11e, 476 U.S. at 541-46
(holding that trial court violated Confrontation Clause by admitting custodial confession
of accomplice incriminating defendant); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (n:jecting
Confrontation Clause challenge to admissibility of hearsay statement made by accomplice
to another inmate and implicating defendant).
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fession admissible?" the members of today's Court would provide at least
three different answers. 18 Lilly's case was closely followed by Confrontation Clause scholars in the hope that it might bring some order to this
troubled corner of Sixth Amendment doctrine. 19 But the case proved an
exercise in futility, leaving Justice Breyer to ponder an uncertain future:
"[T]he fact that we do not reevaluate the link [between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay] in this case does not end the matter. It may
leave the question open for another day." 20
The Court's Confrontation Clause formula for admitting or excluding hearsay has been subject to scholarly criticism for decades 21 and from
a variety of angles. 22 Contributing to that debate is only partly my purIn addition, the Court has decided a series of cases involving the admission of a
non testifying codefendant's confession in a joint trial. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185,
188 (1998); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987); Cruz v. New York, 481U.S.186,
193 (1987); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 123-24. Arguably, the cases in the Bruton line are
distinguishable from Lilly. In the Bruton cases, the confessions were admitted only against
the accomplice codefendants who made them. The principal question in those cases was
whether admission of the confession-or some redacted version-prt:judiced the
nonconfessing defendant.
18. See supra note 14; infra text accompanying notes 103-114.
19. Professors Margaret Berger and Richard Friedman filed an amicus brief as
counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Virginia. Both are
distinguished confrontation hearsay scholars. For examples of their work in this area see
Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal
for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 557 (1992); Richard D. Friedman,
Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. LJ. 1011 (1998). A major aim of
the brief was to convince the Court to change its general course in confrontation-hearsay
cases. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liherties Union at 29, Lilly, 527 U.S. I 16
(No. 98-5881) ("The Court could reach the proper result in this case without revisiting its
approach to the Confrontation Clause. But to do so would just be to put one more patch
on a tattered garment.").
In the brief, Professors Friedman and Berger argued for a "categorical approach"
where application of the Confrontation Clause would not depend upon the reliability of
hearsay. Rather, they contended, "the Clause states a fundamental procedural protection,
and applies categorically to certain types of hearsay." lei. at 20. One category to which the
Clause might apply, they suggested, is "testimonial" hearsay, such as court or grand jury
testimony, affidavits, or even confessions made to police. Id. at 21. Another category
might be evidence which the government had a hand in producing, like confessions or
affidavits generated by police or prosecutorial questioning. Id. at 23-24. Mark Lilly's
statements, of course, fall in both categories.
20. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 142-43 (Breyer, J., concurring).
21. A vast array of critical literature preceded Roberts. There, the Court noted "an
outpouring of scholarly commentary" and justified its own path by "the mutually critical
character of the commentary." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-68 n.9 (1980) (citing
nineteen law review articles which were, in some respect, critical of the Court's
confrontation-hearsay decisions).
22. One frequent-and, 1 believe, accurate-criticism is that a reliability based
approach simply mirrors the law of evidence, rendering the Confrontation Clause
redundant and essentially meaningless. See, e.g., Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra
note 10, at 195 ("By treating the Confrontation Clause as a rule that excludes unreliable
hearsay, the Court has doomed the rule to redundancy with the law of evidence in the
great majority of cases."); Randolph N.Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the
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pose in this Article. My aims are both narrower and broader. As the
Court did in Lilly, I want to focus narrowly on the problem of hearsay
from the reluctant accomplice: the suspect-like Mark Lilly-who "fingers" his criminal associates in a jail house confession, then invokes his
Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid testifying at trial. 23 The reluctant
accomplice is worthy of special attention for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is that his story appears so often as a critical piece of evidence in criminal trials. Most important for qur purposes, the reluctant
accomplice holds a unique place among hearsay declarants. Unlike most
declarants, his live testimony can be purchased. His silence is a bargaining chip which the prosecutor has the power to redeem if the price is
right. 24
For that reason, the problem of accomplice hearsay requires a
broader perspective than the Court has adopted in its confrontation-hear-

Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 622 (1988) (arguing that Confrontation Clause
has become a "minor adjunct of evidence law"); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler,
Constitutional Hearsay: Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the
Confrontation Clause, 81 Va. L. Rev. 149, 174 (1995) (rejecting Court's reliance on
"arcane rules of evidence" to establish constitutional doctrine).
Another criticism is that the Court essentially missed the boat when it first applied the
Confrontation Clause to exclude garden variety hearsay at all. Under this view, hearsay
declarants are not "witnesses against" the accused within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment unless they make statemenL~ in a "testimonial" setting. But when the Clause
applies to such hearsay, it applies strictly, prohibiting the use of hearsay without regard to
reliability unless the declarant is produced for cross-examination. See White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that "Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extntjudicial statemenL~ only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidaviL~, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions");
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 ( 1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that
phrase, "witnesses against him," denotes only witnesses to events who later give testimony
against accused). For a more complete discussion of this "testimonial hearsay" position,
see infra text accompanying notes 253-58.
Professor Margaret Berger has suggested a somewhat different approach, based on the
theory that a principal aim of the Confrontation Clause was to prevent the manufacturing
of evidence in secret proceedings controlled by the government. She argues that the
Clause requires a heightened standard for admitting hearsay statemenL~ elicited by
government agenL~. See Berger, supra note 19, at 561-62.
23. Throughout this Article, I will use the term "reluctant accomplice" to refer to an
accomplice who asserL~ the Fifth Amendment to avoid testifying against his criminal
confederates. A related Confrontation Clause issue arises in joint trials, where the out of
court confession of one nontestifying codefendant implicates the other defendant. See
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 123 (1968). Joint trials represent a prosecutorial
choice that forecloses most, if not all, meaningful opportunities to confront the
nontestifying accomplice. In my view, it is that choice, not the reliability or unreliability of
the hearsay, that should result in exclusion of any part of the hearsay confession that
implicates a coclefendant. See infra text accompanying note 274.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
bane) ("From the common law, we bave drawn a longstanding practice sanctioning the
testimony of accomplices against their confederates in exchange for leniency.").
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say opinions. 25 By the time a case like Lilly reaches the Court, the issue is
limited to one of admissibility: Did the trial court properly admit the
accomplice's out-of-court statement implicating the accused? 26 But hearsay does not arrive at trial by happenstance. Typically, the accomplice's
story arrives in the form of hearsay as the result of three critical pretrial
choices: the choice of the accomplice to "take the Fifth"; the choice of
the prosecutor not to immunize or entice the accomplice into live testimony; and the choice of the defense to attack the hearsay itself rather
than to question the accomplice's silence or the prosecutor's tactics. 27 In
confrontation-hearsay cases, prosecutors and defendants almost never
challenge, and courts seldom second-guess, an accomplice's blanket assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid testifying. 28 And it is
25. The Supreme Court is constrained to review the record it receives and the issues
raised in a petition for certiorari. This Article is not a criticism of the Lilly Court for failing
to address issues that were not before it. Instead, it is a criticism of the way in which the
Court's Sixth Amendment doctrine consistently removes the most important questions
from consideration.
26. All of the Court's confrontation-hearsay cases are about the admissibility of
hearsay. See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 346 (considering admissibility of hearsay statements by
child victims of sexual abuse); tdaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990) (same); Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 531 (1986) (considering admissibility of accomplice's hearsay
confession); Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56 (considering admissibility of preliminary hearing
testimony of absent declarant). Only a few cases even mention the process which led the
government to use hearsay in the first place. See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,
723-25 (1968) (excluding hearsay where government failed to produce declarant from
federal prison); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (excluding hearsay where
declarant disappeared after government released him from jail and failed to monitor him).
Very few cases even note the possibility that a defendant might have some means available
to confront a hearsay declarant. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397 (1986)
(noting that defendant could have subpoenaed declarant and cross-examined him
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 806).
27. I use the term "pretrial" to describe choices that typically occur before trial. In a
given case, however, they may come about during trial. In any event, they are choices
separate from, and typically prior to the trial court's decision to admit or exclude hearsay.
28. Lilly apparently took no steps to test his brother's blanket assertion of the Fifth
Amendment. See supra note 8. Without addressing the pretrial conduct of the prosecutor
or the defendant's opportunity to question Mark's Fifth Amendment claims, the Lilly
Court simply assumed that Mark was unavailable to testify at all. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116, 124 n.l (1999).
The record in Lilly is typical of most confrontation-hearsay cases in this respect. My
own research has not uncovered any case where the prosecutor offered an accomplice's
hearsay confession and the defendant mounted a challenge to the accomplice's assertion
of a Fifth Amendment privilege. And, for reasons explained in more detail in Part II of
this article, prosecutors have no incentive to question the scope of an accomplice's
privilege once they choose to offer hearsay in evidence. See infra text accompanying notes
213-236.
By contrast, in other contexts not involving accomplice hearsay, challenges to a
witness's broad assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege are more common. See, e.g.,
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 479 (1951) (reversing contempt conviction where
government had successfully challenged grand jury witness's assertion of privilege); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 13 F.3d 1293, t295-96 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting grand jury
witness's assertion of privilege); Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1461-62 (7th Cir.
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familiar gospel that the power to immunize a witness or to bargain in
exchange for testimony is the prosecutor's alone. 29 Courts almost never
look behind the exercise of that power, even where the prosecutor's decisions seem calculated to make confrontation impossible.'.'1° Confrontation-hearsay opinions seldom discuss these pretrial choices. Confrontation Clause scholarship has largely ignored them.'.'1 1 Yet-as Lilly
1992) (n;jecting defendant's claim that trial court failed to inquire into validity of Fifth
Amendment claim by potential defense witness).
29. E.g., United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2cl 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The cases are
legion and uniform that only the Executive can grant statutory immunity, not a court.").
The federal use-immunity statute provides that a District Court "shall issue" an order
compelling testimony, "upon the request of the United States attorney." 18 U.S.C.
§ 6003(a) (1994). The effect of such an order is to grant use immunity. See id. § 6002
("[N)o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case .... "). ln essence, then, the statute entrusL~ the
immunity-granting decision to the prosecutor.
Some decisions suggest, however, that courL~ retain the power to compel prosecutors
to exercise their immunity-granting powers in "extraordinary circumstances." E.g., Lugg,
892 F.2cl at 104. For opposing views on the power of courts to grant immunity at the
request of clefenclanL~, compare Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity
Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1266, 1280 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Sixth
Amendment) (arguing for right to have use immunity granted), with Richard L. Stone,
Note, The Case Against a Right to Defense Witness Immunity, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 139, 141
(1983) (arguing against right to have use immunity granted).
In other cases, while acknowledging that the power to grant use immunity resL~ with
the prosecutor, some courL~ have imposed burdens on the government as a consequence
of iL~ failure to immunize a witness. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 937 F.3cl 797,
806-07 (2cl Cir. 1991) (holding that exculpatory grand jury testimony was admissible at
defendant's request since grand jury witnesses were not "unavailable" fo1· c1·ossexamination by government, as they could have been immunized at trial), rev'cl, 505 U.S.
317 (1992).
30. See, e.g., Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124 n. l (declining to address prosecution's timing of
trial); cf. United States v. Perkins, 138 F.3cl 421, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to
order use immunity of potential defense witness despite witness's letter claiming threaL~ by
prosecutor). But cf. United States v. Flores, 985 F.2cl 770, 780-83 (5th Cir. 1993)
(reversing district court's decision to allow hearsay where witness's unavailability is clue
solely to invocation of Fifth Amendment in response to actual or threatened prosecution).
31. Most confrontation-hearsay scholarship focuses on the question of admissibility
and, as a result, devotes little attention to pretrial choices which frame the confrontationhearsay dilemma. Sec, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 Geo. LJ 64 I, 693-97 ( 1996) [hereinafter Amar, Sixth Amendment First
Principles) (arguing that Confrontation Clause excludes only hearsay statement~ made in
trials, depositions, or afficlaviL~); Jonakait, supra note 22, at 622 (arguing that
Confrontation Clause excludes hearsay unless prosecutor can show that cross-examination
is not reasonably likely to lead 'ju1)' to weigh the evidence more favorably to the accused");
Nesson & Benkler, supra note 22, at 173 (arguing that hearsay is admissible under
Confrontation Clause only when independently corroborated).
One exception is Professor Berger's work, which focuses on the process that creates
the hearsay statement it~elf. Berger, supra note 19, at 561-62 (arguing that Confrontation
Clause is designed in part to prevent government creation of evidence in secret). Another
exception is Professor Van Kessel's comprehensive study which justifies the hearsay rule as
necessat)' to compensate for deficiencies in the American adversarial process. Gordon Van
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demonstrates-these pretrial decisions of accomplice, prosecutor and defense determine the hearsay landscape at trial, and frame the Confrontation Clause issues that have proved so troublesome for decades.
Conversely, the treatment of hearsay at trial under the Court's Sixth
Amendment doctrine has profound impacts on these pretrial choices.
Pretrial dealings between prosecutors and accomplices are the subject of
intense and continuing debate. 32 Deals with "snitches" in exchange for
testimony have been condemned by some as an affront to truth 33 and
defended by others as essential to uncovering the most serious crimes. 34
A change in Confrontation Clause doctrine might reshape the way prosecutors deal with accomplices as potential witnesses, at least in the significant number of cases where the accomplice has "spilled" some of his story
long before trial. But the Court has never addressed this connection, and
scholars have dealt with cooperating witnesses and accomplice hearsay as
two separate worlds. 35 My effort here is to explore the natural link between the two.
Kessel, Hearsay Hazards in the American Criminal Trial: An Adversary-Oriented
Approach, 49 Hastings LJ. 477, 544 (1998). Somewhat akin to Professor Berger's
approach, Professor Van Kessel's theory would put tighter controls on hearsay created in
contacts with government investigators, but would allow expanded use of "nonadversarycreated" hearsay. Id. Professor Van Kessel notes the dangers of "party-produced"
evidence, including statements by witnesses prepared or pressured by prosecutors, and
argues that hearsay and confrontation rules "are particularly important in controlling
prosecutorial overreaching in the creation and production of testimonial evidence from
informers and accomplices." Id. at 503, 508.
32. See infra note I53.
33. As Chief Justice Warren noted in Hoffa v. United States:
This type of informer and the uses to which he was put in this case evidence a
serious potential for undermining the integrity of the tmth-finding process in the
federal courts. Given the incentives and background of [the cooperating
witness], no conviction should be allowed to stand when based heavily on his
testimony. And that is exactly the quicksand upon which these convictions
rest ....
385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); see also Barry Scheck et al., Actual
Innocence 126-57 (2000) (documenting cases of false testimony by cooperating "snitches"
and calling for mies requiring, among other steps, the recording of all conversations
between informants and police or prosecutors).
34. "Notwithstanding all the problems that accompany using criminals as witnesses,
however, the fact of the matter is that police and prosecutors cannot do without themperiod." Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as
Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1390 (I996); see also Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 3Il (noting
prosecutor's dependence on informers).
35. There is a growing literature on cooperating accomplices, including first hand
accounts from judges and trial lawyers who have experience dealing with such witnesses.
See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating ClienL~, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 69, 77-78 (1995)
(describing risks and rewards of cooperation); Trott, supra note 34, at 1398-1413
(presenting circuit judge's advice to prosecutors on negotiation with accomplice
witnesses); J. Richard Johnston, Plea Bargaining in Exchange for Testimony: Has
Singleton Really Resolved the Issues?, Crim. Just., Fall 1999, at 24 (noting the uncertainty
of such "snitching" agreemen L~ and the role of defense lawyers in reducing such
uncertainty). For an historical perspective on the practice of "snitching" in exchange for
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This Article focuses on pretrial choices: how they are affected by,
and how they might affect, our constitutional approach to hearsay from
the reluctant accomplice. This is the most realistic way to frame a complex problem. The problem of hearsay from the reluctant accomplice
poses more than a narrow question of reliability, or an even narrower
question of the historical pedigree behind the hearsay exception for
statements against penal interest. The problem involves the clash of
three interests: the government's interest in full presentation of evidence
at trial,a" the accomplice's right to avoid self-incrimination, and the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him. ln the pretrial setting,
all three players make choices that can put those interests in conflict, or
bring them into relative harmony, once the case goes to trial. ln my view,
a coherent approach to the problem of accomplice hearsay requires consideration of all three interests.
Part 1 evaluates the Court's approach on its own terms. When the
Court excludes accomplice hearsay, it acts on the premise that the accomplice's blame-shifting statements are unreliable.a 7 That premise may
make sense as a starting point. But the Court's reliability analysis ends
too soon because it fails to account for the pretrial choices that result
from an exclusionary rule. Exclusion of evidence creates a vacuum. And
prosecutors, who must shoulder the burden of proof at trial, abhor an
evidentiary vacuum. Where blame-shifting hearsay is likely to be excluded at trial, the prosecutor will seek something else to take its place.
ln most cases that "something else" will be equally blame-shifting live testimony from the same accomplice.a8 Typically, by the time of his live
testimony, the accomplice will have closed a deal with the government.
leniency, see Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 Vand. L.
Rev. I, 8-13 (I 992). Professor Weinstein's excellent study examines the recent histo1y and
current "overuse" of cooperating accomplices by prosecutors. Ian Weinstein, Regulating
the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563, 568-69 (1999). Another recent
commentator addresses the imbalance between prosecution and defense in their power to
induce cooperation. Korin K. Emg, Note, Establishing an Equal Playing Field for Criminal
DefendanL~ in the Aftermath of United States v. Singleton, 49 Duke LJ. 1371, 1400 (2000).
But none of that literature discusses accomplice hearsay.
A handful of articles, both before and after Lilly, have dealt specifically with hearsay
from accomplice declaranL~. But, like the Court, those writers have tended to address the
reliability of accomplice hearsay in isolation, without reference to broader concerns with
the reliability of accomplices as witnesses. See, e.g., Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The Future of
Codefcndant Confessions, 30 Seton Hall L. Rev. 516, 517-18 (2000); Welsh S. White,
Accomplices' Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill RL~ . .J. 753, 755
(1996).
36. Actually, the government has dual interesL~. 1t seeks evidence to prove the guilt of
the defendant. But it must do so without jeopardizing it.~ prosecution of the accomplice,
or without paying too high a price for his cooperation and testimony.
37. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 131 (1999) (plurality opinion) (arguing that
accomplice confessions which implicate an accused are "inherently unreliable"); Lee v.
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (same).
38. Of course, the practice of seeking testimony from cooperating accomplices is not
limited to cases where such testimony replaces inadmissible hearsay. Today's federal
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His live testimony will be well compensated and his story well rehearsed.
When it comes to confrontation, this may be the preferred result. 39 lf the
accomplice testifies, the defendant can cross-examine. But tested by the
Court's own standard of reliability, there is little reason to conclude that
even the cross-examined testimony of most accomplices is inherently
more reliable than most accomplice hearsay, especially after the prosecutor has purchased and polished that testimony in preparation for trial.
In fact, the reliability equation may be even more complex. Excluding accomplice hearsay may have unintended "ripple effects" in the pretrial setting. 40 When the law excludes hearsay as an option, it increases
the prosecutor's need for live testimony to prove the same facts. That
adds to the bargaining power of the reluctant accomplice and drives up
the price the prosecutor must pay for his testimony. 41 In a perverse way,
therefore, excluding accomplice hearsay may actually diminish the reliability of courtroom testimony, by adding to the accomplice's incentive to
favor the government. This is not to say, of course, that the Court should
admit all blame-shifting hearsay. But if reliability is the Court's concern, I
question whether it accomplishes anything by excluding blame-shifting
hearsay in favor of equally blame-shifting live testimony from an accomplice who has joined forces with the government. 42
Part II shifts the focus from reliability to confrontation. That Part
considers whether the Court's approach promotes pretrial choices which
are likely to bring about effective confrontation of the accomplice at trial.
The Court's doctrine falls short here as well. Even after Lilly, the Court's
practice is overrun with cooperating accomplices who testify in an effort to get relief from
guideline sentences. See Weinstein, supra note 35, at 563-64.
39. Indeed, the Court's principal justification for allowing live testimony of
cooperating accomplices is that confrontation itself will uncover the truth. See Hoffa, 385
U.S. at 311 ("The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system leave the
veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony
to be detennined by a properly instructed jury.").
40. The notion that rules of constitutional criminal procedure may have secondary,
unintended, and often counterintuitive consequences has been demonstrated in a variety
of contexts, most elegantly by Professor Stuntz in the Fourth Amendment arena. See
William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1265, 1266-67 (1999) (arguing that Fourth Amendment privacy protectio'ns tend to
channel police investigation into areas where residents enjoy less privacy, especially poor
and minority communities); William]. Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the Exclusionary
Rule, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 443, 451-55 (1997) (arguing that Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule skews criminal litigation by, among other things, diverting defense
resources from central factual contests).
41. Usually the higher "price" takes the form of a more lenient sentence
recommendation, or a reduced charge. See infra text accompanying notes 204-209.
42. Ironically, in Lilly, the jury which heard Mark Lilly's "unreliable" hearsay also
heard equally blame-shifting testimony from the second accomplice, Gary Barker, who
testified pursuant to a plea agreement which allowed him to avoid a potential death
sentence. Barker's story-blaming Ben Lilly for the shooting-was essentially the same as
Mark's "unreliable" hearsay. See Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 528-29, 534 (Va.
1998) (noting that Barker's testimony corroborated Mark's statements).
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doctrine neither predictably excludes nor predictably admits accomplice
hearsay. 48 However, one thing is predictable under the Court's analysis:
The admissibility of a given statement depends upon its reliability. And
reliability, in turn, depends largely upon the hearsay label attached to the
statement. 44 By treating the Confrontation Clause as an exclusionary rule
for unreliable hearsay, the Court has marginalized the procedural
rights-in-court, face-to-face confrontation and cross-examinationwhich the Clause was designed to protect in the first place. The Court's
approach invites both prosecutors and defendants to ignore confrontation in their pretrial decisions because they both know that the ultimate
admissibility of hearsay will depend upon something else: its supposed
reliability.
The impact of that approach is especially troublesome when it comes
to prosecutors. ln most American jurisdictions, they have the power to
immunize, and thereby compel, live testimony. 4 r. But the Court's focus
on reliability gives them peculiar incentives when it comes to the exercise
43. Lilly failed to achieve a majority on the critical issue of whether any accomplice
confessions may fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. At best, then, Lilly is
precedent for a narrow constitutional rule excluding blame-shifting, out-of-court
statements that do not genuinely inculpate the declarant. See john G. Douglass, Balancing
Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2130 (2000) [hereinafter
Douglass, Balancing Hearsay] ("[Lilly] leaves lower court.~ with considerable leeway to
admit 'genuinely self-inculpato1y' hearsay statement.~ from accomplices."); Rosenberg,
supra note 35, at 549 ("Lilly was unable to muster a 1rn!iority on the critical questions of
whether statements against penal interest are 'firmly rooted hearsay exceptions,' and
whether, even if they are not, they may have 'sufficient indicia of reliability' to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause."); Note, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases:
Criminal Law and Procedure, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 233, 241 (1999) [hereinafter Note, 1999
Supreme Court Tenn] (arguing Lilly "should have no precedential impact on either noncustodial confessions or custodial confessions that are genuinely self-inculpato1y"). ln
addition, under the Roberts formula, accomplice hearsay will still be admissible if it carries
other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Robert.~. 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980).
44. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 2 l 0-l 4 (noting the "primacy
of labels" in the Court's confrontation-hearsay analysis); Note, l 999 Supreme Court Term,
supra note 43, at 243 (explaining that, even after Lilly, "the constitutional right of
confrontation may hinge on what label the prosecution chooses to put on the hearsay
statement").
45. The federal immunity statute provides that, upon application of the United States
Attorney, the court "shall" issue an order compelling a witness to testify. 18 U.S.C. § 6003.
The effect is to grant "use immunity" for testimony compelled by the order. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 6002-6003 ( l 994). See generally Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 44 l, 443-44 ( l 972)
(tracing hist01y of power to compel testimony). Prosecutors may accomplish a similar
result through contract, by entering into an "immunity agreement" with a cooperating
witness. See United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1562 (I Ith Cir. 1994) (noting that
"basic principles of contract law" govern immunity agreements).
Unlike most states, Virginia does not have a comprehensive use immunity statute
applicable to most offenses. A~ a result, the Lilly prosecutor had fewer options to induce or
compel Mark to testify. Of course, he still had the power to induce testimony through a
plea bargain. He exercised that power to turn Ga1y Barker into a witness, but withheld it
from Mark Lilly, leaving him on the sideline until Ben's trial was over. See supr;1 note 7.
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of that power. Where there is a realistic likelihood that hearsay will be
admitted based solely on its reliability, the prosecutor has little incentive
to consider immunity or other tactics aimed at bringing about confrontation. Instead, the Court's approach offers the prosecutor an incentive to
structure her hearsay arguments-and perhaps even the hearsay evidence
itself46-to fit within the Court's approved hearsay labels. 47 She can then
offer the hearsay in evidence while ignoring the potential for-or even
discouraging-live testimony from the accomplice. Where successful "labeling" seems less likely, on the other hand, the prosecutor's best option
is to forget the hearsay and buy the loyalty of the accomplice as a cooperating witness for trial. Without a cooperation agreement to maintain control of the accomplice, a "cold" grant of immunity is too great a risk for
the prosecutor. 48 Under the Court's approach, nothing promotes a third
option: presenting hearsay along with the live, unvarnished testimony of
46. Mark Lilly's testimony was taped, so that it was reproduced verbatim at trial. But
much, probably most, hearsay is recounted at trial by a third party, typically by the police
officer who arrested and interrogated the accomplice. At trial, it is related only in
substance, not verbatim. Under the Court's hearsay "labeling" approach, the officer's
characterization of the accomplice's statements can make a difference when it comes to
admissibility. For example, an accomplice's hearsay statement, "Ben and I agreed to kill
the victim," may be regarded as genuinely self inculpatory and therefore admissible. By
contrast, the hearsay statement, "Ben said we should kill the victim and I went along," may
be considered-by some courts at least-as primarily blame shifting and not admissible. A
testifying officer without verbatim notes and with a recollection only of the substance of
the confession might truthfully report the statement either way. Ironically, the officer who
testifies to the first, more general description, is more likely to see the court admit the
hearsay. The more specific version is less likely to pass muster under the Confrontation
Clause.
47. Before Lilly, prosecutors enjoyed a high degree of success in offering hearsay by
squeezing it within traditional hearsay exceptions, even when it did not precisely fit within
the exception's traditional boundaries. This process of "pigeonholing" new hearsay within
old labels allows prosecutors to take advantage of the automatic admission of "firmly
rooted" hearsay under the Roberts formula. See supra note 10. Several of the Court's
opinions-at least implicitly-endorse such pigeonholing. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 357-58 (1992) (admitting hearsay statements of child abuse victim as
spontaneous declarations and as statements for purposes of medical diagnosis, even
though lower courts had expanded such exceptions beyond traditional limits); Bourjaily v.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178 (1987) (admitting coconspirator statements as within
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception while modifying the exception itself to eliminate
foundational requirement of independent evidence of conspiracy). For a more detailed
discussion of this "pigeonholing" phenomenon and its tendency to liberalize the admission
of hearsay, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note IO, at 210-14.
Lilly will not end the practice of pigeonholing hearsay. At most, it will narrow the
target for prosecutors who seek to pigeonhole an accomplice's confession within the
exception for statements against penal interest. See infra text accompanying notes
227-228.
48. Statistics suggest that prosecutors are increasingly wary of obtaining testimony
through a "cold" grant of use immunity-that is, by obtaining an order compelling
testimony under 18 U .S.C. § 6003, without entering into a cooperation agreement with the
accomplice. Requests by federal prosecutors for § 6003 orders increased almost every year
from 1973 through 1986, the year before the Sentencing Guidelines took effect. After
peaking at 2550 in 1986, such requests declined in number every year through 1996, when
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an immunized accomplice who has not become a sycophant of the prosecutor. ln other words, the Court's reliability formula promotes a choice
between unconfronted hearsay or unrealistic confrontation. Neither
seems especially satisfactory from the perspective of a court or jury
charged with finding the truth.
Jn the case of the reluctant accomplice, the rules of evidence compound the confrontation problem. Statements against penal interest are
admissible only where the declarant is "unavailable." 49 That rule was designed to create a preference for live testimony." 0 If the confessing accomplice is available, the theory goes, he should be called as a witness
and his hearsay excluded. But for a prosecutor who possesses a favorable
hearsay statement from an accomplice who will make an unsavory or unpredictable witness at trial, the rule may have the opposite effect. It gives
the prosecutor an incentive to keep the witness "unavailable."
When considered in conjunction with the law of evidence, then, the
Court's approach to accomplice hearsay may create incentives for prosecutors to avoid confrontation of the accomplice. As for the defendant,
since admissibility is purely a function of reliability, he can raise a confrontation challenge to hearsay even though actual confrontation with his
accomplice is the last thing he wants to happen at trial. He can assert the
right with no concern that he may really have to exercise it.
Part 111 offers a different approach to the problem of confronting
the reluctant accomplice, an approach designed to encourage pretrial
decisions more likely to result in real confrontation at trial, without increasing the pressure on prosecutors to purchase live testimony. The
Sixth Amendment says nothing about reliability; indeed, it says nothing
about hearsay."' I argue that the Confrontation Clause is not an excluthere were only 1493 request~. Bureau of .Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of .Justice,
Source book of Criminal .Justice Statistics 418 tbl.5.1 (1996).
By contrast, since the Guidelines took effect, prosecutors have made increased use of
plea and cooperation agreements. The Guidelines grant prosecutors sole discretion to file
a sentence reduction motion based on a defendant's "substantial assistance" to the
governmem in the investigation or prosecution of others. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5Kl.1 (2000). Such motions typically follow plea agreement~ by cooperating
accomplices who agree to testify against their confederates. In 1989, the first year data was
collected, only 3.5% of federal sentencings involved downward departures based on
"substantial assistance"; by the mid 1990s, that figure had risen and held steady at around
19%. Weinstein, supra note 35, at 563-64 (citing Sentencing Comm'n, 1996 Sourcebook
of Federal Sentencing Statistics 39 fig.G (1996)).
Jn sum, perhaps largely because of the powers granted prosecutors under section
5Kl. I, we have seen a gradual, but substantial, shift in prosecutorial tactics away from
cmnjJUlsion of testimony and toward fmrchase of testimony.
49. Fed. R. Evie!. 804(a), 804(b)(3).
50 . .John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence: Hornbook Series 389 (5th ed. 1999).
51. "The language [of the Confrontation Clause) is particularly ill-chosen if what was
intended was a prohibition on the use of any hearsay .... " Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95
( 1970) (Harlan, .J., concurring).
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sionary rule for unreliable hearsay. The laws of evidence 52 and of Due
Process-~ 3 are intended to handle that chore. Instead, I suggest, the Confrontation Clause creates a procedural right to challenge prosecution evidence, whether that evidence takes the form oflive testimony at trial or of
hearsay. When hearsay is admitted in evidence, regardless of its reliability, the Clause allows a defendant to test that evidence through an adversarial process. 54
In the specific case of the reluctant accomplice, I argue, the Clause
requires prosecutors to use reasonably available means to promote effective testing of the accomplice's story. At a minimum, the right of confrontation means that a prosecutor cannot use hearsay while pursuing
pretrial strategies which unnecessarily limit the opportunity for cross-examination. 55 It means that a prosecutor cannot simply ignore her immu52. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the law of evidence in every state contain
prohibitions 011 the use of hearsay. See, e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 802. In large measure,
exceptions to the hearsay rule are intended to designate categories of hearsay statements
that are sufficiently reliable to be placed before the trier of fact even in the absence of
cross-examination. Strong, supra note 50, at 389.
Whether the recognized, categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule actually succeed in
separating reliable from unreliable hearsay is, of course, subject to question:
[M]any exceptions have worn too thin to remain convincing ....
Consider, for instance, the dying declarations exception, which arises from
the cultural experience of "facing one's Maker" as a moment of truth .... Dying
declarations no longer evoke the image of a person making a solemn statement
on the death bed, before a confessor, surrounded by family members. Instead,
we more commonly envision a drugged, whispering patient in an impersonal
hospital, alone except for a detective holding a little black book and straining to
hear a name gasped against the flow of pure oxygen. The contemporary image
lacks the comforting effect of the traditional one.
As knowledge of human psychology becomes more sophisticated and widely
disseminated, that discomfort extends to more of the hearsay exceptions. Do we
still believe that people excited by an upsetting event are more likely to tell the
truth than to exonerate themselves ... ? Do we still believe that a plaintiff is more
likely to tell the truth to the physician hired to testify as an expert at the plaintiffs
trial than to any other person whose testimony does not fit another hearsay
exception?
Nesson & Benkler, ;upra note 22, at 156-57. Ironically, the Court has attached it~ own
constitutional standard of reliability to the questionable standards set by "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
53. In his seminal work on the Sixth Amendment, Professor Westen argues that the
Due Process Clause, not the Confrontation Clause, is the proper source of the
constitutional protection against unreliable evidence. Peter Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
567, 598 (1978). Evidence is constitutionally admissible, he contends, if it "possesses
'sufficient aspects of reliability' to be intelligently evaluated by the jury for its proper
weight." Id. (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) ).
54. In an earlier article, I explored the constitutional pedigree of that right, which I
have described as a "right to confront hearsay." Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note
10, at 224-40.
55. Decisions which affect the opportunity for confrontation may include the choice
of the order of multiple prosecutions, the joinder or severance of multiple defendants, the
timing of trials and sentencings, and the offering or withholding of plea agreements.
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nity-granting powers where use immunity is the only means to bring
about confrontation. In addition, at the risk of Fifth Amendment blasphemy, I argue that it means taking a hard look at the accomplice's blanket assertion of a privilege not to testify. Further, it requires defendants
to avail themselves of procedures for testing hearsay, at the risk of forfeiting the right. 56 Under this approach the admissibility of hearsay-as far
as the Confrontation Clause is concerned-has nothing to do with reliability. Instead, courts wield the constitutional power to exclude hearsay
only as a sanction to compel the prosecution to act where necessary to
allow for fair testing of hearsay.
One result of this approach is to change the incentives of prosecution and defense in the pretrial setting. Reliability is no longer the relevant Sixth Amendment battleground. If a prosecutor wants to use hearsay, then she must find a way to allow for fair adversarial challenge. If a
defendant asserts his confrontation right, then he should seek to exercise
that right. If we give both parties a reason to seek confrontation, rather
than merely to debate hearsay labels, we may find that the initial silence
of the reluctant accomplice is less of a barrier than we presume it to be.
ln many cases, without resorting to purchase or polish, we can have
confrontation. 57

56. Of course, the first step is to demand confrontation. And the first step in
confronting the accomplice-declarant is to put him on the witness stand, and attempt
cross-examination. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 806 (entitling party against whom hearsay is
admitted to examine declarant "as if under cross-examination"). \\'here the accomplice
asserts a Fifth Amendment privilege, I contend, defendant must take the additional step of
proffering-out of the jury's presence-at least the basic subject matter of his intended
cross-examination, so that the court may make an informed decision whether proposed
cross-examination actually conflicts with the accomplice's right against se!f:incrimination.
See infra text accompanying notes 310-329.
57. Confrontation is, of course, not possible where accomplices are tried together in a
single trial. In such cases, the Court has held, a defendant is denied his right of
confrontation when a nontestifying codefendant's hearsay confession contains statemenL~
implicating him in the crime. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
The approach to accomplice confessions outlined in this Article would not change the
result in cases like Bruton. Indeed, the approach proposed here would strengthen the
position of defendanL~ objecting to such hearsay. Under the Court's approach, some
accomplice-codefendant confessions will be admissible, Bruton notwithstanding, because
the confessions meet the Court's test for "reliability." By contrast, l would exclude the
accomplice confession not because it is unreliable-though perhaps it is. lnstead, l would
exclude the hearsay confession simply because the government, by its affirmative choice to
indict and try the defendants together, has made it impossible to confront the reluctant
accomplice.
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1.

THE DARK SIDE OF THE COURT'S RELJABILl'TY FORMULA:

A

CoNSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCE FOR THE VARNISHED TRUTH

Accomplices make the best witnesses. After all, the first qualification
for "witnessing" is perception." 8 Since most criminal activity is carried
out in secret, accomplices have a unique advantage: They see and hear
the defendant plan and commit the crime. For that reason, accomplices
often provide the most complete and most compel.ling evidence in a
criminal case. Sometimes, they provide the only direct, eyewitness account. Without information from cooperating accomplices, many crimes
would never be prosecuted at all.''Y
Accomplices also make the worst witnesses. 60 They are, by their own
admission, criminals. Worse yet, they are mercurial criminals: turncoats
who have sold their loyalty to savethemselves. 61 Accomplice-witnesses are
mercenaries. The government purchases their testimony in a court sanctioned process that would itself be criminal if pursued by anyone other
than the prosecutor. 62 Tht;n their testimony is prepared and polished
behind closed doors before the government marches them out to face a
jury.68
58. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 ("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
n1atter.").

59. See, e.g., United States v. Vl'hite, 27 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (noting
that without the power to offer inducements in exchange for testimony, "the government
would be unable to ... effectively proceed in the thousands of cases each year in which it
relies on witnesses who testify in return for leniency"); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d
534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (noting government reliance on inducements in exchange for
testimony).
60. Often, "snitches" are believed only insofar as their testimony can be corroborated
by independent evidence, and then only with reluctance and disdain. Sometimes, even
when accomplice-witnesses are believed, their mere participation taints a prosecution to
the point that a judge or jury rejects the case out of disgust. See Trott, supra note 34, at
1388.
61. See id. at 1383 ("Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what
they want, especially when what they want is to get out of trouble with the law.");
Weinstein, supra note 35, at 565 ("Because disloyalty is at the heart of cooperation,
snitching engenders almost universal moral ambivalence .... ").
62. Under federal law, under most circumstances and for most litigants, offering
anything of value to a witness in exchange for testimony is a criminal offense. See 18
U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2) (1994). A recent flurry of federal cases has confirmed that federal
prosecutors are, in effect, exempt from that statute, at least with respect to most forms of
inducement. See, e.g., United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 306 (4th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Albanese, 195 F.3d
389, 394 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999)
(en bane) (Singleton II).
63. See Trott, supra note 34, at 1396 ("If you decide to call an informer as a witness,
you will end up spending much time with him preparing for his testimony."); Van Kessel,
supra note 31, at 508 ("Defense attorneys often complain that prosecutors and other law
enforcement officials in preparing their witnesses use suggestive techniques to mold or
strengthen their testimony.").
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Simultaneously prized and despised, accomplices are among the
most ubiquitous players on the stage of the modern criminal trial. And
their use as government witnesses has grown in recent years. 64 Still, they
are among the most reluctant witnesses. Out of concern that their words
will become the tool of their own prosecution, or out of an even more
paralyzing fear of retribution from former colleagues in crime/'5 most
accomplice-witnesses would prefer to avoid the stage altogether."" Since
the Fifth Amendment often shields an accomplice from the duty to testify, juries seldom hear from him unless his story is coerced through a
grant of immunity, induced by a favorable plea bargain, or-as in Lillypresented to the jury in the form of hearsay.
The Court's treatment of live testimony from the reluctant accomplice differs substantially from its approach to hearsay. As Lilly demonstrates, the Court remains leery of accomplice hearsay. m By contrast, the
Court has set few boundaries to limit live testimony from even the most
unsavory of accomplices. 68 Perhaps that difference in treatment makes
sense if we set out to protect the procedural right of in-court confrontation and cross-examination. But as the Court's Confrontation Clause
doctrine has drifted farther from the protection of procedural rights, and
64. Sec John Gleeson, Supervising Criminal Investigations: The Proper Scope of the
Supervisory Power of Federal.Judges, 5 J.L. & Pol'y 423, 424 n.9 (1997) (noting increase in
cooperating defendants brought about by federal Sentencing Guidelines); Weinstein,
supra note 35, at 563-64 (same).
65. Fear of retaliation, more than fear of prosecution, may be the biggest inhibitor of
cooperation hy accomplices. See Steven S. Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 Minn. L.
Rev. 669, 7M (1980).
66. As Lilly demonstrates, however, it is not uncommon for an accomplice to discover
the value of silence belatedly. In the first hours following arrest, in the company of skilled
interrogators, suspects regularly "finger" their criminal associates in hopes of winning the
favor of police. Only after a night's sleep and a conference with counsel do they realize
that they may have given away information that they could have sold for a premium. The
Fifth Amendment, and the rule against hearsay, then become the accomplice's most
valrn1ble bargaining chips. If the prosecutor wants to use his statements to convict another,
she must pay to turn the accomplice into a witness.
67. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. I 16, 131-34, 143-45 (1999). Three times in the last
fifteen years, the Court has considered constitutional or evidentiary objections to
accomplice hearsay. It has rejected, or at least limited, the evidence each time. See id.;
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530,
546-47 (1986).
68. Prosecutors violate the Due Process Clause, not to mention the rules of ethics, if
they knowingly offer pe1jured testimony, Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), or if they knowingly allow false evidence to go
uncorrected after it appears at trial. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). But the
Court has found no Due Process violation when the government makes use of paid
informers to gather evidence and to testify, even when such witnesses testify to avoid
criminal charges or obtain their own freedom from jail. See Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 311 (1966). Indeed, the Court's sanctioning of the practice is more than a
century old. Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1892); The Whiskey Cases, 99
U.S. 594, 599 (1878).

2001]

CONFRONTING THE RELUCTANT ACCOMPUCE

1817

toward a rule of evidence based on reliability, that explanation becomes
less satisfying.
A. The Court's Approach: Reliability and Hearsay Labels

1. Hearsay Labels as Surrogates for Confrontation: The Ohio v. Roberts
"General Approach." - For over a century, the Court has struggled to
make sense out of hearsay under the Sixth Amendment. 09 On its face,
the Confrontation Clause seems simple enough. The accused has a right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him." 70 At trial, that means
he has a right to be present, 71 to physically see, hear, and be seen by the
prosecution's witnesses, 72 and-most critically in the Court's view-to
cross-examine those witnesses. 73 But when the prosecution offers hearsay, the "witness against" the accused is a hearsay declarant74 who typically
never enters the courtroom. 75 The accused, it would appear, has no opportunity to confront that declarant-witness.
69. The problem of applying the Confrontation Clause to hearsay is among the most
perplexing dilemmas of constitutional criminal procedure. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note
19, at 1012 (calling issue a "pervasive perplexity"); Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the
Confrontation Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207, 207 (1984) (describing
issue as "intractable problem").
70. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
71. Kentuckyv. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1987).
72. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846-47 (1990). In Craig, the Court found no
Confrontation Clause violation in a state-court procedure which allowed a child witness to
testify via live closed-circuit television, subject to full cross-examination, where the trial
court made a finding that the child would suffer severe emotional distress if required to
testify in the physical presence of the defendant, her alleged abuser. Id. at 840-42. Noting
that physical confrontation was among the "core of the values" protected by the Clause, the
Court nevertheless held that the right could give way in the face of another "important
public policy" as long as the reliability of the testimony was assured. ld. at 847-50.
73. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231-33 (l 988) (per curiam) (finding
violation of confrontation right where rape defendant was denied opportunity to crossexamine victim regarding cohabitation with boyfriend); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
316-18 (1974) (finding confrontation violation where defendant was not permitted to
cross-examine witness regarding possible bias).
74. Whether some, or all, hearsay declarants should be regarded as "witnesses against"
the accused for Sixth Amendment purposes is, of course, a major source of controversy.
See infra text accompanying notes 253-258. For the moment at least, the Court insists that
hearsay declarants are, in fact, "witnesses against" the defendant. See White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 352-53 (1992) (rejecting a claim, advanced by the Department of Justice, that
only declarants who provide formal "testimonial" statements are "witnesses against" the
accused).
75. Of course, some hearsay declarants do testify at trial. When that occurs, the Court
has not applied the Confrontation Clause as a rule excluding hearsay. Rather, the Court
has simply treated testifying declarants like other witnesses. Defendant's right is to
"confront" and to cross-examine them. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560
(1988); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626 (1971); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164
(1970). In my view, these "testifying declarant" cases signal a doctrinal approach that
should apply to all hearsay. lf declarants are "witnesses," then the Clause provides the right
to treat them like witnesses. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l 0, at 226-27
(discussing testifying-declarant cases); infra text accompanying notes 259-263.
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Thus, the right of confrontation seems inherently at odds with hearsay. Yet both English and American criminal courts admitted some forms
of hearsay well before and long after ratification of the Sixth Amendment. 7<i Indeed, it took more than a hundred years before the confrontation-hearsay dilemma even surfaced in the United States Supreme
Court. 77 From the start, for both practical and historical reasons, 71:! the
Court declined to apply the Confrontation Clause as a rule prohibiting all
hearsay against criminal defendants. Instead, in its first constitutional
brush with hearsay in 1895, the Court allowed the evidence where "the
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved" through actual
cross-examination of the declarant in an earlier proceeding. 7 !l
Eighty-five years later, in an opinion far more sweeping than necessary, the Court spelled out a formula to determine when hearsay satisfies
the "substance" of the Sixth Amendment. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Court
reasoned that the "underlying purpose" of the confrontation right is "to
augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant
an effective means to test adverse evidence."l:!O Since "accuracy" is the
goal, the Court continued, the Clause allows hearsay that is "marked with
such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason
of the general rule.' "l:!I Next, the Roberts Court married the constitutional measure of "trustworthiness" to the law of evidence: "[C] ertain
hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of
virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of the
constitutional protection."'!:!:.! Finally, the Court summed up its "general
approach" to hearsay under the Sixth Amendment in a formula that has
dominated confrontation-hearsay analysis ever since:
[A hearsay statement] is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a
76. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (noting that "from time
immemorial [dying declarations] have been treated as competent testimony"). For a more
detailed view of the development of hearsay rules before and during the American
constitutional period, see .James W. Jennings, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A
New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Tl"ials, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 746-47
( 1965) (" [T] he established [hearsay] exceptions had gone through a gradual and at times
confusing development by the l 790's, and others were still in the process of being
relined."); see also 5.John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law§ 1364, at
12-28 (James H. Chadbourn ed. 1974) (tracing history of hearsay rule from 1500s).
77. See Mal/ox, 156 U.S. at 240-44.
78. The Ma/lox Court recognizecl that some hearsay had to be permitted, and
historically had been permitted, "simply from the necessities of the case." Id. at 244.
7Y. Id. In Mattox, defendant had been twice tried for murder. His first conviction was
reversed on appeal and his second trial resulted in a hung jury. Before his third trial, two
government witnesses died. The trial court admitted the court reporter's transcript of
their testimony from the first trial. Id. at 237-40. The Supreme Court found no
confrontation violation, principally because cross-examination at the earlier trial preserved
"the substance of the constitutional protection." Id. at 244.
80. 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980).
81. Id. (quoting Snyder v. MassachusetL~, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)).
82. Id. at 66 (quoting Mal/ox, 156 U.S. at 244).
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case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 83
Thus, in the Court's Sixth Amendment world, reliability is the surrogate for confrontation, and "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions are surrogates for reliability.
2. Accomplice Confessions Under the Roberts Formula. - The Roberts
formula has proved convenient-probably too convenient-for courts
faced with confrontation challenges to prosecution hearsay. Where hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception, there is no need for separate
constitutional scrutiny. By determining admissibility under the law of evidence, the court automatically determines admissibility under the Sixth
Amendment. 84 In the two decades since Roberts, the Court has made the
process even easier by identifying as "firmly rooted" virtually any hearsay
exception with a name recognizable to students of the law of evidence. 85
As a result, the Confrontation Clause has posed little impediment during
a period of unprecedented expansion in the world of admissible hearsay.80 Arguably, the Court's approach to confrontation has even accelerated that expansion. 87
83. Id.
84. Literally applied, the &berts formula does not provide for automatic admission of
hearsay within a firmly rooted exception. Roberts says that reliability "can be inferred
without more" in cases of such hearsay. Id. It does not say that reliability "must be"
inferred. Nevertheless, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have treated
admissibility as automatic, once hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception. See, e.g.,
\\lhite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992).
85. Only once with respect to the "residual" or "catch-all" exception-which is not
really a categorical hearsay exception at all, see Fed. R. Evid. 807-has a majority of the
Court declared that a hearsay exception is not firmly rooted. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 8I7-18 (1990). ln its holdings or in dictum, the Court has blessed the firm roots of
the exceptions for coconspirator statements, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987), spontaneous declarations, White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8, statements for purposes of
medical diagnosis, id., public records, &berts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8, business records, id.,
dying declarations, id., and prior testimony, id. Lower courts have filled most of the gaps.
See, e.g., Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir. 1995) (recorded recollection);
United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 42-43 {1st Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.
Veltmann, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493-94 (11th Cir. 1993) (statements regarding declarant's state of
mind); United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1525 (5th Cir. 1992) (statements by an agent);
Williams v. Melton, 733 F.2d 1492, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (res gestae exception).
86. A variety of factors, principally the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975, have brought about a significant liberalization of the hearsay mies in the last
quarter century. See Ronald]. Allen, A Response to Professor Friedman: The Evolution of
the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 797, 800 (1992); Faust F. Rossi,
The Silent Revolution, in The Litigation Manual: A Primer for Trial Lawyers 640, 645-53
(John G. Koetl ed., 2d ed. 1989). In an earlier article, 1 argued that-contrary to popular
perceptions-the admissibility of hearsay has expanded more rapidly in criminal than in
civil litigation, and more rapidly in favor of prosecutors than criminal defendanL~.
Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 43, at 2106-33.
87. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 210-14.
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The process has proved remarkably efficient except for one glaring
exception: accomplice confessions. Since Roberts, the Court has addressed accomplice confessions three times. 88 It has yet to tell us how
they fit within the Roberts formula. In Lee v. Illinois, the trial court relied
on an accomplice's jailhouse confession implicating Lee in a murder. 89
On appeal, the state characterized the hearsay as a statement against penal interest.9° A sharply divided Court reversed Lee's conviction. In a
brief footnote, the Court simply brushed aside the Roberts formula, finding that the hearsay category of statements against penal interest "defines
too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis." 91 Eight
years later, in Williamson v. United States, the Court faced a similar case
where accomplice confessions had been admitted under Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b) (3) as statements against penal interestY 2 There the
Court avoided the constitutional issue by narrowing the application of
the federal hearsay exception itselfY~ Nevertheless, the Court signaled
the likely constitutional result under the Roberts formula when it noted in
dictum that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatorywhich our reading of Rule 804(b) (3) requires-is itself one of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement admissible
under the Confrontation Clause." 94 In short, the Court suggested that if
the accomplice statement legitimately falls within the hearsay exception,
it will satisfy the Sixth Amendment as well.9 5
Roberts, Lee, and even Williamson left the lower courts in a muddle.
The federal circuits split in their effort to determine whether the hearsay
exception for statements against interest was "firmly rooted."% State
88. Sec Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999); Williamson v. United States, 512
U.S. 594, 605 (1994) (declining to reach Confrontation Clause issue); Lee v. Illinois, 476
U.S. 530, 546 (1986) (holding that trial court violated Confrontation Clause by admitting
custodial confession of accomplice incriminating defendant). A clecaclc before Roberts, a
divided Court n::jcctccl a Confrontation Clause challenge to a hearsay statement made by
an accomplice, not to the police, but to another inmate. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 74
(1970).
89. 476 U.S. at 531.
90. lei. at 544 n.5.
91. lei.
92. 512 U.S. at 599-600.
93. Willirmirnn held that Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3), the exception for
statemenL~ against interest, only encompasses those portions of an accomplice's narrative
that arc "genuinely seJf:inculpatory." lei. at 600-01, 605.
94. Id. at 605 (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 543).
95. At least one commentator disagrees with that interpretation of Williamson. John J.
Capowski, StatcmcnL~ Against Interest, Reliability, and the Confrontation Clause, 28 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 471, 479-80 (1997) (contending that, even after Willia11Lwn, cotirl~ should not
view the exception for statements against penal interest as "firmly rooted").
96. Compare, e.g., United States v. Keltner, 147 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 1998)
(admitting statemenL~ against interest as within a firmly rooted hearsay exception),
Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3cl 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1997) (same), United States v. Trenkler, 61
F.3d 45, 62 (lst Cir. 1995) (same), and United States v. York, 933 F.2cl 1343, 1363 (7th Cir.
1991) (same), with Crespin v. New Mexico, 144 F.3cl 641, 648-49 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting
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courts were similarly divided. 97 Some lower courts skirted the issue, admitting accomplice hearsay case by case on the basis of a confusing array
of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 98 Others seemed disinclined to permit such hearsay.9 9
Then came Lilly. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that Mark
Lilly's confession fit easily within the Roberts formula. 100 Mark's tape recorded statement, taken as a whole, clearly implicated him in a robbery
and an abduction, possibly even a homicide. Applying Virginia evidence
law, the court found that Mark's entire statement properly fell within Virginia's hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, despite
the fact that some portions were self-serving attempts to shift blame toward his brother. 101 Further, the court unanimously held, the exception
for statements against penal interest is firmly rooted and, therefore,
Mark's hearsay statements were admissible under Roberts. 102
The United States Supreme Court reversed, unanimously. 103 But the
Court was far from unanimous in its application of Roberts. Speaking for
four members, Justice Stevens wrote that accomplice statements which
shift or spread blame to a defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception and are, in fact, presumptively unreliable. 104 Speaking for
·three-or perhaps four 105-members, Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted
that "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements against interest, even those
that statements against interest are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception), LaGrand
v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (same), and United States v. Flores, 985
F.2d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 1993) (same). A few courts had chosen a middle ground,
suggesting that some subcategory of statements against interest might qualify as "firmly
rooted." E.g., United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1994).
97. Compare People v. Newton, 966 P.2d 563, 574 (Colo. 1998) (holding that
exception for statements against interest is not firmly rooted), Franqui v. Florida, 699
So.2d 1312, 1319 (Fla. 1997) (same), and State v. Kimble, 688 So.2d 552, 564-65 (La. Ct.
App. 1996) (same), with People v. Wilson, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(same), and Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998) (holding exception is
firmly rooted).
98. See, e.g., Latine v. Mann, 25 F.3d 1162, 1167 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding statement
trnstworthy where accomplice spoke to friend, with little time to fabricate, and statement
inculpated accomplice as well as defendant); United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522,
530-31 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding statement trustworthy where corroborated by independent
evidence and closely intertwined with self-inculpatory statements); State v. Wilson, 918 P.2d
826, 837-38 (Or. 1996) (finding hearsay trustworthy where accomplice made highly
detailed statement, at home, to friend, voluntarily).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770, 781 (5th Cir. 1993) (declining to
find accomplice's grand jury testimony sufficiently reliable to satisfy Confrontation
Clause).
100. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d at 534.
101. Id. at 533 (citing Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 224-25 (Va.
1995) ).
102. Id. at 534.
103. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 116-19 (1999).
104. Id. at 131 (plurality opinion).
105. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Id. at 144.
Although Justice Thomas did not join that opinion, he wrote "I agree with THE CHIEF
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that implicate an accused, may fall within a firmly rooted exception and
hence may be admitted automatically under the Confrontation Clause. 100
Mark Lilly's statements did not qualify for such treatment, the Chief Justice argued, because the relevant portions which implicated Ben Lilly in
the murder simply were not against Mark's penal interest. 107 Further, the
Chief Justice wrote, Mark's statements were made under custodial interrogation by police, a factor which raised "special suspicion" about their
reliability in light of an accomplice's "strong motivation" to exonerate
himself in the eyes of the police by implicating another. 108
3. 17ie Lilly Solution: Subdividing the Labels. - ln the brief introductory segment of his opinion that gained a majority of the Court, Justice
Stevens wrote: "Our concern that [Virginia's] decision represented a significant departure from our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
prompted us to grant certiorari." 10u But even that starting point seems
doubtful. Justice Stevens was quick to challenge the Virginia Supreme
Court's conclusion that statements against penal interest fit within a
firmly rooted exception under the Roberts formula. 110 ln doing so, however, he conveniently ignored the standardless ease with which the Court
has endorsed other hearsay exceptions with no more solid "roots." 111 For
JUSTICE that the Clause does not impose a 'blanket ban on the government's use of
accomplice statements that incriminate defendant."' lei. at 143 (Thomas, J., concurring).
106. lei. at 146. The Chief Justice wrote: "This case ... does not raise the question
whether the Confrontation Clause permit~ the admission of a genuinely self-inculpatory
statement that also inculpates a coclefenclant, and our precedent does not compel the
broad holding suggested by the plurality today." fcl. The ChiefJustice relied on Williamson
v. United Sta/es, where the Court held that the federal hearsay exception for statement~
against interest encompasses only the "genuinely self-inculpato1y" portions of a longer
narrative. Id. (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-0 I ( f 994)). There the
Court suggested in dictum that such se1t:inculpato1y statement~ possess the "particularized
guarantees of trnstworthiness" required to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Williamson,
512 U.S. at 605 (quoting Lea v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986)).
In essence, the Chief .Justice holds out for the view that those "statement~ against
interest" that satisfy the Federal Rules will likewise satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The
Chief Justice's championing of the Federal Rules of Evidence as the constitutional
standard of admissibility is ironic in light of the view he expressed in dissent in Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 308 (1973) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting). There he condemned
the Court's "constitutionalization of the intricacies of the common law of evidence." lei.
(citation omitted).
107. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring).
I 08. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
I09. lei. at 123 (plurality opinion).
110. lei. at 130-34.
ff l. The historical pedigree for accomplice hearsay implicating an accused is no
doubt debatable. Indeed, statement~ against f1enal interest, as distinguished from
statements against projJJietmy interest, were not encompassed within the hearsay exceptions
for mostjurisdictions until well into the twentieth centwy. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299;
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 ( 1913). But the "roots" of that exception are
no fess "firm" than those of many hearsay categories approved by the Court in other postRoberts opinions. In fact, the Court has approved virtually eve1y hearsay exception listed in
the Federal Rules, with no consistent standard for assessing whether history, widespread
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his part, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the state court's formalistic "labeling" of Mark's hearsay as a statement against penal interest for purposes of constitutional analysis. 112 But other post-Roberts opinions have
blessed lower courts that did the same thing: pigeonholed new forms of
hearsay within established hearsay labels to avoid constitutional scrutiny.
Indeed, the Court itself has unabashedly stretched historical hearsay labels in an effort to fit new hearsay within old "firmly rooted" exceptions.113 ln truth, Virginia's approach was more a mirror image of the
Court's jurisprudence than a departure from it. The real concern in Lilly
arose when the Court looked in the mirror and saw how easily an accomplice's blame-shifting statements fit within the Roberts formula.
Rather than acknowledge the futility of an approach that elevates
hearsay labels to the status of constitutional doctrine, however, at least
seven members of the Court continued down that same dead end street.
They simply added more hearsay labels. For purposes of assessing reliability, Justice Stevens divided statements against penal interest into three
subcategories. 114 But statements in two of his categories do not implicate
the confrontation right at all. 115 As a result, he ended where he started:
by concluding that statements by an accomplice implicating an accused
are inherently unreliable and presumptively inadmissible. His subcategories add nothing to the constitutional analysis. 116 For his part, Chief Justice Rehnquist labeled two subcategories of statements against interest
which he suggested might qualify as "firmly rooted" under the Roberts
acceptance, or something else is necessary to make for sufficiently "firm" roots. Douglass,
Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 209 ("The Court has relied upon a rather
amorphous mix of chronological age and widespread acceptance-a sort of historical
popularity contest. The Court's test is so generous that virtually all recognizable hearsay
exceptions have passed.").
112. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
113. In White v. Illinois, for example, the Court blessed spontaneous declarations and
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis as firmly rooted exceptions, but failed to note
that both exceptions had expanded significantly in recent years to encompass a variety of
hearsay outside of traditional limits. 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 n.8 ( 1992). Likewise, in
Bourjaily v. United States, the Court held that coconspirator statements fall within a firmly
rooted exception. 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987). At the same time, the Court redefined the
exception to allow for the admission of hearsay without independent proof of conspiracy.
Id. at 178. The Court has seemed content to endorse traditionally labeled hearsay
categories as "firmly rooted," with little concern that the categories no longer retain their
historical limits.
114. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127 (plurality opinion) (dividing statements against penal
interest into (1) voluntary admissions; (2) exculpatory evidence offered by the defendant;
and (3) statements offered by the prosecution to establish guilt of an alleged accomplice of
the defendant).
115. With regard to the first category, if the prosecutor offered defendant's statement
as an admission, defendant would have no Confrontation Clause right-and, of course, no
interest-to cross-examine himself. Regarding the second category, the defense would
have no reason to cross-examine the declarant of exculpatory hearsay.
116. See Note, 1999 Supreme Court Term, supra note 43, at 240 ("[T]he plurality's
subcategorization does nothing more than point out tlie obvious: some declarations
against penal interest raise Confrontation Clause issues and some, by definition, do not.").
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formula: (1) "genuinely self-inculpatory" statements that nonetheless implicate an accused; 117 and (2) statements not made under police interrogation.118 In essence, the Rehnquist approach is merely a refinement of
Roberts, an effort-much as in Williamson-to narrow the broad exception
for statements against interest to encompass a constitutionally palatable
measure of hearsay. 1rn As a result, Rehnquist's approach only extends
Roberts's weakness to a greater level of detail. Any approach based on
hearsay labels is subject to manipulation by prosecutors and trial courts.
The post-Roberts history of unabashed "pigeonholing" of hearsay should
have been enough to deter the Court from more of the same. Moreover,
it is far from clear that the Chief Justice's subcategories represent a class
of hearsay more reliable than the general category of statements against
interest. 120
In sum, Lilly should have convinced the Court that hearsay labels are
an inadequate substitute for a realistic assessment of reliability. Further,
the case should have awakened the Court to the notion that a Confrontation Clause jurisprudence based on hearsay labeling is too easily subject
117. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). As examples, the Chief
Justice cited Court of Appeals opinions which addressed statements inculpating both the
declarant-accomplice and the defendant equally. See id. (citing United States v. Keltner,
147 F.3d 662, 670 (8th Cir. 1998); Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996)).
118. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 146-47.
119. The difference, of course, is that in Williamwn the Court simply narrowed its
construction of the federal rules. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01
(1994). In Lilly, a state prosecution, the Court was forced to address the breadth of the
hearsay exception on constitutional terms.
120. Limiting admissible hearsay to the subcategory of "genuinely selt~inculpatory"
statements makes some sense when it comes to reliability. After ;ti!, the notion that a
statement will genuinely subject the declarant to some loss or penalty forms the basis for
the hearsay exception. But the making of genuine admissions is also a technique of clever
liars. Worse yet, subcategorizing statements, as the Chief Justice proposes, inevitably leads
to the redaction or even manipulation of raw evidence. It is hard to say, for example, that
a jury has a more accurate impression of hearsay when it hears only that "genuinely selfinculpatory" part of a tape where the accomplice says, "Dan and 1 killed Vince," rather than
the complete narrative where the accomplice spells out the details of their respective roles.
The Chief Justice's notion that "statements to fellow prisoners" or "confessions to
family members," Lilly, 527 U.S. at 147, are inherently more reliable than statements to
police is particularly suspect for at least four reasons. First, though an accomplice's
statement to police is almost always motivated by the interest in selt~preservation, at least
that motive is discernable to a judge or jury evaluating the hearsay. The motives for
shading or embellishing stories told to jailhouse snitches or family members may be far
more difficult to unearth. Second, the theory supporting the exception for statements
against interest-the notion that most people will not make statemenL~ that will prove
harmful to their own interesL~ unless such statements are true-seldom comes into play
when the "confession" is to a family member or friend. The confessor does not expect any
adverse consequence from the confession to a confidant. He is just as likely to be bragging
as to be purging his soul. Third, accomplices who confess to police typically expect that
police will investigate the accuracy of what they say. For cooperators motivated purely by
self-interest, fear of being caught in a lie may be the best motivator for honesty. Finally,
hearsay related in court by jailhouse snitches or defendants' family members raises serious
concerns about the motives and credibility of that hearsay-relating witness.
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to manipulation and near random results. 121 But the shock of recognition proved too weak, or the comfort and convenience of the Roberts
formula too strong. The Court just clashed over new labels.
B. Reliability is Relative: Considering the Alternatives to the Accomplice's
Hearsay Confession

In Lilly, at least seven Justices agreed on a simple notion: purely
blame-shifting jailhouse confessions by an accomplice are unreliable.
Surrounded by police and offered an opportunity to "help yourself," or
an admonition not to "take the full rap,'' an accomplice may have a near
irresistible urge to say whatever he believes will further his cause. No
member of the Court could accept a constitutional rule that automatically admitted such statements in evidence.
I share the Court's basic distrust of blame-shifting accomplices. But
even if we accept the logic of the Court's "general approach," it seems
that the Court has skipped a step by making the easy leap from its premise-blame-shifting confessions are unreliable-to its conclusion that
blame-shifting confessions are constitutionally inadmissible. If reliability
has any legitimacy as a measure of the confrontation right, it is only as a
substitute for the real thing: confrontation. After all, that is how the reliability formula got started. Hearsay is admissible, the Court said in Roberts, where it is just as reliable as cross-examined testimony. 122 Under the
Court's own reasoning, then, reliability is a comparative concept. Hearsay is only one side of the reliability equation. On the other side is the
live, cross-examined testimony of the same declarant.
In the case of accomplice hearsay, that comparison is of more than
theoretical importance. It reflects, and affects, the real choices that prosecutors make before trial. When the law of evidence or the law of confrontation is likely to exclude hearsay, prosecutors typically have the
means to turn hearsay into live testimony. They simply have to choose
121. Under the Roberts approach, it is the hearsay label, rather than any realistic
assessment of reliability, that ultimately makes the difference in most cases. In White v.
Illinois, for example, the Court allowed hearsay statements from a small child, recounting
instances of abuse to her babysitter, her mother, a police officer, a nurse, and a physician,
all of whom questioned the child in an effort to investigate the complaint. 502 U.S. 346,
349-50 (1992). By contrast, in Idaho v. Wright, the Court excluded similar hearsay
statements made by a child to a physician. 497 U.S. 805, 826-27 (1990). It is difficult to
draw factual distinctions suggesting the hearsay in "'7iite was likely to be more reliable than
the hearsay in Wright. Instead, the difference in the results is best explained by the
different labels attached to the hearsay. The statements in White were admitted under
Illinois' generous version of the exceptions for spontaneous declarations and for
statements for purposes of medical diagnosis. White, 502 U.S. at 350-51. In Wright, the
trial court admitted the hearsay under the residual, or catch-all, exception. 497 U.S. at
811-12. The "firmly rooted" hearsay in "'7iite passed the Roberts test. The non-firmly
rooted hearsay in Wright did not.
122. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) ("[T]he Clause countenances only
hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the
reason of the general rule."' (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934)) ).
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their tactics, and the price they are willing to pay. ln many cases, prosecutors will have three alternatives to hearsay. First, the prosecutor may control the timing and order of prosecutions. 123 She may elect to indict,
convict, and sentence the accomplice before proceeding against others,
in an effort to limit the accomplice's Fifth Amendment privilege and
clear the way for live testimony. 124 Second, the prosecutor may immunize the accomplice and obtain an order compelling him to testify. 12fi
Third, the prosecutor may offer the accomplice a deal: typically an opportunity to plead guilty to a much reduced charge with a reduced sentence in exchange for pretrial cooperation and trial testimony. 126 Rational prosecutors, of course, will take into account the Court's
confrontation doctrine and the law of evidence in choosing whether to
pursue one or more of these alternatives before trial. Where the law
makes it less likely that important hearsay will be admitted in evidence,
the prosecutor becomes more likely to find an alternative.
The dealmaking alternative has become the most popular among
prosecutors. 12 7 That approach gives the prosecutor the most effective
control over the witness. The prosecutor purchases not only the testimony, but also the opportunity to prepare the accomplice to testify. And
123. Of course, the prosecutor's power to control the sequence of trials is not
absolute. Ultimately, the court controls the scheduling of its own docket. Unless the
prosecutor delays in charging one accomplice-an option often foreclosed by mies
limiting the time between arrest and indictment, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 316l(b) (1994)-she
may not always be able to choose which accomplice goes to trial first.
124. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, § 9-27.600(8) (I )(a),
available at http://www.usdoj.govI usao/ eousa/foia_reading_room/ usam/ title9 I
title9.htm# (last visited October IO, 2001) (on file with the Columbirt Lmu Review)
[hereinafter U.S. Attorneys' Manual] ("[l]f time permits, the person may be charged,
tried, and convicted before his/her cooperation is sought in the investigation or
prosecution of others. Having already been convicted himself/herself, the person
ordinarily will no longer have a valid privilege to refuse to testify .... "). The dissent in
Singleton II offered this alternative as a means to obtain accomplice testimony untainted by
deals exchanging testimony for leniency. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297,
1309 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Kelly, J., dissenting). For prosecutors in many cases,
however, this option proves impractical. The Court has rejected the notion that a
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege expires once he is convicted. Mitchell v. United
States, 526 U.S. 314, 325-27 (1999) (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981)).
Until sentenced, a defendant may still have a legitimate fear that his statements might be
used against him. Id. Moreover, in many cases, a defendant may be convicted of, or plead
guilty to, one offense, yet still face at least the theoretical risk of prosecution for other
related offenses. As a result, the option of compelling an accomplice's testimony by
waiting until his legitimate Fifth Amendment concerns have been removed is often
impractical.
125. See supra note 29. The option of compelling testimony under use immunity was
not available to the prosecutor in Lilly, since Virginia does not have a comprehensive use
immunity statute.
126. Deals involving the exchange of leniency for testimony have become
commonplace throughout the American criminal justice system. See Weinstein, supra
note 35, at 563-65.
l 27. See supra note 48.
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an accomplice who undergoes hours of pretrial preparation is more predictable, and hence more valuable, than one who is forced to testify
under a simple grant of immunity. 1 28
For their part, most accomplices prove willing to sell. 129 The confessing accomplice is unique among hearsay declarants in at least one
critical respect: He has committed crimes which he has confessed in the
presence of the police. Almost by definition, then, the confessing accomplice is a declarant over whom the prosecutor holds tremendous leverage.
The threat, or the reality, of his own prosecution and sentencing offers a
tremendous inducement for the confessing declarant to cooperate as a
witness for the prosecution at trial. 1 30
ln sum, where the law of confrontation is likely to exclude "unreliable" blame-shifting hearsay from an accomplice, prosecutors and accomplices are likely to m~ke pretrial choices to fill that evipentiary void. Most
often, they will fill it by making a deal for equally blame-shifting live testimony. For that reason, the notion of comparative reliability-hearsay
versus cross-examined testimony-which rests at the heart of the Roberts
formula is probably an accurate reflection of the world of accomplice
confessions. But the Lilly Court never completed the comparison. If reliability is the Court's aim, then it asked the wrong question in Lilly. The
real question is not simply whether blame-shifting hearsay from an accomplice is unreliable. The complete question is whether the hearsay
version is likely to be less reliable than the purchased and polished testimony that most likely will take its place. 131
128. Of course, the dealmaking alternative benefits the prosecutor in other ways as
well. It usually leaves her with an assured conviction of the accomplice-albeit to a
reduced charge or sentence-and avoids the time consuming and unwieldy process of
sequencing trials to circumvent an accomplice's invocation of the Fifth Amendment.
129. About one in five federal defendants is sentenced following a "substantial
assistance" motion by the government. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 1996 Sourcebook of
Federal Sentencing Statistics 39 fig.G (1997), available at http:/ /www.ussc.gov/annrpt/
1996/fig-g.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); supra note 48.
130. In federal cases, the Sentencing Guidelines have enhanced the power of
prosecutors to persuade accomplices to cooperate. Many accomplices find that a
"substantial assistance" motion under Guidelines section 5Kl. l is their only hope of
obtaining a sentence below the prescribed guideline and below an otherwise applicable
mandatory minimum sentence. Weinstein, supra note 35, at 573-78. Typically, the
government has exclusive control over the filing of such a motion. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual§ 5Kl.1 (2000) (providing for downward departure "[u]pon motion of
the government"). Where the accomplice has confessed and faces an overwhelming case
against him, his only choices may be to please the government or to accept the full
sentence prescribed by the Guidelines.
131. In this respect, the Lilly opinions fall short of the Court's analysis in earlier cases
where the Court explicitly compared the reliability of certain hearsay to that of crossexamined courtroom testimony. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992)
(noting that factors supporting admissibility of spontaneous declarations and statements
for obtaining medical care "cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony");
United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395 (1986) (finding that courtroom testimony by a

1828

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1797

C. Pick Your Poison: Blame-Shifting Hearsay or the Well Paid, Well Rehearsed
Accomplice Witness?

The law of evidence assumes that self-condemnation is reliable. The
hearsay exception for statements against interest rests on "the assumption
that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves
unless satisfied for good reason that they are true." 132 Lilly is not the first
case to point out, however, that the traditional assumption fails to capture
the reality of most jailhouse confessions by accomplices. 133 No doubt
some confessions stem from true remorse, from a genuine urge not to
delay the inevitable, or even from a selfless desire to free others from
false suspicion. But the typical motives of the confessing accomplice seldom reach that lofty plane. More often, the confession, taken as a whole,
seems calculated to benefit the confessor by shifting primary criminal responsibility to another. When it comes to reliability, the fact that parts of
the confession are self-inculpatory is almost incidental. lt is difficult to
"finger" your criminal colleague without admitting some participation in
the crime yourself. Indeed, a clever "snitch" understands that the occasional admission of culpability can enhance the likelihood that the government will buy what he has to sell. 134 lt is hardly surprising, therefore,
that the Court finds blame-shifting hearsay confessions unreliable.
Though such confessions may contain an element of self-condemnation,
self interest is most often the motivating factor. 135
Of course, the same self interest motivates courtroom testimony by
accomplices. The accomplice testifies to avoid jail, to reduce his own sentence, and sometimes even to save his life. Like the jailhouse confession,
his courtroom testimony is blame-shifting, or at least blame-sharing. That
coconspirator "seldom will reproduce ... the evidentiary value of his statements during the
course of the conspiracy").
132. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3) advisory committee's note (citing Hileman v. Northwest
Eng'g Co., 346 F.2d 668, 669-70 (6th Cir. 1965)). Justice Stevens echoed this assumption
in Lilly: "The exception [for statements against interest] is founded on the broad
assumption 'that a person is unlikely to fabricate a statement against his own interest at the
time it is made."' Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1999) (quoting Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973)).
133. See, e.g., Lee v. lllinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986); Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
134. In the words of the Court, "'One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its selfinculpatory nature."' Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133 (quoting Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S.
594, 599-601 (1994)).
135. Often the selt~inculpatory elements are no more than an acknowledgment of the
self-evident fact that the police have caught the accomplice red-handed. When the
accomplice believes that denial of guilt would be futile, it is unlikely that he regards even
the self-inculpatory ponions of his statement as being adverse to his interests. More likely,
in confirming what the police already know about his own guilt, the accomplice is merely
trying to convince police that he is knowledgeable and accurate when he describes his
colleague's more culpable role in the offense.
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is why the prosecutor wants him as a witness in the first place. 136 However, there are significant differences between the hearsay confession and
the live, purchased version. To complete the reliability comparison that
the Lilly Court omitted, we need to consider those differences. The most
obvious difference, of course, is that courtroom testimony is live, in full
view of the jury, and-most important-subject to cross-examination.
But before we turn to cross-examination, 137 we should understand two
other important differences: (1) the differing incentives of accomplices
who confess to police following arrest and of those who become cooperating witnesses at trial, and (2) the effect of pretrial witness preparation.
1. Incentives. - We can begin with the notion that both thejailhouse
confession and the accomplice's courtroom testimony are motivated primarily by self interest: that is, the accomplice "confesses" or testifies in
order to save himself. 138 The incentive to implicate another for purposes
of self preservation is the disease that threatens the integrity of all accomplice information, whether hearsay or live testimony. 139 There is, however, one major difference. Often, by the time the accomplice appears at
trial as a cooperating witness, that disease has progressed dramatically.
The incentive has increased for two reasons.
First, the cooperating witness has committed himself. He has surrendered any resistance to his own prosecution and placed his fate in the
hands of the prosecutor. Typically, his agreement to testify is merely one
part of a more comprehensive agreement. That agreement was carefully
136. In rare cases prosecutors may find evidentiary uses for accomplice confessions
that are not blame-shifting at all. In a case charging defendant with receipt of stolen
property, for example, the prosecutor may wish to offer the thiefs confession merely to
establish that the goods were stolen.
137. See infra text accompanying notes 192-201.
138. It is, at a minimum, curious that the law of evidence is even more skeptical of
accomplice confessions when they exculpate a defendant than when they inculpate him.
See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3) (providing that such statemenL~ offered to exculpate the
accused are not admissible "unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
trustworthiness of the statement"). As the Court once observed:
Common sense would suggest that [an accused accomplice] often has a greater
interest in lying in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, especially if he
is still awaiting his own trial or sentencing. To think that criminals will lie to save
their fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves is
indeed to clothe the criminal class with more nobility than one might expect to
find in the public at large.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967).
139. "Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce unreliable testimony because they
create an incentive for the accomplice to shift blame to the defendant or other
coconspirators." Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea
Agreements, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 800, 802 (1987). For this reason, when accomplices testify
in exchange for leniency, it is typical for courts to instruct the jurors that they should weigh
such testimony with particular caution. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1309
(10th Cir. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting) (Singleton 11) (noting that cautionary jury
instructions are an inadequate protection against unreliable accomplice testimony); see
also Trott, supra note 34, at 1421-23 (quoting a sample accomplice-witness instruction).
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drafted by the prosecutor for the purpose of maintaining maximum leverage over the cooperating accomplice. 140 Most often, the cooperator
has agreed to plead guilty to a specified charge. He has probably waived
a host of collateral rights, including any right to appeal his sentence. 141
Most important of all, before he testifies, he typically has entered his
guilty plea and is awaiting his own sentencing. 14 ~ He knows that the same
prosecutor who questions him as a witness will speak at his own sentencing. He has no alternative but to be as "cooperative" as possible. By contrast, while the recently arrested accomplice has an incentive to curry
favor with the police, he has not committed his fate entirely into their
hands. The possibility of a successful defense, even though remote, remains exactly that: a possibility. To some degree, he remains an adversary. He has not yet signed on to the law enforcement team. In sum, he
has an incentive to help himself, but that incentive is tentative. His cooperation is begrudging.
Second, the law encourages prosecutors and police to offer more
powerful inducements to cooperating witnesses than to the recently arrested accomplice. The law of confessions treats such inducements with
caution, while the law regarding cooperating witnesses places virtually no
limit on the incentives that may lead an accomplice to testify. When police interrogate the accomplice following his arrest, they generally seek
evidence for two purposes: (1) to convict the accomplice himself; and
(2) to identify and convict any colleagues he may implicate. To satisfy
their first purpose, police must follow the rules that will make the accomplice's confession admissible in his own trial. Accordingly, they must read
him his Miranda rights and obtain a waiver. 14 ~ Further, they must be
cautious to avoid explicit promises of leniency or other benefits in order
to induce the confession. While such promises do not per se invalidate a
custodial confession, 144 they can be important factors when a court ulti140. For a list of considerations for prosecutors in drafting plea-and-cooperation
see Ann C. Rowland, Effective Use of Informants and Accomplice Witnesses,
50 S.C. L. Rev. 679, 685-86 (1999).
141. Federal plea agreements now routinely include waiver-of:appeal provisions. For
a discussion of the validity of such waivers, see Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers
Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 2011, 2029-32 (2000).
142. Federal prosecutors and cooperating accomplices typically follow this sequence
for two reasons. First, it creates maximum control over the cooperating witness, who has
committed himself entirely by entering his own guilty plea. Second, by delaying
sentencing until after his testimony, the cooperating accomplice has an opportunity to
impress the sentencing judge by demonstrating that he upheld his end of the bargain,
testified fully, and produced results helpful to the prosecution.
143. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
confession voluntary despite officer's comment that defendant could "get off pretty easy" if
he cooperated); United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
confession voluntary despite agent's promise to inform prosecutor of cooperation); United
agreemenL~,
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mately passes judgment on the voluntariness of the confession. 145 In the
context of custodial interrogation, therefore, police learn to avoid explicit promises and to rely instead on more general suggestions that cooperation will benefit the suspect.
By contrast, the law imposes virtually no restraint on the inducements a prosecutor may offer to obtain the trial testimony of a cooperating witness. 146 Prosecutors may offer money, 147 immunity from criminal
charges, 148 substantial sentence reductions, 149 and-in capital caseseven life itself150 as inducements to testify. In the celebrated prosecution
of Jimmy Hoffa, the Supreme Court rejected a Due Process challenge to
the testimony of a witness whose cooperation was secured by release from
jail, freedom from serious felony charges in both state and federal courts,
and financial compensation. 151 The annals of American criminal trials
States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 407-08 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding confession voluntary despite
officer's assurance that defendant was not in danger of prosecution).
145. See, e.g., Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
confession involuntary where agent promised leniency and lied about evidence against
accused); United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding confession
involuntary where officer's inducemenL~ were combined with other factors).
146. Indeed, nothing prohibits prosecutors from actively creating their leverage in
the first instance. 1t is not uncommon for prosecutors to initiate charges against lower
level accomplices for the principal purpose of pressuring them into "flipping" against a
more culpable crime boss. See United States v. Paguio, 114 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that indicting defendant's fiancee and son for the purpose of pressuring them to
testify did not violate Due Process); Van Kessel, supra note 31, at 510.
147. See United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d
142, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).
148. The federal immunity statute provides for use immunity upon motion by the
prosecutor. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003. Further, prosecutors may enter into use immunity
agreements or even nonprosecution agreements which are enforceable as contracts. See
United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1994); cf. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 ( 1971) (holding that plea agreemenL~ are enforceable as
contrncts). The Department of Justice authorizes its prosecutors to enter into
nonprosecution agreemenL~ where "cooperation appears to be necessary to the public
interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or would
not be effective." U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 124, at§ 9-27.600(A).
149. See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999) (en bane)
(Singleton 11) (noting the long established practice of testimony under a plea bargain that
promises a reduced sentence); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th
Cir. 198'7) (same). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines expressly provide for downward
sentencing departures based on cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of others.
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual§ 5Kl.1 (2000). The Guidelines include testimony
among the forms of cooperation to be rewarded. ld.
150. In Lilly, for example, Gary Barker avoided potential capital charges by pleading
guilty and agreeing to testify. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999)
(No. 98-5881).
151. The Hoffa informant, Edward Partin, was jailed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on
state charges and was under federal indictment for embezzling union funds. See Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1966). Federal agents arranged his release from jail,
after which he met with Hoffa in Nashville, Tennessee, and obtained evidence regarding
Hoffa's efforL~ to bribe jurors in his own ongoing labor racketeering trial. Hoffa was later
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are filled with examples of witnesses even more handsomely rewarded for
their cooperation, while courts scarcely bat an eye. 15:! A recent flurry of
federal decisions has made it clear that neither federal witness tampering
statutes nor the Constitution stand in the way of such inducements from
prosecutors, even though comparable conduct would be criminal if practiced by others. 153 Federal law now accords prosecutors unparalleled
charged and convicted ofjury tampering. Partin, the government's principal witness, was
never prosecuted for his state or federal offenses, and his wife was paid $1200 by the
government. Id. at 296-98. Among other claims on appeal, Hoffa argued that the
government violated his right to Due Process through the use of a witness who had such
clear motives to lie. The Court n;jected the claim. Justice Stewart wrote for the Court:
The petitioner is quite correct in the contention that Partin, perhaps even more
than most informers, may have had motives to lie. But it does not follow that his
testimony was untrue, nor does it follow that his testimony was constitutionally
inadmissible. The established safeguards of the Anglo-American legal system
leave the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the
credibility of his testimony to he determined by a properly instructed jury.
Id. at 311.
152. Among the more notorious cooperators of recent years was Salvatore ("Sammy
the Bull") Gravano, whose testimony helped secure convictions of Mafia bosses John Cotti
and John Gambino. Gravano, who admitted committing over a dozen murders, received a
substantially reduced sentence and a spot in the federal witness protection program which,
characteristically, he later abused by committing new drug distribution crimes. See Jerry
Seper, 'Sammy the Bull' and Son Plead Guilty to Drug Charges, Wash. Times, May 26,
2001, at A3. Another infamous cooperator was convicted spy John Walker, who testified at
the trial of his confederate, Jerry Whitworth. Walker himself received a life sentence, but
his cooperation netted more lenient treatment for his son, Michael, whose potential life
sentence was reduced to twenty-five years. See Trott, supra note 34, at 1426. There are
cases, however, where coddling of cooperators has exceeded the tolerance of courts and
resulted in dismissal of criminal charges based on government misconduct. The most
notorious recent example may be the thwarted prosecutions of El Rukn gang members in
Chicago, where cooperating witnesses were allegedly given drugs and alcohol, and allowed
to have sex in prison and in prosecutors' offices. United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp.
1215, 1226-30, 1241-42, 1272 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Jeffrey Toobin, Capone's Revenge: How
Far Can a Prosecutor Go to Secure Crucial Testimony from Plea Bargainers?, New Yorker,
May 23, 1994, at 46, 46.
153. Troubled by the growing parade of accomplices who testify under favorable plea
agreement~ with the government, a Tenth Circuit panel sparked a national dehate by
rnling that federal prosecutors violate the criminal anti-gratuity statute, 18 U .S.C.
§ 201 (c) (2), when they offer leniency in exchange for testimony. United States v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1348, 1358 (10th Cir. 1998) (Singleton I), vacated, 144 F.3d 1361
( IOth Cir. 1998). The en bane court quickly reversed course, noting that offers of leniency
by prosecutors in exchange for testimony are "ingrained in our criminal justice system."
Singleton II, 165 F.3d at 130 I. Singleton I spawned a wave of litigation, which ultimately
resulted in decisions from several federal Cour·ts of Appeals, all of which held that
prosecutors do not violate section 201 (c) (2) by entering into plea agreements which
provide potential sentencing benefit~ as a result of testimony. See, e.g., United States v.
Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687,
688-89 (7th Cir. 1999). In the wake of the Singleton cases, some courts have gone an
additional step, ruling that the prosecutor does not violate section 201 (c) (2) by offering
monetary payments to cooperating informant~ who later testify at trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 145
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Albanese, 195 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 1999).
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power to reward cooperators or punish accomplices who refuse to testify
for the government. 154 ln answer to the question, "How much can the
prosecutor pay for cooperation?" it is hardly an exaggeration to answer,
"Whatever it takes."
ln sum, when we assess reliability, there is no reason to favor the live
testimony of a cooperating accomplice over a blame-shifting jailhouse
confession on the basis of the incentives which may shape, and shade, the
accomplice's story. If anything, the incentive to favor the government is
stronger by the time the accomplice finds his way to the witness stand.
2. Polishing Testimony. - In the British legal system, the rules of ethics prohibit barristers from discussing the case with witnesses before
trial. 155 In the American system, witness preparation is an art form. 156
American prosecutors are among its most practiced and capable artists.157 Cooperating accomplices receive much of their artistic attention.1"8 As a result, the testimony presented to a jury may bear only a
distant relation to the far less calculated version captured on a police
videotape in the hours after an arrest. A prominent defense attorney in
the Oklahoma City bombing case once remarked, "The Government has
a room at the Marriott Hotel in which witnesses are transmogrified. I
154. In federal courL~, tough sentencing guidelines and mandatory penalties have
raised the stakes for criminal defendants, especially for drug crimes. See 21 U.S.C. § 84I
(1994). At the same time, the Guidelines have given prosecutors sole discretion to file
"substantial assistance" motions which often provide defendants their only way out of those
sentences. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5Kl.1 (2000). As a result, the
"market" for cooperation has become "overheated." Weinstein, supra note 35, at 564.
155. See The General Standards, Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales 'II
6.1.5 (1990).
156. American texts on trial advocacy offer detailed instruction in the art of witness
preparation. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Modern Trial Advocacy 29-30, 79-81 (2d ed. 1997);
Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 474-79 (4th ed. 1996).
157. My comment is not intended to suggest a general disregard for the ethical
standards of prosecutors. Indeed, my own experience with colleagues in two United States
Attorneys' Offices, on an Independent Counsel's staff, and throughout the Department of
Justice would suggest quite the opposite. And others, more experienced than I, share that
view. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1695, 1702 (2000) ("[N]otwithstanding the
sporadic wimps and whiners, the occasional Batmen and blockheads, from what I have
known of prosecutors and former prosecutors, I consider them by and large the flower of
the bar."). But see Michael Higgins, Fine Line, A.B.A.J., May I998, at 52, 53 (commenting
that coaxing or helping a witness to lie is common among both criminal defense lawyers
and prosecutors).
Obviously, an unethical prosecutor can wreak havoc on justice through the process of
witness preparation. But the larger problem is not unethical prosecutors. It is a system of
rules which allow and even encourage counsel to present carefully scripted, polished trial
testimony that is usually several generations removed from its original form. In truth, the
good faith and professionalism of prosecutors-even more than the right of crossexamination-is probably the accused's greatest protection against false testimony by
accomplices. But in an adversarial system, this puts a heavy load on fallible human beings
who must simultaneously seek both truth and convictions.
I58. Trott, supra note 34, at 1396.
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wish I had a room where I could do that to people." 15 ~} The statement is
not an exaggeration.
One of the most troubling characteristics of accomplice hearsay is
that the police have a hand in creating it; and often they create it in
secret. 160 Blame-shifting confessions emerge from jailhouse interrogations where government agents, shielded from adversarial scrutiny, coax
an accomplice into implicating others. The circumstances sound too
much like the Star Chamber, where Crown prosecutors labored behind
closed doors to procure confessions from accomplices. 161 The typical result in Star Chamber prosecutions was a signed statement crafted for use
at the trial of a coconspirator, with little way of knowing just how the
statement came into being. Hi:.!
There are many dangers in jailhouse confessions induced in secret
by government agents. One is that the accomplice simply becomes a
mouthpiece of the prosecution. Directed by leading questions, asked
simply to confirm what the police "already know," the accomplice may do
nothing more than parrot the results of other police investigation. 1"~
The danger in such a confession is multiplied because the accomplice has
"tailored" his confession to fit the independent evidence. When the hearsay is presented in court, his story may appear to be corroborated when,
159. The statement comes from Michael E. Tigar, lead defense counsel for defendant
Terry Nichols. Jo Thomas, Oklahoma Bomb Defense Accuses U.S. of Misconduct, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 4, 1997, at A7.
160. In her richly annotated article, Professor Berger argues that fear of secret,
nonadversarial creation of evidence was a principal factor giving rise to the Confrontation
Clause. See Berger, supra note 19, at 572-75.
161. Id. at 569-70.
162. The Supreme Court has traced the genesis of the American confrontation right
to reactions ;1gainst this form of "trial by affidavit" in general and to the celebrated treason
prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh in particular. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57
( 1970). Though some commentators question that connection, Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,
The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One,
8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, JOO n.4 (1972), my own view is that the Court's historical account is
essentially accurate. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note JO, at 235-36 (discussing
evidence that American colonists "bristled against attempts by George III to revive
elemenL~ of the inquisitorial system").
163. Police often induce confessions by confronting a suspect with evidence intended
to show that denials would be ti.itile. See, e.g., United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 776
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding confession voluntary where police confronted defendant with
cocaine, scale, and gun seized from dumpster near his house); Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d
894, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding confession volunta1-y where police informed
defendant that his fingerprinL~ matched those in victim's apartment).
Indeed, the tactic often includes exaggeration or outright lies about the evidence
already in police hands. See Peter Carlson, Cops, Suspect~ and the New Art of
Interrogation, Wash. Post Mag., Sep. 13, 1998, at 6, 19 ("[Y)ou've got to convince him that
lying is futile. So it's time for you to start lying, too."). Though the use of false statement~
to induce confessions may reflect on the voluntariness of a confession, there is no
constitutional rule prohibiting the tactic. See, e.g., Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding confession voluntary even though police falsely stated that
defendant's fingerprints were found in victim's home).
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in fact, the opposite is true. The supposedly corroborating facts have created his story in the first place. 164
In theory, live accomplice testimony should remove that danger. Indeed, one theory behind the confrontation right is that trial confrontation requires the government to create testimonial evidence in real time,
in full view of the defendant, the jury, and the public. 165 In theory at
least, both adversaries-prosecution and defense-get to hear the raw,
original, first-hand account of the witness. They both get a fair opportunity to dig for the truth. 166 In a system where cooperating witnesses undergo hours of careful preparation by the prosecutor, however, the reality
of accomplice testimony seldom resembles that theory.
Moreover, in many cases, the accomplice's courtroom testimony has
undergone an even more secret process of creation than the typical jailhouse confession. In fact, most police interrogation is far less secretive
than most prosecutorial witness preparation. Mark Lilly's confession was
tape recorded and offered verbatim at trial. 167 Many police departments
routinely tape record, or even videotape, interrogations. 168 Almost all
police are trained to take notes during such interviews and most make a
regular practice of memorializing them in investigative reports. When
the prosecution offers the hearsay confession, those tapes, reports, and
often even notes are discoverable. 169 By contrast, few prosecutors even
164. Ben Lilly raised such an objection to Mark's hearsay, arguing that police induced
Mark to implicate Ben by statements they made before the interrogation. After first
interviewing Barker, police began their discussion with Mark by telling him, '"[t]hey said
you didn't do it."' Brief for Petitioner at 6 n. l, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No.
98-5881).
165. Berger, supra note 19, at 561-62.
166. Cross-examination, the Court tells us, is the" 'greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth."' Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore,
Evidence § 1367). One wonders whether the Court had in mind the often
counterproductive efforts mounted by defense counsel faced with well rehearsed,
"transmogrified" cooperating witnesses.
167. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121-22.
168. Policies in Alaska and Minnesota call for routine taping of all police station
interrogations. Carlson, supra note 163, at 23. Canadian rules require police and
prosecutors to record all conversations with cooperating accomplices. Scheck et al., supra
note 33. at 157.
169. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963), requires the prosecution to disclose
exculpatory information where it is material to the defense. And Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), extends that rule to information that may impeach government
witnesses. The rule applies equally where the government "witness" is a hearsay declarant.
United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v.
Hawryluk, 658 F. Supp. 112, 116-17 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
In federal courts, Rule 16(a)(l)(C) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
pretrial disclosure of "[d]ocuments and [t]angible [o]bjects" which are "intended for use
by the government as evidence in chief at the trial." Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) (1) (C). Tape
recorded or written hearsay statements should be covered by the Rule.
The application of other discovery principles to hearsay is more problematic. The
Jencks Act requires federal prosecutors to provide the defense with prior written or
recorded statements of government witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994). But courts are
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consider videotaping or tape recording their pretrial witness interviews.
Police or investigating agents may take notes, but most prosecutors discourage the creation of formal reports documenting those meetings. 170
A doctrine akin to a prosecutor's work product privilege-formalized in
federal practice by Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and by the
Jencks Act-typically prevents discovery of notes generated in those sessions.171 Indeed, it is common for prosecutors to spend dozens of pretrial hours with cooperating witnesses without creating one word of discoverable material. 17'.!.
There is an obvious danger that police, either intentionally or inadvertently, will induce an accomplice to tailor his post-arrest statements to
suit what the police already know. But that danger is not unique to hearsay. Indeed, that danger actually increases as a cooperating witness is prepared for his trial testimony. 17 ~ Even if prosecutors and police take pains
cliviclecl in determining whether hearsay cleclarants are "witnesses" within the meaning of
the Act. Compare Williams-Davis, 90 F.3cl at 512-13 (holding hearsay cleclarant is not a
"witness" under the Jencks Act), with United States v. Mills, 810 F.2cl 907, 910 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding that cleclaranL~ are "prospective government witnesses"). At a minimum,
however, when a police officer or government agent testifies to relate hearsay statements,
the otlicer is a government "witness," and her prior written statements, including her
memoranda and notes, are discoverable. United St;1tes v. Welch, 810 F.2cl 485, 490-91
(5th Cir. 1987).
For a more detailed discussion of the application of the rules of criminal discovery to
cases involving prosecution hearsay, see Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 43, at
2160-74.
170. Federal courL~ have held that the.Jencks Act allows prosecutors to instruct agents
not to take notes during witness interviews. United States v. Brimage, 115 F.3cl 73, 76 (1st
Cir. 1997); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1288-89 (1st Cir. 1996).
171. See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (requiring the government to produce
"statemenL~" defined as the written, recorded, or transcribed statements of witnesses); Feel.
R. Crim. P. 16(a) (2) ("Information Not Subject to Disclosure . ... [T] his rule does not authorize
the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government
documenL~ made by the attorney for the government or any other government agent
investigating or prosecuting the case."). Numerous courts have held that the government
is not required to disclose notes or memoranda recording the substance of interviews with
government witnesses. E.g., Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 105-06 (1976); United
States v. Donato, 99 F.3cl 426, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
172. Prosecutors are trained to avoid "creating Jencks material." Of course, pretrial
grand jury appearances by cooperating witnesses do create discoverable transcripts. But
that testimony is usually the tip of a pretrial iceberg of earlier witness preparation. The
grand jury testimony iL~elf may be carefully scripted and deliberately vague, to avoid
creating details useful for impeachment. Often, the real purpose of that grand jury
appearance is to "lock in" the cooperating witness to the testimony that the prosecutor
needs at trial. And, of course, nothing prevents the calculated use of leading questions
before a grand jury. As a result, instead of creating a raw, unpolished version of the
accomplice's story, the grand jury appearance is simply another tool for controlling and
directing the version that ultimately evolves at trial.
173. Time is an important factor in the transmogrification of accomplice witnesses.
Police may have a few hours to induce the accomplice to "come clean" in the jailhouse.
But with key cooperating witnesses in 1myor cases, prosecutorial polishing of cooperators
may be measured in weeks or months.
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to avoid "tainting" their witness with information from other sources, the
danger of tailoring testimony is almost unavoidable. lt is exceedingly difficult to discuss a case with a potential witness without exposing information that will assist the witness in avoiding an impeachable contradiction
at trial. 174
ln many cases, the most significant tailoring of testimony takes place
before the prosecutor ever talks to the accomplice. The "proffer" process-the typical process that precedes any cooperation agreement-almost assures that some tailoring will occur. Most prosecutors will not
agree to reduced charges or a reduced sentence for the accomplice until
they know what testimony he can provide. 175 They will not "buy a pig in a
poke." 176 Instead, most prosecutors will offer a limited form of use immunity to allow the accomplice, along with his counsel, to summarize the
information the accomplice would provide under a cooperation agreement.177 But the proffer session is far less spontaneous than a jailhouse
confession. Typically it comes after the accomplice's counsel has made
her own efforts to prepare her client. Before that preparation occurs,
competent counsel will have performed some investigation. Normally,
she will have received a significant volume of information from the prosecutor in discovery. 178 And she will share that information with her client.
174. Prosecutors and agents are advised not to inform the cooperating witness of
details based on independent investigation. See Trott, supra note 34, at 1404; Rowland,
supra note 140, at 681-82. But almost any pretrial interview will guide the witness to some
degree. Merely showing the witness an exhibit that he will be asked to identify at trial will
often have that effect. If the witness had doubts, or was shaky on a detail, his trial
testimony will naturally become more self-assured and detailed when he sees the document
or photo that will back up-or improve upon-his story.
175. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, supra note 124, at§ 9-27.620 ("In order to be in a
position adequately to assess the potential value of a person's cooperation, the prosecutor
should insist on an 'offer of proof or its equivalent from the person or his/her attorney.");
Trott, supra note 34, at 1402; Weinstein, supra note 35, at 584-87, 585 n.80.
176. A "poke", in the context of this familiar expression, is an opaque bag or sack that
would necessarily limit one's objective evaluation of livestock.
177. Normally, such "queen for a day" agreements provide that the government will
not use the defendant's statements directly against him in the government's case in chief,
while reserving the right to pursue leads based on defendant's disclosures. Weinstein,
supra note 35, at 586 n.80; see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 203-10
(1995) (holding that such agreements validly waive Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e) (6), which would otherwise prohibit evidentiary
use of disclosures made during plea bargaining).
178. Prosecutors often will provide informal discovery early in a case in an effort to
convince defense counsel and defendant to accept a plea agreement. See Laurie L.
Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal
Prosecutors, 26 Fordham Urb. LJ. 553, 554 (1999) ("[T)he practice of many U.S.
Attorney's Offices is to offer earlier and broader discovery to the defense."). That
discovery may include potential trial exhibits, witness statements and even investigative
reports that the formal rules of discovery would otherwise not require to be disclosed. See
United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 773 n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting the prevailing
practice among prosecutors to provide Jencks material earlier than the rules require).
Before advising her client to plead guilty and cooperate, then, the accomplice's counsel
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ln her conferences with the accomplice, she is likely to question any aspects of her client's story that diverge from the government's version.
Whether intended to do so or not, this process practically assures that the
potential cooperator has an opportunity to polish his story before the
prosecutor hears it for the first time. And as for secrecy, this process is
protected by the accomplice's attorney-client privilege.
ln the days awaiting his trial testimony, the cooperator is likely to be
exposed to case related details from a variety of sources other than prosecutors and police. He may learn helpful details through news accounts,
family visits, conferences with his own counsel, and, of course, the always
active jailhouse "grapevine." All of these sources can assist the cooperator
to tailor details of his trial testimony to coincide with other evidence in
the case. 1n As a result, opportunities for surprising or impeaching the
accomplice at trial disappear. The cooperating witness has far more time,
and more varied opportunities, to become "tainted" by outside information than the accomplice induced to talk shortly after his arrest. And
most of the "tainting" information will be undocumented and hence
never known to the defense.
ln short, secret development and tailoring of evidence are not concerns that uniquely affect the reliability of accomplice hearsay. There are
equal, if not greater, dangers throughout the process that prepares and
polishes the live courtroom testimony of a cooperating accomplice.
"Trial by affidavit" rightfully raises concerns about the reliability of hearmay know most of the details of the prosecutor's case. And she normally will share those
details with her client.
Indeed, it is arguable that prosecutors have a constitutional obligation to disclose
some information, particularly exculpatory evidence, before entering into a plea
agreement. Compare Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea
Process, 40 Hastings LJ. 957, I006-23 ( 1989) (arguing that Brady v. Maryland requires
such disclosure in plea bargaining), with John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy
Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 Emory LJ. 437, 487-509 (200 I) [hereinafter
Douglass, Fatal Attraction] (arguing that Brady is ineffective and perhaps even
counterproductive as a rule of pre-plea disclosure).
179. In Actual Innocence, the authors recount an astonishing performance by Leslie
Vernon White, a veteran snitch who demonstrated to law enforcement agents his methods
for assembling the information necessary to back up a convincing story:
A deputy provided White with the name of another inmate, the fact that he was a
murder suspect, and a telephone. In twenty minutes, White showed his stuff. He
made five phone calls and collected enough inside information about the other
inmate to clairn with credibility that the man had confessed. Posing as a bail
bondsman, White called the inmate reception center; as an assistant district
attorney, he called the D.A.'s record room, then the D.A.'s witness coordinator,
the sheriffs homicide office, and the actual D.A. handling the case. He rang the
coroner's office, in the guise of a cop, and learned about mortal injuries to the
victim.
With the facts he gathered during these chats, White knew enough about the
murder to make up a confession on behalf of an inmate whom he had neither
seen nor spoken to.
Scheck et al., supra note 33, at 128.
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say. After thorough trial preparation carried out in secret, however, even
the live testimony of the cooperating witness may be little more than
"trial by talking affidavit." There is little reason to conclude that it will be
more reliable than hearsay. There is, however, at least one reason to fear
that juries will be more inclined to accept it as true. They will hear it
from the lips of the well polished, "transmogrified" accomplice. 180
3. Comparing Apples to Apples: The Relative Value of Cross-Examination.
- For all of its obvious shortcomings, an accomplice's hearsay confession
may be less subject to adversarial polishing, less carefully tailored to
match independent evidence, and less subject to coercion than the version most likely to emerge as trial testimony when hearsay is excluded
from evidence. The jailhouse hearsay version may be more spontaneous
and certainly is closer in time to actual events. If we look only at the
circumstances which produce the evidence, we have ample reason to
question the reliability of accomplice hearsay. But we may have even
greater reason to question the polished version presented in trial
testimony.
So far, however, we have neglected a critical step in our comparison.
We cannot complete our reliability comparison until we consider the impact of cross-examination. 181 After all, the Court has suggested that the
very purpose of cross-examination is to promote reliability in the fact
finding process. 182 The accomplice's courtroom testimony may be carefully tailored and rehearsed, but the defense still gets its chance to probe
beneath that veneer at trial. And hearsay, it seems, is not subject to that
kind of courtroom challenge.
Or is it? If our aim is to compare hearsay to live testimony, we must
make sure to compare apples to apples. Our reliability equation should
180. By contrast, jurors exposed to hearsay will know that they are rece1vmg
secondhand goods. "[H]earsay evidence may be introduced more safely than direct
testimony because the former carries its deficiencies on its face and is subject to the judge's
instructions with respect to its weight." Westen, supra note 53, at 599. For studies
suggesting that juries discount hearsay testimony, see Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision
Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683, 688-98 (1992);
Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging
Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 655, 656-58 & 657
nn.11-12, 658 n.13 (1992) (recounting results of three studies).
181. In theory, the Court admits hearsay without confrontation only where hearsay is
just as reliable as cross-examined, Jive testimony. Hearsay which fits recognizable, "firmly
rooted" exceptions, the Court tells us, is sufficiently reliable to be presented to juries
without cross-examination. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 ( 1980). If we are to exclude
accomplice hearsay for lack of cross-examination, then it must be because we expect crossexamination of tl1e accomplice to accomplish more than, for example, cross-examination
of the child who tells her doctor about sexual abuse or cross-examination of the bank
customer who blurts out a description of the suspect in the moments after a robbery. The
Court seems willing to dispense with cross-examination as "surplusage" in those cases of
"reliable" hearsay. Presumably, it expects cross-examination to make more of a difference
in the case of a testifying accomplice.
182. Id.
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account for the fact that hearsay is subject to impeachment, just like live
testimony. 18a Indeed, an absent accomplice may be an easier target of
impeachment than a well prepared, testifying cooperator. The appropriate comparison then, is not between cross-examined trial testimony and
untested hearsay; it is between cross-examined trial testimony and hearsay
that likewise has been subjected to an adversarial process of impeachment. Below, I will examine that comparison.
a. Impeaching Accomplice Hearsay. - Once hearsay has been admitted
in evidence, the adversarial game is not over. The Federal Rules of Evidence, 184 the law of evidence in most states, 185 and the Confrontation
Clause itself all permit an adversary to impeach hearsay in much the same
manner that he might impeach live testimony: by proving, or sometimes
simply suggesting, facts which demonstrate bias, corruption, self interest,
faulty memory, or inaccurate perception by the witness. 180 In the case of
accomplice hearsay, the principal basis for impeachment-the accomplice's self interest in avoiding prosecution or minimizing punishmentis typically subject to proof whether the accomplice testifies or not.
Sometimes, as in Mark Lilly's case, the inducements may be embedded in
the hearsay statements themselves. 187 The rules requiring disclosure of
promises and inducements apply equally whether the accomplice is a live
witness or an absent hearsay declarant. 188 lf the police promised leniency
to induce a confession, that inducement must be disclosed to the defense, just like the plea agreement that motivates testimony from the cooperating accomplice. 189 And proof of those inducements typically does
183. For a detailed description of the process of impeaching an absent hearsay
declarant, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 251-60; see also Fred
Warren Bennett, How to Administer the "Big Hurt" in a Criminal Case: The Life and
Times of Federal Rule. of Evidence 806, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1135, 1142-63 (1995)
(illustrating impeachment of absent hearsay declarant); Hon. Anthony M. Brannon,
Successful Shadowboxing: The Art of Impeaching Hearsay Declarants, 13 Campbell L.
Rev. 157, 160-78 ( 1991) (describing use of Rule 806 in impeaching non testifying
declarant); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Evidence Rule 806 and the Problem of
Impeaching the Nontestitying Declarant, 56 Ohio St. LJ. 495, 525-30 (1995) (same).
184. Fed. R. Evid. 806.
185. Most states have provisions similar to Rule 806. Jack B. Weinstein et al., 4
Weinstein's Evidence 806-14 to 806-17 (1996); cf. Unif. R. Evid. 806 (1974) (nearly
identical to Fed. R. Evid. 806).
186. See Mauet, supra note 156, at 241-59.
187. ln Mark's tape recorded dialogue with police, an interrogator suggests that
unless Mark breaks "family ties," his brother, Ben, "may be dragging you right into a life
sentence." Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 121 (1999).
188. The Brady and Giglio rules requiring disclosure of exculpatory and impeaching
evidence apply to hearsay declarants as well as to testifying witnesses. See supra note 169.
189. Of course, jailhouse inducement~ typically will not include the disclaimers and
qualifying language which prosecutors are so careful to include in their written plea
agreement~ with cooperating witnesses. The principal value of those written disclaimers,
of course, is to minimize the impeachment value of the agreements. In fact, many written
cooperation agreement~ appear to bolster, rather than impeach, the cooperator's
credibility. Rowland, supra note 140, at 685-86.
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not require the presence of the accomplice at trial. Defense counsel can
call on the police to testify about inducements that they offered. In most
cases, the other classic approaches to impeachment are likewise available
even though the accomplice never enters the courtroom. The accomplice's criminal record, "bad acts," prior inconsistent statements, history
of mental illness, past drug usage, and other facts which may impact his
credibility often are available and subject to proof in his absence. 190
Moreover, in one important respect impeachment in absentia offers
a significant advantage to the opponent of accomplice hearsay. lt is
largely risk free. In live cross-examination, a cooperating accomplice is
well prepared to explain and minimize impeaching facts. 191 By contrast,
when the accomplice is an absent hearsay-declarant, defense counsel gets
the last word. He can prove the impeaching facts without fear of contradiction, denial or explanation by the absent accomplice-declarant.
b. Cross-Examination of the Polished Accomplice. - Impeachment of the
accomplice-declarant in absentia may sound like a sterile process. As a
practical matter, however, both its substance and its likelihood of success
may be little different than in cross-examination of a live witness. 192 Real
cross-examination seldom matches the popular fantasy: a no-holdsbarred assault on a confounded liar who breaks down on the witness
stand and confesses his deceit. 193 Instead, most cross-examination is a
tightly controlled process with limited aims and much less dramatic results. Typically, the cross-examiner's questions are not really questions at
all; they are assertions of fact which the witness simply admits or denies.194 They are not aimed at discovering new information. Indeed, the
last thing the cross-examiner wants to hear is a new, unexpected fact. 195
190. Rule 806 allows the opponent of hearsay to attack the declarant's credibility "by
any evidence which would be admissible ... if declarant had testified as a witness." Fed. R.
Evid. 806. In the case of a prior inconsistent statement, Rule 806 exempts the opponent
from the requirement that the witness be given an opportunity to deny or explain the
inconsistency. Id.
191. See Richard H. Underwood, The Limits of Cross-Examination, 21 Am. J. Trial
Advoc. 113, 121 (1997) ("[I]n the real world, witnesses are not clay pigeons. They can
move, and some can shoot back.").
192. For the views of an experienced trial lawyer and an able jurist on the virtues of
cross-examination in absentia, see Bennett, supra note 183, at 1168; Brannon, supra note
183, at 158-59.
193. The reality of most cross-examinations is perhaps more aptly described by one of
its ablest teachers, Irving Younger, in his popular lecture. Commenting upon counsel's
typical disappointment at the results of cross-examination, Younger remarked, ''You
wanted the ground to open underneath you and swallow you up .... You had embarrassed
yourself." Irving Younger, The Art of Cross-Examination I6 (1976).
194. By prohibiting leading questions, the rules of evidence insure that direct
examination is a witness centered process. By contrast, cross-examination is a counsel
centered process. Counsel asks nothing but leading questions, and often gets little more
than a yes, or no, or a shrug from the witness. See Lubet, supra note 156, at 1 I7-I9.
195. Professor Mauet notes:
Many witnesses will seize every opportunity to hurt you. Cross-examination is not
a discovery deposition. This is not a time to fish for interesting information or to
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Most questions in cross-examination rest upon facts already known to the
questioner, especially facts that can be proved independently if denied by
the witness. 196 As a matter of substance, then, most of the facts typically
proved from the mouth of the cross-examined accomplice are precisely
the facts that a defendant could prove to impeach accomplice hearsay. Hi 7
ln live cross-examination, there is admittedly some impeachment value in
hearing such facts from the mouth of the witness himself. But often that
value is more than offset by the explanation that the well rehearsed witness has been prepared to give.
Of course, there is more to cross-examination than proof of facts. ln
live cross-examination, the accomplice-witness must respond on the spot
to evidence which may contradict or limit his testimony. Denials, explanations, and changes in testimony all impact his credibility, as do the
sweat on his brow and the shift in his eyes throughout the process. Hesitant or fumbling reactions to a courtroom surprise can harm his credibility more than his prior convictions or the promises that led the accomplice to testify. 198
But the very polishing process that serves to make accomplice testimony less reliable in the first place also serves to make demeanor less
useful for impeachment, and less accurate in assessing truth. Surprise is
seldom attainable with cooperating accomplices. The accomplice knows
the important questions on cross-examination because the prosecutor has
already asked them three times in pretrial interviews. And the answers
have become a little smoother each time. The polishing process can
transmogrify demeanor just as it can smooth out gaps and contradictions
satisfy your curiosity. IL~ sole purpose is to elicit favorable facL~ or minimize the
impact of the direct testimony. Accordingly, your cross-examination should tread
on safe ground.
Mauet, supra note 156, at 220. In the case of cooperating accomplices, defense counsel
may be especially cautious in cross-examination. Experienced counsel knows that a well
prepared accomplice seldom volunteers impeaching facL~. To the contrary, he is more
likely to explode a "land mine" of damaging testimony when defense counsel strays into
unpredictable areas of questioning.
196. "[NJ ever ask a question to which you do not already know the answer." Younger,
supra note 193, at 23.
197. For example, the accomplice's physical presence and live testimony normally
would not be necessary to prove his prior convictions, prior inconsistent stateme11L~. history
of mental illness, or past drug abuse. And if defense counsel had no independent
evidence of such impeaching facts, it is unlikely that he would ever discover them in the
first instance by engaging in a blind "fishing expedition" on cross-examination.
198. The Court has noted the significance of witness demeanor in cross-examination,
where the witness is compelled "to stand face tu face with the jlll)' in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
242-43 ( 1895). Likewise, Blackstone recognized the value of spontaneous answers in open
court: "[T) he occasional questions of the judge, the jut)', and the counsel, propounded to
the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of
interrogatories previously penned and settled .... " 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*373.
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in the substance of accomplice testimony. The purely visual effect of that
process can be stunning. Shoulder-length hair gives way to a conservative
trim. Fearsome tattoos disappear behind a well-pressed shirt sleeve.
Courtroom attire-not too casual, not too formal-replaces orange
prison garb or a grease-stained T-shirt. 199 Even language patterns can go
through a Pygmalian-like transformation before trial. Four letter words
take on additional syllables and a softer edge. As a result, the defendant
may confront his accomplice at trial, but he may not recognize the person who speaks from the witness stand.
Under the most spontaneous circumstances, trial demeanor is an inconsistent barometer of witness credibility. 200 In the case of a well prepared accomplice, demeanor may be a useless measure at best, and a
misleading one at worst. The Lilly jury may have gotten a more realistic
impression of Mark Lilly from the tape recording of his frightened, still
intoxicated voice on the night of his arrest201 than it would have gotten
from seeing the well scrubbed, sober version in the courtroom months
later.
In sum, drawing generalizations about the likely impact of cross-examination may be a haphazard process at best. But the Court's approach
invites just such a process. The Roberts formula asks the question, "Is the
hearsay just as reliable as the cross-examined version?" 202 With respect to
accomplice hearsay, the Lilly Court answered "no" without fully exploring
the problem. Though most of the Justices were appropriately skeptical
about blame-shifting confessions, none of them considered the alternative. Yet a close look at live testimony from the cooperating accomplice
can make hearsay look rather benign by comparison. Prosecutors have
virtually limitless power to offer inducements to cooperating witnesses.
199. "Prepare the witness for his courtroom appearance. Decide on what he should
wear. Jurors expect neat, conservatively dressed witnesses, with clothes appropriate to the
witness' background. For most witnesses this means a suit or jacket and tie." Mauet, supra
note 156, at 475-76. The physical "polishing" of otherwise disreputable wi01esses is one
reason for the familiar trial tactic of offering in evidence, and enlarging to near life-size, a
photograph of the witness in his more natural habitat, dress and hairstyle. Such
photographs are favorite props during closing arguments. Of course, this tactic works
equally well when the "witness" is an absent hearsay declarant.
200. Most empirical studies suggest that witness demeanor is a misleading measure of
truthfulness. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity
of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 Neb. L. Rev. 1157, 1189 (1993);
Olin Guy Wellborn lll, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075, 1091 (1991) (suggesting that
transcripts are superior to live testimony as a basis for credibility judgments). See generally
Hon. James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 903, 907 (2000)
(arguing that expert behavioral scientist testimony can enhance a jury's ability to assess
credibility based on demeanor).
20 I. While a videotape would have offered an even better view of Mark's demeanor, it
seems likely that the audiotape would have captured the slurring of his voice, reflecting the
degree of his intoxication. Likewise, the audiotape would reflect pauses, false starts, and
the pace and pitch of Mark's voice, all factors which may have provided more accurate
clues to credibility than would the responses of a well rehearsed witness.
202. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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Pretrial polishing of accomplice testimony is commonplace, and largely
shielded from adversarial scrutiny. Cross-examination may give the defense a fighting chance to show deceit or exaggeration. But the polishing
process itself reduces the likelihood of successful impeachment. And, at
least as a general proposition, efforts to impeach hearsay may provide just
as strong a chance of exposing deception. 20 ~ We are right to be concerned about both accomplice hearsay and cooperating accomplice testimony. When it comes to reliability, however, there is no clear reason to
fear one more than the other.

D. Boosting the Price for the Varnished Truth: How .Excluding Hearsay May
Decrease the Reliability of the Accom/Jlice 's Courtroom Testimony

A prosecutor needs admissible evidence to convict. When she can
predict that crucial hearsay will not be admitted in evidence, she will look
for something else to take its place. Often that search will lead her to
make a deal with the accomplice in exchange for his live testimony. 204
Excluding accomplice hearsay, then, may just replace one form of unreliable evidence with another. But the problem may not end there. Excluding accomplice hearsay may actually affect the quality of the live version
that replaces it. Simply stated, when we remove the prosecutor's option
to use hearsay, we increase the bargaining power of the accomplice. As a
result, the prosecutor must pay more for his testimony. And the more
she pays the accomplice to testify, the greater his incentive to lie.
Skilled negotiators understand that bargaining power does not stem
from wealth, position, charm, or bluster. It comes from having alternatives.20" lt makes no sense to accept a deal if you have an alternative that
is better, or less expensive. Accordingly, a negotiator's best alternative to
a negotiated agreement-his BATNA-often defines how much he is willing to pay or to accept to conclude the negotiation. 20 " A buyer will not
pay $50,000 for a Mercedes when he can get the same model next door
for $45,000. Even if there is only one Mercedes on the market, the availability of Fords and Chevrolets will exert at least a little limiting pressure
203. A~ a general proposition, it is hard to see how cross-examination of accomplice
witnesses would be of greater value in exposing truth than would cross-examination of
some other classes of hearsay declarant~ whose "reliable" hearsay the Court allows. See,
e.g., \>\'hite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 346 ( 1992) (allowing hearsay statement~ of child
describing incident~ of alleged abuse).
204. The step from exclusion of hearsay to "purchase" of live testimony from the
cooperating accomplice, of course, is not an automatic one. In some cases, that purchase
will prove impossible or unpalatable, leading the prosecutor to dismiss the case, negotiate
a plea favorable to the defendant, or take the risk of uying the weaker case. Sometimes the
prosecutor may find a different source for the same evidence, perhaps even a different
cooperating accomplice. But experience suggests that the "purchase" of testimony from
an accomplice will be the most popular choice among prosecutors. See supra text
accompanying notes 128-131.
205. Roger Fisher & William U1y, Getting to Yes 106-07 (Bruce Patton ed., 1981).
206. BATNA is an acronym developed by Professors Fisher and U1y. Id. at 104.
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on its price. Having an alternative increases the buyer's bargaining
power.
The same phenomenon controls negotiations between prosecutors
and potential cooperating witnesses. Consider a case like Lilly, where the
prosecutor has an interest in the live testimony of an accomplice, but has
a taped, blame-shifting statement from the same accomplice. As long as
the prosecutor holds the option to use hearsay, the accomplice is in a
weaker bargaining position. The prosecutor may prefer the live version,
but if the price becomes too high, she is likely to retreat to her BATNAthe hearsay. When the law of evidence or of confrontation removes the
hearsay option, however, the market for cooperation changes. 207 Now, if
the prosecutor cannot buy the accomplice's testimony, the only alternative may be to dismiss the case against his criminal colleague. Suddenly,
the value of testimony has gone up. The likely result is a deal where the
cooperator wins greater concessions-typically a lower sentence-in exchange for his cooperation. 208
A system which influences prosecutors to pay higher prices for cooperation reduces the reliability of already unreliable accomplice testimony.
That testimony is suspect from the beginning because the accomplice can
gain a benefit by implicating others, even where he must lie to do so.
And the greater the benefit, the greater the incentive to shade his story to
favor those who pay him. 209 In other words, a well paid cooperator is
207. As a matter of simple logic, of course, keeping hearsay as an option does not
eliminate the option of live testimony. But the law of evidence seldom leaves prosecutors
with the option of offering an accomplice's hearsay confession and the live, compelled
testimony of the same accomplice. The option typically does not exist because the
accomplice-declarant must be "unavailable" in order for his confession to be admitted
under the hearsay exception for statements against interest. See infra text accompanying
notes 228-231.
208. Of course, a long list of other factors can affect the willingness of both
prosecutor and cooperator to make a deal. The prosecutor's willingness to offer
sentencing concessions may be limited by organizational policies, sentencing guidelines, a
sense of equity, or a concern over public reaction to a deal that looks too "sweet." The
cooperator may not be willing to sell at all, especially if his fear of retribution by his
confederates outweighs his fear of long imprisonment. But at the margins, prosecutors will
have to pay more for cooperation where they have no realistic option of proving the same
facts through hearsay.
209. I am not aware of empirical studies which demonstrate that stronger
inducements lead to lies more often than weak inducements. But, based purely on logic
and human nature, the proposition makes sense. Experienced prosecutors recognize that
greater inducements pose a greater threat to truth. That is one of the reasons that
prosecutors are cautioned to "[d]rive a [h]ard [d]eal" in their dealings with potential
cooperating witnesses. Trott, supra note 34, at 1392. A sweetheart deal will be perceivedaccurately-as an invitation for falsehood. Indeed, this perception accounts in part for the
rule in Giglio v. United States requiring prosecutors to reveal any agreement which provides
benefits to a witness in exchange for testimony. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
The notion that strong inducements can lead to false condemnation arises in other
contexts as well. A frequent criticism of plea bargaining is that the most favorable bargains
are offered in the weakest cases, and that some inducements can be strong enough to
induce guilty pleas even from innocent defendants. The result, critics argue, is that plea
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likely to be more "cooperative" than a poorly compensated one.~ 10 The
end result is another irony. The Court excludes accomplice confessions
in the name of reliability. But its exclusionary rule can make false trial
testimony more likely. This does not mean that excluding accomplice
hearsay is necessarily a bad thing, or that admitting such hearsay is always
a good thing. My point is more limited. To the extent that it excludes
accomplice hearsay in the name of reliability, 1 doubt that the Court
achieves its goal.

11.

AVOIDING CONFRONTATION OF THE RELUCTANT ACCOMPLICE:

A GAME

OF CHICKEN AND A CATCH-22

ln Part 1, my focus was the Court's focus: reliability. The Court's
approach may not serve that goal very well in cases of accomplice hearsay.
But it may still serve the goal of the Confrontation Clause if it encourages
prosecutors to sign deals with accomplices and put them on the witness
stand. Even a staged confrontation, one might argue, is better than none
at all. Since the Lilly decision imposes some limit on accomplice hearsay,
we can at least give it credit for enticing a few accomplices off the sidelines and onto the field, even if they join the prosecution team before
play begins.
But there is another side to Lilly. Hearsay-even blame-shifting
hearsay from an accomplice-is still admissible under Roberts and Lilly as
long as it satisfies the Court's standard of reliability.~'' And despite the
result in Lilly, a prosecutor still improves the odds of admissibility if she
can fit hearsay within the exception for statements against penal interest.~'~ But this side of the Court's confrontation-hearsay formula can inbargaining is a poor vehicle for separating the guilty from the innocent. E.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 50, 60 (1968);
McMunigal, supra note 178, at 989-91; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster,
!01 Yale LJ. 1979, 2000 (1992). If strong inducement~ can lead to false selfcondemnation, no doubt they can lead to false condemnation of others.
210. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 35, at 580 (suggesting that defendant~ with exposure to
higher sentences have a greater motivation to "snitch").
211. Even hearsay that falls out~ide of a firmly rooted exception is admissible if the
circumstances provide "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 ( 1980). In Lilly, the plurality undertook an independent review of the
circumstances surrounding Mark Lilly's confession and found no such "guarantees." Lilly
v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 135-39 ( 1999) (plurality opinion). The Chief.Justice argued that
the case should be remanded to allow the Supreme Court of Virginia to make that
determination in the first instance. Id. at 148-49 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring). Lower
court rulings after Lilly demonstrate that this option remains viable for prosecutors. E.g.,
United States v. Pap<~john, 212 F.3d 1112, I I IS-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (admitting grand jury
testimony of unavailable accomplice based upon circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness).
212. The Court has yet to summon a majority to determine whether the exception for
statement~ against interest, properly limited to "genuinely selt~inculpatory" statements, is a
firmly rooted exception. The Court suggested as much in Williamson. Williamson v.
United States, 5I2 U.S. 594, 605 (1994). In Lilly, Chief.Justice Rehnquist and at least two
other Justices seem to hold out for that result. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 145-46 (Rehnquist,
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fluence pretrial choices in a perverse way. It ·can lead prosecutors and
defendants to ignore confrontation.
A. The Game of Chicken: How the Court Allows Prosecution and Defense to
Ignore Confrontation While Arguing About Confrontation
Lilly is not the first case where the Court has decided a Confrontation Clause battle between parties who showed little interest in confrontation at trial. It is not even the starkest example of that phenomenon. In
Dutton v. Evans, a case dealing with an accomplice's jailhouse confession
implicating the accused, defense counsel candidly informed the Court at
oral argument that he could have subpoenaed the accomplice-declarant
for testimony at trial, but "concluded that this course would not be in the
best interests of his client." 213 In United States v. Inadi, the government
introduced hearsay statements of a nontestifying coconspirator who was
within the trial court's subpoena power and who never asserted a claim of
privilege. 214 The government made a half-hearted effort to subpoena the
coconspirator, but abandoned the effort when the witness claimed "car
trouble" and failed to appear for trial. 215 Though the trial court offered
to have the coconspirator produced as a witness, defense counsel never
responded to the offer. 216 Instead, she chose to pursue a Confrontation
Clause challenge to the admission of the hearsay. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court observed, "[T] he actions of the parties in this
case demonstrate what is no doubt a frequent occurrence in conspiracy
cases-neither side wants a coconspirator as a witness." 217 But the parties' collective disinterest in confrontation did not change the Court's
approach. Like most of the Court's confrontation-hearsay opinions, 218
Dutton and Inadi both turned on the Court's assessment of the reliability
CJ., concurring). At a minimum, the Chief Justice suggesL~, those statements against
interest that are "genuinely self-inculpatory," id. at 146, and perhaps those statemenL~
made outside of custodial interrogation as well, id. at 146-47, should fit within a firmly
rooted exception. Even after Lilly, therefore, prosecutors improve the odds of admissibility
by offering the "genuinely self-inculpatory" portions of an accomplice confession under
the exception for statements against interest. Likewise, they improve their odds by relying
on the same exception when offering accomplice statements made outside of custodial
interrogation. The resulL~ in a handful of post-Lilly cases confirm the value of that strategy.
See, e.g., United States v. Boone, 229 F.3d 1231, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming
conviction where trial court admitted accomplice's statements against interest made to
girlfriend); United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 668-69 (1st Cir. 2000) (admitting
statements against interest made to friends).
213. 400 U.S. 74, 88 n.19 (1970).
214. 475 U.S. 387, 390 (1986).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 397 n.7.
218. Since Roberts, all of the Court's confrontation-hearsay cases have turned on the
question of reliability, with one important exception: cases where the hearsay declarant
actually testified. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988) ("We do not think such
an inquiry [into reliability] is called for when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and
subject to unrestricted cross-examination."); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985).
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of hearsay. It did not matter that confrontation was-quite literallywithin reach of both parties.
Prosecutors and defendants are skittish about accomplices as witnesses, and for good reason. 219 In preparing for trial, pragmatic lawyers
prefer to avoid potentially damaging surprises. From the defense perspective, no witness carries greater potential for damage than an accomplice. The accomplice simply knows too much. And few witnesses are
less predictable. The accomplice is caught in a tug-of-war. On one side is
his loyalty to-or perhaps his fear of-the defendant. On the other is his
fear of the prosecutor and the court, whose charging and sentencing decisions will take into account anything he may say as a witness. Where
that tension will lead may be anybody's guess. But few defendants seem
anxious to bet on its outcome. As a result, in-court confrontation with his
accomplice is often the last thing the defendant really wants, no matter
how proficient his counsel may be at cross-examination. His protests
under the Confrontation Clause are aimed at excluding hearsay, not at
promoting a confrontation.22o
Prosecutors fear accomplice-witnesses for similar reasons. The law
enforcement lexicon describing cooperating accomplices contains a variety of colorful terms, none of which is a synonym for "hero" or "solid
citizen." 221 Prosecutors accept cooperators as a necessary, though distasteful, cost of the business of investigating crime and proving criminal
charges.222 Of course, prosecutors have more power than defendants to
control, or at least to predict, the substance of accomplice testimony because the law allows them to pay for it. The purchase price usually guarantees an opportunity to inspect the goods, and perhaps even to repair
damaged goods before use at trial. Still, prosecutors rightly fear that an
unsavory witness may taint their whole case. 223 Where an alternative is
available, prosecutors will be quick to seize it. And a hearsay confession
can provide that alternative. A prosecutor will choose hearsay where ( 1)
it proves what she needs to prove, and (2) it is likely to be more convincing than the live version. At the margins, therefore, she will opt for hearsay when it is most probative and when it comes from an accomplice who
219. See supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
220. Other factors may contribute further to the tendency of defendanL~ to favor
challenges to admissibility over serious efforL~ to confront or impeach an available
declarant. Particularly for poorly funded defense counsel with limited time, a
constitutional challenge to admissibility is ordinarily less difficult and less time consuming
than the factual investigation necessary Lo mount an effective cross-examination of the
accomplice. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 221-23. And, where the
odds of successful impeachment seem low, a defendant's best tactical choice may be to
avoid confrontation of the accomplice altogether, thus preserving his "Lilly'' issue for
appeal. lei.
221. The terms most favored by prosecutors and police have evolved from the ancient
"stool pigeon," to the long popular "snitch," to the more pejorative "scumbag" or "dirt
ball."
222. Trott, supra note 34, at 1390-91.
223. Id. at 1388-90.
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is likely to make the worst impression as a live witness. 224 In other words,
she will choose hearsay in those cases where live confrontation could
make the most difference.
This kind of risk aversion can lead both parties to avoid confrontation with an unpredictable accomplice. And the law of confrontation
provides little counterweight to that tendency. Because confrontationhearsay doctrine boils down to an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, a defendant can raise a Confrontation Clause objection even though
the declarant may be sitting outside the courtroom and willing to testify. 225 For her part, the prosecutor may answer that objection without
making any effort to bring the accomplice-declarant to the witness stand,
even when she has the power to do so at little or no risk to other
prosecutorial interests. In opting to use hearsay, of course, she must calculate the likelihood of admissibility. But that calculation does not require her to consider whether confrontation is possible and how she
might bring it about. Indeed, she does not improve her chance of admitting a favorable hearsay statement if she offers to immunize the accomplice. 226 Instead, she must consider only whether the hearsay meets the
Court's test for reliability. Normally, that means assessing whether the
hearsay, or critical parts of it, can fit within a firmly rooted exception to
the hearsay rule.
Prosecutors are accustomed to approaching confrontation-hearsay issues from that perspective. Ever since Roberts elevated "firmly rooted"
hearsay exceptions to the status of constitutional shibboleth, prosecutors
have proved adept at pigeonholing an increasing variety of hearsay within
established exceptions to assure its admissibility under the Confrontation
Clause. 227 The fragmented decision in Lilly did not end the practice of
pigeonholing accomplice hearsay to suit the constitutional standard. At
best, it refined the rules. Today's prosecutors offer in evidence "genu224. Mark Lilly could probably serve as poster child for this class of accomplicedeclarant.
225. Both United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986), and Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 88 n.19 (1970), are examples. See supra note 9.
226. By immunizing the declarant or otherwise bringing about confrontation, she
may lose the right to offer favorable hearsay under the exception for statements against
interest. See infra text accompanying notes 231-232.
227. I use the term "pigeonholing" to describe the practice of insuring the
admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause by arguing that it falls within a
traditional "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, even after the boundaries of the traditional
exception have been expanded by modern re-interpretation. For a more complete
discussion of the phenomenon and its impact on the generally expanding world of
admissible hearsay, see Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note IO, at 210-14; see also
supra text accompanying note I 18.
Lilly itself is an example of the pigeonholing tactic. The prosecution sought
constitutional blessing for Mark Lilly's confession by labeling the entire, rambling narrative
a "statement against interest," even though most of it was an effort to deny responsibility
and shift blame for the most serious crimes. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 144-45
(1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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inely self-inculpatory" statements against interest, or "non-custodial" statements against interest. 228 In other words, rather than promoting confrontation of accomplices, Lilly may only have encouraged prosecutors to
think harder about hearsay labels. 22 Y
In sum, by consistently ignoring confrontation in its constitutional
analysis, the Court has invited prosecutors and defendants to ignore confrontation as a tactical choice. Since admissibility turns entirely on reliability, both parties can calculate their Confrontation Clause strategies
without regard for real opportunities to confront the accomplice or to
impeach his hearsay. As a result, confrontation-hearsay arguments often
become a game of Sixth Amendment "chicken," with both parties pursuing an all-or-nothing battle over the reliability-and, hence, the admissibility-of hearsay, while neither is really anxious to see the accomplice on
the witness stand.

B. The Catch-22: How the Law oJEvidence Discourages Confrontation of the
Reluctant AccornjJlice

The Court's Sixth Amendment doctrine allows prosecution and defense to ignore confrontation while they debate hearsay labels. But the
problem deepens when we take into account the law of evidence. To
satisfy the Confrontation Clause, prosecutors must rely on the law of evidence. And to satisfy the law of evidence, prosecutors must avoid confrontation. In combination, the law of evidence and the Court's confrontation doctrine have created a Catch-22. 2 ~ 0 Here is why.
228. See supra notes 211-212.
229. The notion of pigeonholing hearsay to satisl)' the Confrontation Clause may
involve more than the clever structuring of evidentiar-y argument. It may also lead
prosecutors and police to structure the hearsay evidence itself in order to fit within
acceptable hearsay labels. 1 am not suggesting that the Court's doctrine encourages the
creation of false evidence. To the contra1-y, the process or structuring hearsay can be
accomplished quite legitimately by a well informed interrogator. Knowing that only
genuinely self~inculpator-y portions or a jailhouse confession are admissible, a patient
interviewer can frame questions that are likely to lead to admissible answers that will still
prove useful against a colleague in crime. The results may be admissible under the Court's
standards, though the answers may be no more reliable than Mark Lilly's, and no more
subject to confrontation by the defense at trial.
Structuring law enforcement tactics to satist)' confrontation and hearsay doctrine is
nothing new, and it is not unique to the jailhouse interview of an accomplice. The
potential admissibility of hearsay is one reason why medical personnel are encouragedand sometimes trained-to question child victims of sexual abuse about the identity of the
perpetrator and the circumstances of the abuse. A police officer may ask the same
questions, but the answers may not be admitted as "statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis," even though the child-declarant may perceive no difference in the
circumstances surrounding the two interviews.
230. A "Catch-22" is a dilemma wherein the steps necessary to achieve an outcome
necessarily result in the defeat of that outcome. It is a trap, a "no win" situation. The term
derives from the popular novel, Catch-22, by Joseph Heller. The central character, an
American bombardier named Yossarian, seeks to avoid flying further bombing missions
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For two decades, the Roberts formula has encouraged prosecutors to
characterize accomplice confessions as statements against penal interest.
Though the target may be a little smaller after Lilly, the incentive remains
to pigeonhole hearsay within that exception. But to satisfy the hearsay
exception for statements against interest, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the declarant is "unavailable."2 31 An accomplice who validly
asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege and refuses to testify is "unavailable" within the meaning of the rule. 232 In many cases, the prosecutor
may have the power to immunize a reluctant accomplice with no realistic
risk to future prosecutions. But the prosecutor cannot pursue that option if she wants to use the hearsay. Instead, to win the use of favorable
hearsay, she must make sure the accomplice remains "unavailable." She
can satisfy the law of evidence only by avoiding confrontation. 233
On the surface, that may not seem like too much of a problem. If
she can get the live testimony, one might ask, why does the prosecutoror the jury for that matter-need the hearsay? But the problem is not
that simple. An immunized accomplice provides no guarantee that his
courtroom testimony will sound anything like the hearsay version. Without a deal for full cooperation, he remains a hostile, unpredictable witness. If granted use immunity and compelled to speak, he is just as likely
to disclaim his earlier version as to confirm it. 234 Aside from paying for
his testimony, the prosecutor's only option for reproducing the original
version will be to offer the hearsay in evidence. And there is the catch.
over Italy during World War II. He discovers that a flyer can get himself grounded if he is
crazy. Then he learns the catch:
"Sure, there's a catch," Doc Daneeka replied. "Catch-22. Anyone who wants to
get out of combat duty isn't really crazy."
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a
concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate
was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would
have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he
didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and
didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was
moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out
a respectful whistle.
"That's some catch, that Catch-22," he observed.
Joseph Heller, Catch-22 55 (Scribner Paperback Fiction ed., 1996) (1955).
231. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b) (3). Virginia's hearsay exception for statements against
interest, like that of most states, applies only where the declarant is unavailable. Lilly v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 533 (Va. 1998) (citing Ellison v. Commonwealth, 247
S.E.2d 685, 688 (Va. 1978)). See generally 2 Strong, supra note 50, § 320, at 330 (noting
that most states require that declarant be unavailable).
232. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(I); Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d at 533.
233. Ironically, the unavailability requirement in the law of evidence was designed to
establish a "preference" for live testimony. 2 Strong, supra note 50, § 253, at 127.
234. Mark Lilly did exactly that. Once he reached his own plea bargain with the
government, Mark testified at his brother's sentencing and recanted much of his earlier
statement. See supra note 8.
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Under the law of evidence, that option means the prosecutor must avoid
confrontation. The accomplice must remain unavailable. 235
The Court's approach to confrontation encourages a prosecutor to
embrace the hearsay exception for statements against interest. Once she
takes that course, the law of evidence offers the prosecutor a limited
choice: hearsay or confrontation. There is no room in the law of evidence for a different choice: hearsay and confrontation.2 3 G As a result,
juries hear from accomplices in two kinds of cases: ( 1) cases like Lilly,
Dutton, and Inadi, where the jury hears the hearsay version without confrontation, and (2) cases where prosecutors make a deal to purchase accomplice testimony. We almost never see a third case: where the jury
hears the hearsay version and the defendant has a real confrontation with
his accomplice, untainted by deals with the government. That is the case
where the jury hears evidence more like the investigators hear it, before it
has been packaged and polished. That case may offer the jury the best
opportunity to sift through conflicting stories and arrive at the truth. But
that case is caught in the Catch-22 between the law of evidence and the
law of confrontation.
Changing the hearsay rules-by eliminating the "unavailability" requirement for statements against interest-might allow that approach. 237
235. There is a way out of the Catch-22, though it is unpopular with prosecuto1·s. A
prosecutor may forsake the penal interest exception and attempt to admit the hearsay
under the residual exception, which applies whether or not the declarant is available. See
Fed. R. Evie!. 807. But to satisfy that exception and the Confrontation Clause as well, she
must demonstrate "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" in the circumstances
surrounding the statement. Ohio v. RoberL~, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Generally, that is a
riskier proposition for prosecutors than aiming for a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
Compare Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816-18 (1990) (disallowing hearsay statemenL~ of
child abuse victim offered under residual exception), with White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
348-49 (1992) (allowing almost identical statemenL~ offered under firmly rooted
exceptions for ·spontaneous declarations and statements for purposes of medical
diagnosis). Still, both before and after Lilly, prosecutors have convinced a number of
courL~ to find "particularized guarantees" to support a wide variety of hearsay. See United
States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (admitting grand jury testimony
of unavailable accomplice based upon circumstantial guarantees of trnstworthiness); see
also Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 43, at 2120-23 (documenting success of
prosecutors in persuading federal courL~ to admit hearsay under residual exception).
236. Currently, the Federal Rules allow a prosecutor to offer hearsay as substantive
evidence where it is inconsistent with the witness's courtroom testimony and where the
hearsay statement was given under oath in another proceeding. Fed. R. Evie!.
801 (cl) (1) (A). Most accomplice confessions will not satisfy the Rule, however, because few
are given under oath. Sometimes, Rule 801 (cl) (1) (A) provides a means to offer
accomplice hearsay given in grand jury testimony where the prosecutor calls the witness
only to be surprised when he recants his earlier version. Nevertheless, in the absence of
such surprise, many courts still cling to the "voucher" rnle prohibiting a party from
impeaching his own witness. See 1 Strong, supra note 50, at 58.
237. Another means to allow hearsay and confrontation would be to adopt a provision
similar to Rule 503(b) of the Model Code of Evidence, which allows hearsay whenever the
cleclarant "is present and subject to cross-examination." Model Code of Evidence R.
503(b) (1942). Some critics argue that the Model Rules approach would allow prosecutors
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But we would need a different set of incentives under the Confrontation
Clause to encourage that result. Those incentives would arise, 1 believe, if
we treated the Clause not as a right to exclude unreliable hearsay, but as a
right to confront whatever hearsay the law of evidence might permit. In
Part llI, I will outline the contours of that right. Then 1 will suggest how
it might affect the pretrial decisions that determine the hearsay landscape
of criminal trials.

III.

CONFRONTING THE RELUCTANT ACCOMPLICE

A. Missing the Point of the Confrontation Clause

The Court treats the Confrontation Clause as an exclusionary rule
for unreliable hearsay. 238 I believe it is both less and more than that.
Both the law of evidence and the Due Process Clause stand as protections
against unreliable hearsay in criminal cases. Treating the Confrontation
Clause as an exclusionary rule has made it redundant, and largely useless,
as a constitutional protection. 239 Worse yet, treating the Clause as a rule
of evidence has led courts and parties to ignore its value as an adversarial
right that can and should play an important role even after hearsay is
admitted in evidence. The Court has gone so far as to suggest that the
confrontation right is "satisfied" once reliable hearsay is admitted. 240 In
my view, the confrontation right is no more satisfied in that circumstance
than it would be by allowing a reliable prosecution witness to testify without cross-examination.
Neither the text nor the history of the Sixth Amendment makes the
Court's approach inevitable. The history of the Confrontation Clause is
to craft carefully prepared hearsay statements, then simply tender an uncooperative
declarant for cross-examination. See Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) advisory committee's note. I
suggest that the Model Rules approach makes a great deal more sense than the current
rules which, as I have described, actually encourage prosecutors to avoid confrontation of
potentially available declarants. v\'here prosecutors can obtain live testimony for direct
examination, tactical considerations usually will dictate that they do so. A live witness is
simply more convincing than hearsay. See supra note 180. And where both hearsay and
the live witness are available, why not let the jury hear both? A jmy will have a better
chance at arriving at the truth when it knows both what the accomplice first said to police
and what he now has to say in court, subject to cross-examination.
238. Confrontation-hearsay issues are framed in terms of admissibility before they
ever reach the Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27. Perhaps it is
not surprising, then, that all of the Court's Confrontation Clause opinions approach
hearsay from the same perspective. They view the Clause as a rule of evidence: a
constitutional "super-hearsay" rule which either admits or excludes particular hearsay
statements. See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 814 ("The Confrontation Clause, in other words,
bars the admission of some evidence that would othenvise be admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule.").
239. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 206 ("The 'general
approach' of Roberts has evolved into an exclusionary rule that excludes very little.");
Jonakait, supra note 22, at 622 (arguing that the Court's approach has reduced the
Confrontation Clause to the role of "minor adjunct of evidence law").
240. White, 502 U.S. at 356.
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notoriously unilluminating. 241 Justice Harlan, probably the Court's most
thorough student of that history, wrote that the "Confrontation Clause
comes to us on faded parchment." 242 His observation has stood the dual
tests of time and intense academic scrutiny. Able scholars have sifted
through that history, with few conclusive results.2 43 My own view is that
the Framers may not have intended for the Clause to exclude any hearsay
at all. 244 The Clause was probably intended-at least in part-to forbid
trial by ex parte affidavit. 245 But history does not tell us whether such a
prohibition requires exclusion of hearsay, or whether even "testimonial"
hearsay like an affidavit might be admissible as long as the government
produces the declarant to testify in person. 246 The Framers may have left
the admissibility of hearsay to the law of evidence. 247 If they considered
hearsay at all in adopting the Clause, they may have intended only a right
to produce available declarants for cross-examination. 248 At any rate,
there is little historical evidence that the Clause was intended to constitutionalize the hearsay rule and its exceptions which, in effect, is what the
Roberts formula has done.2 49
241. Friedman, supra note 19, at 1022 ("The origins of the Clause are famously
obscure.").
242. California v. Green, 399 U.S. l 49, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
243. For two excellent accounts of the available historical material, see Berger, supra
note 19, at 567-86; Lilly, supra note 69, at 208-15.
244. In an earlier article, l offered my own interpretation of the Clause's ambiguous
history. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note l 0, at 234-40. What follows here is
a summary of those views.
245. The Court seems to accept this view. Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57; Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-41 (1999)
(Breyer,.J., concurring); White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas,.J., concurring).
246. The Mattox Court, for example, described the aim of the Clause as preventing
the use of ex parte affidavits "in lieu of" live testimony and cross-examination. Mattox, 156
U.S. at 242. The Mattox Court seems not to have contemplated the possibility of some
form of out-of~ourt statement in addition to live, cross-examined testimony.
247. That was Wigmore's conclusion:
The Constitution does not prescribe what kinds of testimonial statements (dying
declarations or the like) shall be given infrajudicially-this depends on the law of
evidence for the time being-but only what mode of procedure shall be
followed-Le., a cross-examining procedure-in the case of such testimony as is
required by the ordinary law of evidence to be given infrajudicially.
5 Wigmore, supra note 76, § 1397 (a), at l 59.
248. After reviewing the "amorphous backdrop" of Sixth Amendment history, .Justice
Harlan concluded that "the Confrontation Clause ... reaches no farther than to require
the prosecution to fnvduce any available witness whose declarations it seeks to use in a
criminal trial." Green, 399 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., concurring).
ln a celebrated turnabout less than a year later, Justice Harlan backed away from that
position, fearing that it would be impractical to require production of available declarants
in many cases where hearsay was routinely accepted in the absence of confrontation.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that
production of declarant would be "unduly inconvenient and of small utility" in cases
involving, e.g., business records).
249. The notion that the Confrontation Clause might track the hearsay rule, and its
exceptions, appears first in dictum in the Court's earliest confrontation-hearsay opinion.
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The text of the Sixth Amendment says nothing about excluding
hearsay. 250 The defendant's right is "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." 251 Still, when it comes to hearsay, that language poses a
dilemma which seems naturally to lead to exclusion. If the "witness" is a
hearsay declarant, how can the accused "confront" him? And if the accused cannot confront the declarant, then how can we allow hearsay at
all? Excluding all hearsay offers a straightforward way to protect the right
of confrontation. But the Court has never been willing to adopt such a
rule, for both historical and practical reasons. 252 Instead, for more than
a century, the Court has simply made exceptions to the rule when hearsay
is sufficiently reliable. And for the last twenty years, the exceptions have
tracked the law of evidence.
Textually at least, there is another way out of the dilemma. A declarant may be a "witness" in the sense that he is an observer of events. But,
perhaps he is not a "witness against the accused" until he testifies. This
construction of the Sixth Amendment text-which has been advanced by
the Department ofjustice, 253 supported by prominent academics, 254 and
endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas 255-would split the confrontation-hearsay pie along relatively clear lines. On one side would be "testimonial" hearsay. If a declarant testifies in a formal proceeding designed
to create evidence for use at a criminal trial-as in grandjury testimony,
an affidavit, or perhaps even in a jailhouse confession-then he is a "witness against" the accused. The Confrontation Clause would forbid use of
See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243 (noting that confrontation right is "subject to exceptions,
recognized long before the adoption of the Constitution, and not interfering at all with its
spirit," then identifying dying declaration as an example of such an exception).
250. As Justice Harlan commented, "The language is particularly ill-chosen if what was
intended was a prohibition on the use of any hearsay .... " Dutton, 400 U.S. at 95 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
251. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
252. Historically, it seems unlikely that the Confrontation Clause was intended to
exclude all hearsay, since many forms of hearsay passed without complaint in English and
Colonial courts during the American constitutional period. See supra note 76. And as a
practical matter, many trials would prove almost impossible without some exceptions to a
rigid rule against hearsay. It is hard to imagine any form of complex, commercial litigation
in the absence of a rule allowing business records, for example.
253. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
9-10, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113).
254. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to
Professor Friedman, 86 Geo. LJ. 1045, 1045-50 (1998); Friedman, supra note 19, at
1038-43 (arguing that "witnesses against" the accused include any declarants who make
statements intended to be used in a criminal prosecution).
255. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[The Confrontation
Clause) is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions."); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864-65 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(contending that the phrase, "witnesses against him," denotes only those witnesses to
events who later give testimony against an accused).
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such testimonial hearsay without regard to reliability. 256 On the other
side of the constitutional line would be all other "garden variety" hearsay,
like business records or spontaneous declarations: statements written or
uttered in nontestimonial settings with no intention that they serve as
evidence against an accused. The Confrontation Clause simply would not
deal with such statements because the declarant would not be a "witness
against" the accused. Nontestimonial hearsay would be admissible, or
not, depending solely on the law of evidence. This approach, its proponents suggest, comports not only with the Sixth Amendment text, 257 but
also with the historical evidence that the Framers' main Confrontation
Clause target was the infamous Star Chamber practice of trial by
affidavit. 2 5 8
The Court has rejected this approach, based largely on the Roberts
line of precedent, 259 but has never addressed its merits. Though I believe the Roberts reliability-based formula is seriously flawed, I am no more
optimistic about the Scalia-Thomas "testimonial hearsay" approach. First,
I have little confidence that excluding hearsay really eliminates the risk of
manufactured evidence. In the case of accomplices, it simply converts
that evidence into an equally manufactured but probably more dangerous form: the live testimony of a polished cooperator. 260 Second, one
need not exclude hearsay to protect against Star Chamber-like abuses. In
the celebrated treason prosecution to which some have traced the right
of confrontation, Sir Walter Raleigh did not seek to exclude the out of
court confession of his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, who implicated Raleigh in a plot against the Crown. Instead, Raleigh demanded
confrontation. "[L]et Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser
before my face, and I have done." 2 fi 1 If Raleigh's argument is our model,
then we should seek an approach that allows for both hearsay and confrontation. 262 Third, and most important, the Scalia-Thomas approach
shortchanges the adversarial right at the core of the Confrontation
256. See White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas,J., concurring).
257. See Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, supra note 31, at 647.
258. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6,
tt'hite, 502 U.S. 346 (No. 90-6113); Berger, supra note 19, at 503; Friedman, supra note 19,
at 1023-25.
259. See tt'hite, 502 U.S. at 353 (noting that the testimonial hearsay argument "comes
too late in the day" in light of the Roberts line of cases).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 125-135.
261. Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for High Treason, 1603, 2 Complete Collection of
State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from
the Earliest Period to the Present Time 1, 16 (R. Bagshaw ed., 1809).
262. The Court appeared to accept this view in Califarnia v. Green. Justice White,
writing for the majority, noted that objections to the practice of trial by aftidavit
appear primarily to have been aimed at the failure to call the witness to confront
personally the defendant at his trial. So far as appears, in claiming confrontation
rights no objection was made against receiving a witness' out-of-court depositions
or statements, so long as the witness was present at trial ....
399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
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Clause. At heart, the confrontation right is the right to an adversarial
process for testing evidence. 263 If most hearsay declarants are not "witnesses," then we have deprived defendants of a constitutional basis for
insisting that hearsay, like live testimony, must be subject to adversarial
challenge. To me, that is a high price to pay for the convenience of a
bright line rule which neither the text nor the history of the Sixth
Amendment really requires.
The Lilly Court seems poised on the edge of a choice between the
Roberts reliability based formula and the Scalia-Thomas view that only declarants of "testimonial" hearsay are "witnesses against" the accused. 2 64 1
believe either choice would be a mistake. There is a third approach, consistent with the text, history, and-most important-the fundamental
purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Hearsay declarants are "witnesses
against" the accused. We simply must learn how to treat them like
witnesses.

B. The Right to Confront Hearsay
When courts and parties debate the reliability of hearsay, they are
missing the point about confrontation. The right of confrontation does
not guarantee reliable evidence. 265 After all, there is no guarantee that a
cross-examined witness is telling the truth. Conversely, the Confrontation Clause allows cross-examination even where it may discredit an honest and accurate witness. Instead, the Clause guarantees a process of adversarial challenge to prosecution evidence. That process may or may not
produce reliable evidence, but it is designed at least to give the defendant
a fighting chance to expose the flaws in prosecution. testimony. In the
263. Justice Scalia himself recognized this basic starting point in Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable
evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable
evidence , , , .").
264. The concurring opinions of Justices Scalia and Thomas adhere to the
"testimonial hearsay" view. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J,
concurring); id. at 143-44 (Thomas,]., concurring). Much of Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion is devoted to that theory, though he ultimately concludes that a full reevaluation
of the Court's approach must await "another day." ld. at 143 (Breyer,]., concurring), The
opinions of Justice Stevens and the Chief Justice, however, adhere to the Roberts "general
approach" for assessing hearsay based on reliability. See id. at 124-25 (plurality opinion);
id. at 144-48 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
265. Indeed, there is little about the Sixth Amendment as a whole that suggests its aim
is reliability. The Amendment calls for an "impartial" jury, not a jury of experts most likely
to arrive at a reliable conclusion. U.S. Const. amend. VL It calls for the right to
compulsory process, a right which entitles the accused to ohtain all witnesses "in his favor,"
whether they be reliable citizens or convicted perjurers. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18-19 (1967) (invalidating a Texas rule that prohibited defendant from calling an
accomplice as a witness), And it provides a right to counsel: a counsel who has the
obligation to impeach even "reliable" witnesses where the opportunity arises. See United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967) (White,J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting defense counsel's obligation to defend the guilty as well as the innocent).
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case of a live witness, that process is easy enough to define. lt involves
testing the witness through face to face cross-examination under the penetrating glare of a jury. 266
Hearsay, unfortunately, has led the Court to drift away from the process at the core of the confrontation right. The Court strayed first from
confrontation to reliability, then from reliability to "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions. 267 The result is a sterile debate over hearsay labels, while
living, breathing hearsay declarants cool their heels in silence outside of
the courtroom. The Court first rationalized this drift as a matter of necessity. 268 But necessity is a poor excuse when no one has really explored
whether confrontation is possible. And even when live cross-examination
is impossible, why should we drift so far? Would it not make more sense
to look for a process that still involves the adversarial testing of hearsay?
That process, 1 believe, is how the Confrontation Clause deals with
hearsay. The Sixth Amendment creates a right to confront hearsay. 26 \' lt
creates a right for the defense to treat hearsay declarants like the "witnesses," which the Court insists that they are. Where the law of evidence
allows the prosecutor to present hearsay, the Confrontation Clause allows
the defense to subject that hearsay to adversarial challenge, to attempt to
impeach, contradict or limit the declarant's "testimony" like that of any
other witness. If the declarant is available, the right is simple enough.
The defendant can demand confrontation and get it. 270 If the declarant
might be made available through reasonable efforts-as in the case of
many reluctant accomplices-then the defendant has a right to those efforts. 271 And if the declarant is truly unavailable-as with declarants who
266. See 5 Wigmore, supra note 76, § 1395, at 150 ("The main and essential purpose
of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination."
(emphasis omitted)).
267. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88.
268. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
269. Part 111.B of this article describes the basic contours of the right to confront
hearsay. In an earlier article, I offered a more detailed description of the elements of that
right. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 241-71.
270. My own view of the right to confront available declaranL~ is akin to the view
originally expressed by Justice Harlan in California v. Green. See 399 U.S. 149, 174 ( 1970)
(Harlan,J., concurring); see also supra note 248. I would add, however, that in the case of
available declaranL~. we should expect the defendant to exercise the right by demanding
confrontation and exercising the right of confrontation. A~ a general rule, that should
address Justice Harlan's later concerns that it would be impractical to require the
government to produce all available hearsay declarants as a predicate to the admissibility of
hearsay. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan,J., concurring) (noting that
production of the declarant would be "unduly inconvenient and of small utility" in some
cases). There should be no reason to produce even an available declarant where
defendant asserL~ no plausible interest in cross-examination as, for example, in most cases
involving business or public records.
271. Such efforrn may include moving fo10 a compulsion and use immunity order, at
least where immunity poses no realistic threat ,to the government's legitimate interest in
prosecuting the accomplice. See infra text accompanying notes 330-338.
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have died or disappeared-then the defendant has a right to any available means to impeach the declarant in absentia. 272
Under this approach, courts would not exclude, or admit, hearsay
under the Confrontation Clause on the basis of its supposed reliability.
When considering an accomplice confession, then, the question for the
court and the parties would not be, "ls it reliable?" The law of evidence,
and the Due Process Clause, 273 would settle that question. Instead, the
proper question under the Confrontation Clause would be, "What steps
can we take to allow for a fair challenge to the hearsay?" To the extent
that exclusion of evidence might be considered at all, it would be as leverage. That is, a court might exclude hearsay if the government took steps
that blocked confrontation, or failed to take steps that would allow for
confrontation. 274 Conversely, a court would be free to deny a confrontation challenge from a defendant who declined to take advantage of an
available opportunity to exercise the right. 275
An approach that measured the confrontation right by a defendant's
opportunity to mount a fair challenge to prosecution hearsay would encourage pretrial choices unlike those we now see. Confrontation-hearsay
debates would take on a very different flavor. They would have little to do
with reliability. and hearsay labels. Instead, they would focus on
confrontation.
C. Reconsidering Pretrial Choices in Light of the Right to Confront Hearsay

By the time we see them in appellate courts, confrontation-hearsay
issues are all about the admissibility of hearsay. The cases only reach the
272. See supra text accompanying notes 185-192; see also Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility, supra note 10, at 251-60.
273. One reason for applying the Confrontation Clause as a rule excluding unreliable
hearsay stems from a fear that, without constitutional restraint, the states would be free to
admit any hearsay that prosecutors found convenient. My own view is that such fear is
unfounded and misdirected. For one thing, Lilly notwithstanding, today's Confrontation
Clause has evolved into an exclusionary rule that excludes very little. Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility, supra note 10, at 206. lndeed, it seems likely that the Court's approach to
confrontation has actually hastened the expansion of hearsay exceptions in state courts.
Id. at 206, 211. For another, the Constitution already includes an outer limit on unreliable
evidence: the Due Process Clause. Westen, supra note 53, at 598 (arguing that Due
Process Qause excludes prosecution evidence where it does not possess" 'sufficient aspects
of reliability' to be intelligently evaluated by the jury for its proper weight" (quoting
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977))); see also Dutton, 400 U.S. at 99 (1970)
(Harlan,]., concurring) (judging admission of evidence under Due Process Clause).
274. For example, although the court 'may not have the power to require the
government to grant use immunity to a witness, the court can put the government to a
choice between granting use immunity on the one hand, or foregoing use of the
accomplice's hearsay confession ori the other.
275. ln light of the general aversion of mariy defendants to facing their accomplices
in court, see supra text accompanying notes 219-220, it seems likely that a number of
Confrontation Clause objections to hearsay would simply evaporate when trial courts
responded to such challenges by offering defendants exactly wbat they asked for: a real
confrontation.
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appellate stage after the government has offered hearsay, the defendant
has objected, the trial court has overruled the objection, and the jury has
found the defendant guilty. 276 But if we could turn the clock back to the
moment when the government offered the hearsay in evidence, or-even
better-to the days before trial when the prosecution was contemplating
the use of hearsay, we would see a broader range of issues. The question
which the Court sees as an all or nothing contest over admissibility is
really a conflict among three important inter~sts: (1) the prosecution's
interest in proving its case against the defendant,2 77 (2) the accomplice's
interest in avoiding self-incrimination, and (3) the defendant's interest in
confronting the accomplice.
lf we look at the problem of reluctant-accomplice hearsay from this
perspective, then we may see a broader range of solutions than simply
admitting or excluding hearsay. Conflict among competing rights is common in our constitutional system. 278 ln many contexts, courts resolve
such conflicts through the balancing of interests. 279 Better yet, courts
sometimes find ways to accommodate potentially competing interests and
avoid conflict altogether. lf our approach to the Confrontation Clause
gave parties a reason to seek real confrontation, then a variety of conflict
resolving solutions appear.
276. With one partial exception, all of the Court's confrontation-hearsay opinions,
including Lilly, fit this pattern. The partial exception is the Court's first confrontationhearsay case: Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). To the extent that Mattox
considered the admissibility or the transcript of testimony from an earlier trial, it is merely
the first in a long line of cases considering the admissibility of hearsay under the
Confrontation Clause. But Mat/ox presented another issue as well. Once the trial court
admitted the hearsay, defendant sought an opportunity to impeach the deceased declarant
by calling two defense witnesses to testify that, after Mattox's first trial, the declarant had
made statement~ admitting that his original testimony was false, having been induced by
"threat~ made to him in the corridors of the court-house." Id. at 245. The Court disposed
of the claim under the law of evidence, never mentioning the Confrontation Clause. Id. at
250. That was the Court's first, and so far only, opportunity to articulate an affirmative
constitutional right to impeach a hearsay declarant. Despite prodding from the dissent,
see id. at 251-61 (Shiras, J., dissenting), the Court bypassed the opportunity.
277. Actually, the government's interests are a bit more complex. In all likelihood,
the government will seek to convict and punish both the defendant and his accomplice. A
grant of immunity might put future prosecution of the accomplice at risk. A plea and
cooperation deal with the accomplice avoids that risk, but at the price of a reduced
sentence. The use of hearsay avoids both problems for the government, but that choice
risks exclusion of probative evidence or-even worse-reversal on appeal, if the
government miscalculates in forecasting the admissibility of hearsay at trial.
278. In the First Amendment arena, for example, the Court has faced conflict~
between the right oF some citizens to engage in religious speech and the rights of others
under the Establishment Clause. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 837-38 (1995).
279. The Court has resolved Fourth Amendment claims, for example, by balancing a
citizen's interest in privacy against a variety of societal interests. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist.
4~J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (weighing a student athlete's interest in privacy
from drug testing against a school's "special" need to address drug abuse crisis).
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1. "Speak No Evil": Reconsidering the Accomplice's Silence. - In some,
perhaps even most, cases of accomplice hearsay, courts presume a conflict that may not exist. When the accomplice-declarant asserts his Fifth
Amendment privilege, courts seldom examine his claim in detail. 280 Instead, they simply assume he is unavailable for cross-examination. 281
And, as we have seen, current Confrontation Clause doctrine gives the
parties little incentive to challenge that assumption. 282 As a result, the
reluctant accomplice takes the Fifth and walks away in silence. We typically do not know what the defense would have asked on cross-examination or how the accomplice would have answered. The entire confrontation-hearsay argument often rests on an untested foundation: the notion
that admission of hearsay will create a direct conflict between the accomplice's Fifth Amendment right to silence and the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to cross-examine him. In fact, the conflict is not as
certain as it might first appear, because the Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights at stake are not absolute.
There is, of course, no Fifth Amendment right to "silence." 283 The
accomplice has a right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself
280. In Lilly, for example, the Supreme Court of Virginia simply asserted that "a
declarant is unavailable if the declarant invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege to remain
silent." Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 533 (Va. 1998) (emphasis added) (quoting
Boney v. Commonwealth, 432 S.E.2d 7, 10 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)). In his brief to the United
States Supreme Court, Lilly argued that "although Mark Lilly was technically unavailable at
trial because of his assertions of his Fifth Amendment rights, the timing of his trial was
within the Commonwealth's control." Brief for Petitioner at 22, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116 (1999) (No. 98-5881). In other words, though Lilly contended the state was
responsible for making Mark "unavailable," Lilly never questioned the validity or scope of
Mark's blanket claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. The Supreme Court simply brushed
the issue aside, noting, "[w]e assume, however as petitioner did in framing his petition for
certiorari, that to the extent it is relevant, Mark was an unavailable witness for
Confrontation Clause purposes." Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124 n.l.
lt is typical in confrontation-hearsay cases that neither the trial court nor the parties
question the accomplice's blanket assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that accomplice
refused to testify at trial and trial court therefore "declared [accomplice] an unavailable
witness").
281. On the surface, at least, the assumption seems reasonable. He is, by his own
admission, an accomplice in the crime charged. So, it appears, he must have a legitimate
fear that his testimony will incriminate him.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 226-229.
283. The popular notion that the Fifth Amendment is essentially a right to silence
stems from Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court held that before custodial interrogation
police must inform the suspect that he has "the right to remain silent." 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966). Further, the Court has held that prosecutors may not use a suspect's post-arrest,
post-Miranda silence against him at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976). But
neither Doyk nor Miranda creates a comprehensive Fifth Amendment right to be silent at
all times and in all circumstances. The Miranda "right to silence" is essentially a form of
protection against the inherently coercive nature of custodial police interrogation.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448. But courtrooms are different than police stations.
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in a criminal case. 284 That means that the state may not force incriminating statements from his lips, then use them as a tool of his own prosecution. lf a statement is not incriminating, then he can be compelled to
speak. 28 :; Likewise, even an incriminating statement can be compelled if
it is not to be used against him. 2 8 6
Similarly, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine
government witnesses is not absolute. Instead, the Constitution guarantees an "adequate opportunity" to cross-examineY87 Courts routinely,
and constitutionally, limit cross-examination that is redundant, harassing,
irrelevant, pointless, or unfairly prejudicial. 288 lndeed, they may limit
otherwise legitimate cross-examination where it conflicts with other important interests and where the defendant nonetheless has a fair chance
to test the credibility and accuracy of the witness. 28 \ 1
A real conflict of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights exists only where
(1) an adequate opportunity to cross-examine requires (2) incriminating
answers from the accomplice which (3) the government needs to convict
or punish the accomplice. That confluence of events does not arise in all
accomplice hearsay cases. Indeed, the conflict probably did not exist in
Lilly, though the trial court did not know that until Mark testified at sentencing. 290 My suspicion is that, if courts could examine these questions
284. The Fifth Amendment states, "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V.
285. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1951).
286. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1972).
287. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557 (1988); see also Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) ("Generally speaking, the Confrontation Clause guarantees an
ofJjJOrtunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examim1tion that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.").
288. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (holding that
confrontation right is not violated by resu·icting cross-examination on matters of marginal
relevance); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 888-89 (4th Cir. 1996) (restricting
cumulative cross-examination); Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 402 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that comt properly restricted cross-examination which lacked any factual basis).
289. United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1421 (9th Cir. 1995) (restricting crossexamination regarding location of surveillance in order to protect legitimate government
interesl~ in future investigations); United States v. Balliviero, 708 F.2d 934, 943 (5th Cir.
1983) (restricting use on cross-examin;1tion of transcript of witness's sentence reduction
hearing where use would jeopardize ongoing investigation).
290. When Mark testified at sentencing, he denied seeing his brother shoot the
murder victim, claiming instead that he was vomiting next to the car at the time. Brief for
Petitioner at t9, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999) (No.98-5881). It seems likely,
therefore, that on the most critical point at issue in Ben Lilly's trial, Mark could have
testified with no legitimate fear of self-incrimination. At worst, his "vomiting" story would
have been incriminating only to the extent that it acknowledged his presence at the scene
of the murder, a fact which he had already admitted to the police.
Obviously, wide ranging cross-examination could have ventured into areas of
legitimate concern to Mark. But-because the parties and the court never attempted to
explore the issue-we will never know whether a constitutionally adeq11<1te crossexamination might have occurred without exposing Mark to a legitimate risk of further
incrimination.
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in every case, an irreconcilable conflict would arise in very few. In other
words, most confrontation-hearsay conflicts involving a reluctant accomplice could be avoided if courts gave them a closer look. ~
Before considering how courts might examine potential conflicts in
the real world of trials, imagine a world where omniscient courts could
read the minds of the parties and of the reluctant accomplice. In that
world, the court could know what questions the defense would ask, and
how the accomplice would answer, if hearsay were admitted in evidence
and the accomplice were put on the witness stand for cross-examination.
Our hypothetical omniscient court could determine whether those answers posed a realistic likelihood of incriminating the accomplice in light
of everything the government already knew about him. If courts could do
all that, I suspect, they seldom would find irreconcilable conflicts between
the defendant's right of cross-examination, the accomplice's right to
avoid incriminating himself, and the government's ability to convict and
punish the accomplice.
One reason for my optimism lies in the principal circumstance that
gives rise to reluctant-accomplice hearsay cases in the first place: The
accomplice has already confessed to the police. 291 Given that circumstance, the chances of meaningful self-incrimination through trial testimony are limited, as are the odds that the government would have any
realistic need to use what the accomplice might say on cross-examination.
If the accomplice merely repeats what he said to the police, then he has
done little to deepen his already deep state of "incrimination." 29 2 If, on
the other hand, he recants his confession and denies participation in the
crime or-like Mark Lilly293-denies knowledge or memory of the crime,
then his testimony is not likely to be incriminating. 294 A cross-examina291. The term "confession," in this context, may be misleading. Given our earlier
definition of the reluctant accomplice, see supra text accompanying note 23, the most we
can say with confidence is that he has given a post-arrest statement to police, that the
statement implicates his criminal confederate, and that the statement may fall within an
exception to the hearsay rule-most likely the exception for statements against interest. In
most cases, of course, that jailhouse statement will implicate the accomplice in at least
some aspect of the same criminal wrongdoing in which he implicates his confederate.
292. Where a witness has disclosed facts voluntarily, and is later called upon to testify
to the same, or related, fact~, the Fifth Amendment issue becomes "whether the question
present[s] a reasonable danger of further crimination in light of all the circumstances,
including any previous disclosures." Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951).
293. See supra note 8.
294. Of course, his new version may be a lie. But the Fifth Amendment privilege only
applies where a truthful answer would tend to incriminate the witness. It does not protect
him against a later prosecution for pe~jury. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441,
448, 459 (1972); see also 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1994). One could argue, perhaps, that a
witness who testifies to a new, true version of events may subject himself to prosecution for
making earlier false statements to police, at least in jurisdictions which criminalize such
statements. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (criminalizing the making of false statement~ in a
matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency). But, for the reluctant accomplice, that
is hardly a realistic outcome. After all, the government has chosen to offer his hearsay
statement in evidence for it~ truth.
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tion that elicited any of .these responses would pose little real risk to the
accomplice's Fifth Amendment rights.2 95
The only substantial risk to the accomplice arises if his answers on
cross-examination would implicate him in a more serious version of the
crime or provide new evidence which the government needs to prove his
guilt. Experience and human nature suggest that few accomplices are
likely to take the stand and acknowledge greater guilt than they already
have confessed. 290 But in the few cases where an accomplice's testimony
would provide new or more deeply incriminating evidence, the Fifth
Amendment should-and would-protect the accomplice against that
risk.
Of course, even that risk need not create an irreconcilable conflict of
rights. That conflict is avoidable as long as the government chooses not
to use that new evidence in any later prosecution of the accomplice. 2Y7
In federal courts and in most states, the government can make that
choice by granting use immunity to the accomplice. 2Y8 Admittedly, use
immunity can be a sensitive issue for a variety of reasons, which are explored below. For the moment, it will suffice to observe that most prosecutors in most cases could grant use immunity to the reluctant accomplice and offer him up for cross-examination with no real risk to any
subsequent prosecution of the accomplice.
There are other important reasons why most cross-examination of
most accomplice-witnesses is unlikely to create irreconcilable conflicts between Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. One reason is the typical subject matter of cross-examination of an accomplice. A great deal of that
cross-examination has nothing to do with the crime for which defendant
is on trial, and nothing to do with any crime for which the accomplice is
likely to be prosecuted. Instead, cross-examination often aims to impeach the accomplice by demonstrating bias toward the defendant, prior
convictions, prior inconsistent statements, a self-serving motive, or an untrustworthy character. Because these questions have nothing to do with
295. The test for determining when a witness may legitimately assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege is a generous one-for witnesses. The witness may refuse to answer
when a truthful response "would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute" him for a crime. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). The
privilege is not automatic, however. "The witness is not exonerated from answering merely
because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself-his say-so does not of
itself establish the hazard of incrimination." Id. Instead, the privilege applies "where the
witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." Id.
296. The much more likely outcome may be the Mark Lilly approach: convenient loss
of memory. But that would be sufficient to allow a defendant an adequate opportunity for
cross-examination. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557-60 (1988). lndeed, it
would suggest to the jury ample reason to hesitate in relying on the accomplice's earlier
statemenL~. See id. at 558 ("[A] defendant seeking to discredit a forgetful expert witness is
not without ammunition, since the jury may be persuaded that 'his opinion is as unreliable
as his memory."' (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 19 (1985))).
297. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453.
298. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003; see also supra notes 29, 45.
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the crime in most cases, the accomplice usually can respond with no legitimate fear of incrimination. For example, had Mark Lilly faced such
cross-examination, he might have acknowledged-as he later did-that
he was drunk when he made his hearsay confession. 299 He might have
admitted that he had reasons to favor his roommate-Gary Barker, the
third participant in the homicide-over his brother, Ben. He might have
admitted that police made subtle threats that he could face the death
penalty if he failed to implicate Ben. He might have acknowledged prior
convictions, disreputable acts, or prior inconsistent statements. All of
that would be typical in the cross-examination of an accomplice witness,
and none of it would have posed a serious Fifth Amendment concern for
Mark Lilly.
Of course, some impeachment may involve efforts to implicate the
accomplice-witness in other crimes. In drug prosecutions, for example, it
is common for defense cross-examination to prove-or at least suggestinvolvement of the accomplice in drug transactions not at issue in the
trial. But courts have had little trouble reconciling Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights in that context. Courts often disallow cross-examination on "other crimes" or "collateral matters" in deference to the Fifth
Amendment rights of an accomplice-witness. 300 The Confrontation
Clause guarantees an "adequate opportunity" to cross-examine, not an
unfettered right to cross-examine on every matter that may affect credibility.301 Thus, in the case of impeachment by other crimes, courts have
accommodated Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by ruling that the
right of cross-examination must yield.
If our omniscient court could forecast the cross-examination of the
reluctant accomplice, it might discern still another reason why real Fifth
and Sixth Amendment conflicts are unlikely. This reason arises from the
nature of cross-examination itself. Cross-examination is a cautious process-perhaps especially cautious when the witness is a former accomplice of the defendant. Cross-examiners control witnesses by asking leading questions, based on known facts, and primarily based on facts that
can be proved independently if denied by the witness. 302 Witnesses seldom volunteer new information on cross-examination. As long as crossexamination follows this familiar pattern, then the real risk to the accomplice's Fifth Amendment interests is small, for a simple reason: The privilege applies to his answers, not to the questions. He has no Fifth Amendment protection that would prohibit the prosecutor from learning, and
even using against him, the facts asserted in the cross-examiner's ques299. See Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, 14, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 ( 1999) (No. 985881).
300. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 993 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir. 1993) (sustaining
government witness's assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege, and restricting crossexamination regarding "collateral" matter of witness's recent drug dealing).
301. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 557.
302. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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tions and the independent evidence upon which those questions are
based.:io 3 Only the answers· are protected, and in most cross-examination,
those answers consist of a "yes," a "no," or a shrug. 304 Obviously, where
the accomplice admits an incriminating fact, the Fifth Amendment would
prohibit use of that admission against him. But typically that prohibition
will be of little moment to the prosecutor:io;, because the important fact is
available from a source independent of the accomplice's admission. 306
Finally, there is one other reason to expect that our omniscient court
would find few true conflicts at the heart of most confrontation-hearsay
arguments. This reason has to do with the outcome of most cross-examination. Despite popular images to the contrary, experienced trial lawyers
share a disappointing secret about their chosen trade: Most cross-examination falls short of expectations.:io 7 Impeaching a witness can be an extraordinarily difficult enterprise. Even for talented advocates, the odds
303. See Kastigarv. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459-60 (1972). In practice, the risk is
even further reduced. Mose of the independent evidence-the "ammunition" which the
cross-examiner would use if the witness denied his assertions of fact-probably comes from
the prosecutor in the first place. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972)
(discussing the responsibility of the prosecutor to disclose impeachment evidence). For a
discussion of the application of Giglio to hearsay declarants, see Douglass, Balancing
Hearsay, supra note 43, at 2176-84.
304. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
305. Arguably, the prosecution might violate the accomplice's Fifth Amendment
rights by making "nonevidentiary" use of his answers, even where the questions themselves
provided independent sources co prove the admitted facts. The accomplice's admissions
might serve to focus government investigation on particular areas, while his denials might
lead the government not to pursue the leads suggested by other questions. Whether this is
a valid concern, however, depends upon the extent to which the Fifth Amendment
protect~ against such "nonevidentiary" use. The Court has never addressed that question,
and the lower court~ have split. Compare United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 31 I
(8th Cir. 1973) (finding nonevidentiary uses impermissible), with United States v. Serrano,
870 F.2d 1, 16-17 (!st Cir. 1989) (stating that nonevidentiary use of compelled testimony
would not offend Fifth Amendment), and United States v. Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d
Cir. 1988) (noting that no Fifth Amendment violation arises where immunized testimony
may have influenced prosecutor's thought process).
Of course, some court~ have adopted a remarkably broad definition of "evidentiary"
use. In the celebrated case of Oliver North, for example, the District of Columbia Circuit
found a Ka.stigar violation where government witnesses had listened to immunized
testimony and, as a result, may have refreshed or changed their recollection of event~.
United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940, 944-46 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For a critique of the
"superstrict" approach at work in United States v. North, see Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B.
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Selt~lncrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
857, 879-80 (1995).
306. Requiring the defense co proffer the basic suf:!ject matter of anticipated crossexamination, and the independent evidence upon which it would be based, would
substantially limit the risk to the government in granting use immunity. It would, after all,
establish a record of pre-existing sources of most of the information revealed during crossexamination. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460-62 (allowing later prosecution of witness based
on evidence derived from sources independent of his immunized testimony).
307. See supra note l 93.
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favor the witness. 308 If counsel could review and edit their cross-examinations after the fact, they often would "un-ask" many of their questions. Of
course, the Sixth Amendment still guarantees the right to attempt impeachment, even where it may fail. Courts do not, and should not, limit
procedural rights simply because they do not always work. My point is
more limited. If we had a structure that allowed courts to preview defense cross-examination of an accomplice, and that process demonstrated
that a particular line of questioning produced nothing useful to the defense, then we would do no harm to the defendant if we eliminated those
questions. Indeed, we would do h_im a favor. 3 ov
Of course, when real courts consider hearsay proffered by the government, they lack the advantage of twenty-twenty foresight. The accomplice takes the Fifth, and we seldom know how much, or how little, he
might have said if we compelled him to face cross-examination. We do
not know what questions the defense would ask. Indeed, we do not even
know for sure whether defense counsel would choose to cross-examine at
all. Still, our hypothetical exercise leads in a promising direction. If we
had the means to know in advance what defense counsel would ask, and
how the accomplice would answer, then we might avoid the conflicts at
the heart of most confrontation-hearsay cases. And if knowing their questions and their answers could prove that helpful in even some cases, then
the next step seems logical enough. We should ask them.
2. "Hear No Evil": Reconsidering the Defendant as Potted Plant. - There
is a common misperception that the defense has a constitutional right to
do nothing at a criminal trial. That is an overstatement. True, the defendant need not testify. 310 He need not present evidence. 311 But many of
the rights associated with criminal trials require action by the defense.
For example, a defendant has a right to be present during trial, but he
can waive that right by failing to show up. 312 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees compulsory process for obtaining defense witnesses, but a defendant must make a timely request for a subpoena in order to exercise
the right. 313 Again, the penalty for inaction is waiver. The same is true of
cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity
308. See Mauet, supra note 156, at 217 ("[I]n the cross-examination game, ties go to
the witness.").
309. In fact, an in camera "dry run" might well convince many defendants to limit
their actual cross-examination. The result might be both more effective cross-examination
and avoidance of the confrontation-hearsay issue altogether.
310. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
311. The Due Process Clause assigns the burden of proof to the prosecution to prove
all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
312. See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
defendant waived right by failing to return to afternoon session of trial).
313. E.g., United States v. Tran, 16 F.3d 897, 905-06 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.
King, 762 F.2d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1985).
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to cross-examine. But defense counsel must stand up and seize that
opportunity. 314
Curiously, courts seldom apply this principle when it comes to confronting hearsay. Under the Court's confrontation-hearsay formula,
courts seldom even ask a defendant whether he wants to put an available
declarant on the stand for cross-examination. 315 And courts almost never
invite the defendant to attempt cross-examination where the government
offers hearsay from a reluctant accomplice. Instead, as we have seen, defendants often assert a confrontation right which they have no interest in
exercising. 310 Their real aim is to exclude hearsay. But if we had a confrontation doctrine that treated hearsay declarants just as it treats other
witnesses, then we would expect more from defendants than the passive
silence of the potted plant. When a prosecution witness testifies at trial,
the right of cross-examination is not self-executing. The defendant must
choose to cross-examine and must put questions to the witness. The same
principle should apply with hearsay declarants.
1f the defendant objects to otherwise admissible hearsay on confrontation grounds, then we should give him what he asks for. Where the
declarant is available, we should allow the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine. 317 Where the declarant is an accomplice who asserts a
Fifth Amendment privilege, we should at least explore opportunities to
proceed in the same manner. That is, we should consider whether the
defendant's cross-examination will really threaten the accomplice's Fifth
Amendment rights. But to begin that effort, we must first hear what questions the defendant expects to pursue on cross-examination.
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a court from requiring that
much from a defendant who claims that hearsay will violate his confrontation right Indeed, that is the process which real courts pursue when a
314. See United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907, 918 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding no
confrontation violation where defense counsel declined to cross-examine coconspirator);
United States v. Howard, 751 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding no confrontation
violation where defense counsel declined opportunity to cross-examine witness on key
point~).

315. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986), is an exception. There, at least, the
trial court asked counsel whether she wished to have the declarant produced. But the
Court ultimately attached no consequence to defendant's failure to respond to that
invitation. Id. at 399.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 218-226.
317. The !nruli Court suggested that the right to call a hearsay declarant as an adverse
witness is a byproduct of the Compulsory Process Clause. lnadi, 475 U.S. at 397 ("If
(defendant] independently wanted to secure [declarant's] testimony . . . . (t]he
Compulsory Process Clause would have aided (him] in obtaining the testimony .... "). I
believe that the Court's sentiment is correct, but that the proper basis for that sentiment
lies in the Confrontation Clause. The Compulsory Process Clause addresses only witnesses
"in favor" of an accused. To me, it seems inapposite to regard an adverse hearsay declarant
as a witness "in favor" of the defendant. The right to put such a witness on the stand for
hostile questioning lies more naturally in the Clause gu<1ranteeing the l"ight to confront
"witnesses against" the accused. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 10, at 242-45.
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prosecution witness asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege during crossexamination.318 ln those cases, courts do not react by automatically striking the direct testimony of the witness, or by ordering a mistrial. Nor do
they simply ignore the right to cross-examine where they conclude the
witness is "reliable." Instead, they assess whether the anticipated crossexamination really conflicts with the Fifth Amendment rights of the witness, and whether the conflict really jeopardizes the opportunity for a fair
and adequate cross-examination. 319 And they start by requiring the defendant to proffer the questions he expects to pursue on crossexamination.
Of course, this kind of question-by-question proffer occurs away from
the jury. 320 The witness-typically with assistance of his own counselidentifies which questions he will answer and which will give rise to a
claim of privilege. Where the claim has no merit, the court compels an
answer. In this manner, the court winnows out the areas of true conflict
between Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The remaining "safe" areas
of cross-examination can then proceed in front of the jury. Often, nothing more is required to accommodate the competing rights of witness
and defendant. The areas of true conflict may turn out to be nonexistent, insignificant, or unhelpful to the defense. 321 The allowable areas of
cross-examination may be sufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right
to an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. 322
The same procedure could be followed just as easily in cases where
the "direct" testimony consisted of hearsay from a reluctant accomplice.
This process could avoid many instances where courts wrongly presume a
conflict between Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. But some conflicts
would remain. Of course, as our hypothetical omniscient court would tell
us, we could refine the process further if we could know how the accomplice might answer the proffered questions. Unfortunately, things get
stickier at this juncture. We have a chicken-and-egg problem. We need
to hear the answers to know if they are really self-incriminating. But incrimination may result from giving the answers. 323
318. See, e.g., United States v. Viera, 819 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the proper procedure in such cases is to "excuse[] the jury, and [to hear] the desired
cross-examination").
319. See, e.g., United States v.Jackson, 915 F.2d 359, 360 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to
strike testimony where defendant had adequate opportunity for cross-examination despite
witness's claim of Fifth Amendment privilege in response to some questions).
320. See, e.g., Viera, 819 F.2d at 501.
321. See, e.g., United States v. Yip, 930 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1991) (declining to
strike witness testimony where witness invoked Fifth Amendment privilege only in relation
to collateral matters).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 921F.2d1412, 1424 (11th Cir. 1991) (refusing
to strike testimony where defense amply impeached witness despite his claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege); Jackson, 915 F.2d at 360 (same).
323. "[l]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard
[of self-incrimination] in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in
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Even this sticky problem, however, is manageable. Courts often address questions of privilege by requiring ex parte, in camera submissions.
Debates over attorney-client privilege are typically resolved in that manner. ~24 Courts review ex parte submissions from prosecutors as a means
to resolve discovet)' disputes.~ 25 The same process offers a fair way to
adjudicate a potential conflict between the accomplice's Fifth Amendment privilege and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right. Where the
government offers otherwise admissible hearsay and the defendant demands confrontation, the court might conduct an ex parte proffer in
chambers and compel the accomplice to answer. To the extent that any
answers may be legitimately self-incriminating, the prosecutor could
never use them.~ 26 Indeed, she would never even hear them absent a use
immunity order.~ 27 To the extent that answers were not incriminating,
the court could order the cross-examination to proceed in front of the

court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee." Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (195I).
324. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence 426-27 ( 1995).
325. In Pennsylvania v. /We/tie, for example, the Court suggested in camera, ex parte
review as a means for determining the materiality of information in confidential child
custody files which, the defendant contended, contained exculpatory evidence. 480 U.S.
39, 60 (1987).
326. The practical effect of compelling a proffer would be to create the equivalent of
use immunity for the accomplice's statements. Since the statements would have been
compelled, the government could make no use of them, directly or indirectly. United
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 39 (2000).
327. A~ long as the prosecutor was unaware of the answers, the accomplice would
remain fully protected, and the government would face no risk that iL~ future prosecution
of the accomplice might be "tainted." That risk would arise only if information disclosed
in an in camera, ex parte proffer were somehow leaked to the prosecutor. Then, in any
future prosecution of the accomplice, the government would face the burden of proving
that iL~ evidence was independently derived. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 44I,
46I-62 ( 1972). Still, that seldom would pose a serious risk to the government. See infra
text accompanying notes 337-338. Despite some suggestions to the contrary, United States
v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 856 (D.C. Cir. I 990), amended by 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990),
there is no absolute Fifth Amendment protection against prosecution by a government
attorney who may have been exposed lo immunized testimony. See United States v.
Mariani, 851 F.2d 595, 600 (2d Cir. I 988) (noting that no Fifth Amendment violation
arises where immunized testimony may have influenced prosecutor's thought process);
United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that Fifth
Amendment does not protect against nonevidentiary use of immunized testimony in
decisionmaking by prosecutors); United States v. Pantone, 634 F.2d 716, 720 (3d Cir.
1980) (noting that Kastigar does not prohibit prosecutor's "mere access to immunized
grand jury testimony").
For a more detailed discussion of the varying approaches of courts in defining the
scope of use immunity, see Gary S. Humble, Nonevidentiary Use of Compelled Testimony:
Beyond the Fifth Amendment, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 35I, 363-74 (I987);Jerome A. Murphy, The
Aftermath of the Iran-Contra Trials: The Uncertain Status of Derivative Use Immunity, 51
Md. L. Rev. l OI 1, 1030-31 (l 992).
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jury. The result would be a further winnowing of the real conflicts from
those we only presume to exist. 3 28
If we required these steps from the defendant and the accomplice,
we would see that many confrontation-hearsay cases do not present irreconcilable conflicts between Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. We could
admit an accomplice's confession, allow adequate cross-examination, and
preserve both rights. Many confrontation-hearsay problems would simply
disappear.
Conflicts between the competing rights of the defendant and the accomplice would remain in those cases where the accomplice has something to say that is both genuinely self-incriminating and necessary for a
fair cross-examination. In the starkest case, for example, the accomplice
might recant his earlier blame-shifting statements and "take the rap"-or
at least more of the "rap"-for the crime charged against the defendant.
Short of compromising the right of confrontation, the only choice would
be to exclude the hearsay or grant use immunity to the accomplice. If we
take the right of confrontation seriously, the Confrontation Clause
should compel the prosecution to make that choice. 329
3. "See No Evil": Reconsidering the Government's Responsibility to Promote
Confrontation. - Before the Roberts formula made reliability the exclusive
focus of Confrontation Clause analysis, the Court sometimes used the
power to exclude hearsay for a different purpose. It refused to allow
hearsay where the government neglected to use available means to allow
328. In some measure, "pre-screening" a cross-examination would detract from the
spontaneity of the examination conducted later in front of the jury. But that disadvantage
could be overcome by videotaping the proffer and allowing the defense to use portions of
the tape where the difference was significant. Moreover, any disadvantage to the defense
from having to disclose its cross-examination strategy in a dry nm would be offset by the
advantage of discovering the accomplice's responses in the risk free environment of an in
camera proceeding.
329. Cases where the accomplice, if cross-examined, would accept blame for the
defendant's alleged offense are cases of clear conflict between the accomplice's Fifth
Amendment rights and the defendant's right of confrontation. But they are also the cases
where cross-examination is most critical to the defense. In a related context, the Court
found a Due Process violation where the defense was denied the opportunity to introduce
a third party's hearsay confession to the crime with which the defendant was charged.
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03 (1973). The Chambers Court further held
that the state violated Chambers's right to due process when it applied a "voucher" rule to
prohibit the defense from calling the confessing third party to the stand and crossexamining him as an adverse witness. Id. at 295-97.
One could argue that a defendant's right to a fair trial is even.more seriously impaired
when the state relies on an accomplice's blame-shifting confession to convict, while the
Fifth Amendment denies the defendant an opportunity to present a blame-accepting
confession fro·m the same accomplice. Yet the Court's current approach to confrontation
would allow that to happen, as long as the blame-shifting confession satisfied the Court's
somewhat unpredictable standards for "reliability." In my view, that is an untenable result.
Instead, it makes sense to put the government to a choice: either forego the blame-shifting
hearsay, or allow cross-examination of the accomplice under a grant of use immunity.
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for confrontation.:-1:-io In those early cases, the exclusionary rule was not
just a rule of evidence for screening out unreliable hearsay. It was leverage to require government action. The aim was to promote
confrontation.
In the case of a reluctant accomplice, the Confrontation Clause can,
and should, function in just that way. When the accomplice takes the
Fifth, the government holds the key to his silence. Except in cases of the
most recalcitrant accomplice, the prosecutor can bring about confrontation by granting use immunity. 331 And in most cases, she can do so with
no real risk to the government's legitimate interest in punishing the accomplice for his own crimes. It would seem only natural, then, to condition the use of hearsay on the exercise of that power.
But courts seldom take that approach, in part because they regard
immunity decisions as the private domain of prosecutors. 3 :-ll! Courts do
not grant immunity; prosecutors do. 33 :-i And, with a few limited exceptions, courts do not compel immunized testimony at the request of defendants. :-1:-14 For that reason, the notion that a court might order use
immunity to allow for defense cross-examination of a hearsay declarant
may seem far-fetched. It should not be.
The principal reason for opposing defense-witness use immunity
does not apply in most cases of reluctant accomplice hearsay. In other
contexts, if defendants routinely could immunize their witnesses, then
330. E.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 723-25 (1968) (excluding hearsay under
Confrontation Clause where government made no effort to obtain declarant from federal
prison); Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 474 (1900) (excluding hearsay when
witness's absence resulted from government negligence in releasing witness from jail and
failing to monitor him).
331. See 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1994); see also supra notes 29, 45. Even a grant of use
immunity will not always bring about live testimony. A few witnesses will refuse to talk even
when ordered to do so. In such cases, the court will find the witness in contempt of its
order and typically will jail the witness until he complies with the order and testifies, or
until the end of the proceeding in which his testimony is sought. The court can enhance
the coercive effect of its order by imposing an additional term of imprisonment for
criminal contempt.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 616 (1984) ("We decline to extend
the jurisdiction of courts to include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of
the formal request [of the United States Attorney) that the statute requires."); United
States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101, 104 (O.C. Cir. 1989) ("The cases are legion and uniform that
only the Executive can grant statutory immunity, not a court.").
333. The federal use immunity statute makes this division of labor clear. Courts have
the power to compel immunized testimony, but only after the prosecutor moves for such
an order. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003.
334. A few court.~ have suggested that the government may be compelled to grant use
immunity in extraordinary circumstances. See Lugg, 892 F.2d at 104 (noting that a few
federal courts "have indicated that courts may intervene in the prosecutorial immunity
decision '[w]here the prosecutor's decision not to grant a witness use immunity has
distort[ed) the judicial fact-finding process'" (alterations in original) (quoting United
States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 403 (9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting))). For more
extensive discussions of defense witness immunity, see Note, Sixth Amendment, supra note
29; Stone, supra note 29.
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they would have the power to grant "immunity baths" to their friends and
coconspirators. 335 Their choices undoubtedly would conflict with the
prosecutor's power to choose whom to charge, when to charge, and what
to charge. That concern carries little weight, however, when the government offers the hearsay confession of a reluctant accomplice. Immunizing an accomplice whose hearsay statement the government chooses to
offer in evidence is critically different fr.om immunizing defense witnesses
because it is the prosecution that chooses to use the accomplice's story in
the first place. The government might face a hard choice between granting use immunity on the one hand and foregoing the use of hearsay on
the other. But it is still the prosecutor's choice. And she has a range of
other options where the risks of use immunity appear too great. 336
In most cases, use immunity will pose little risk to any future prosecution of the accomplice. Use immunity allows the government to compel
testimony, yet still prosecute the accomplice as long as the later prosecution rests on evidence obtained independently of the immunized testimony. 337 In the case of the reluctant accomplice, that will seldom be a
difficult feat for a prosecutor. After all, she already has a confession from
the accomplice, typically has already charged him, and probably expects
to use most of the same evidence against him that she is using in the trial
of his colleague in crime. She could immunize the accomplice's crossexamination with little risk that a later prosecution would fail for lack of
independent evidence. And it is easy for her to create a record demonstrating that such evidence is, in fact, independently derived. 338 Indeed,
335. See Note, Sixth Amendment, supra note 29, at 1273-74.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 126-129.
337. In that circumstance, the Court has told us, immunity is commensurate with the
Fifth Amendment right of the witness. In essence, he is in the same position he would
occupy if he never testified at all. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1972).
338. The Fifth Amendment protects against the use of derivative evidence. See
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2000); Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-54. And, in
any later prosecution of the accomplice, the prosecutor must prove that none of her
evidence was derived from immunized testimony. Id. When a prosecutor grants use
immunity to a witness whom she may later wish to prosecute, therefore, her risk is not so
much that the witness will confess to the crime. She can simply avoid using the confession.
Instead, her real risk is that the testimony might suggest leads to new evidence. That cat,
she may find, is hard to stuff back into the Fifth Amendment bag.
As a practical matter, however, prosecutors can satisfy the requirement~ of Kastigar by
making a record of the evidence· in their. possession before the witness gives any immunized
testimony. By definition, that evidence is independently derived. This process, called
"canning" a case, is familiar to prosecutors. Amar & Lettow, supra note 305, at 879. While
"canning" may prove quite burdensome in complex cases, e.g., United States v. North, 920
F.2d 940, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (describing the "canning" process undertaken by the
Independent Counsel in advance of Oliver North's immunized testimony before a
congressional committee), it would be simple enough in most cases where the prosecutor
possesses an earlier confession from the accomplice, has already assembled the evidence to
indict the accomplice, and is prepared for trial in a related case in which the accomplice's
hearsay implicates a criminal colleague.
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much of that record will exist in the accomplice's confession itself and
the record of the trial of his colleague.
Use immunity could eliminate the confrontation-hearsay conflict in
most reluctant accomplice cases. lt can allow for hearsay and confrontation, with no risk to the Fifth Amendment rights of the accomplice and
minimal risk to the prosecutor. But prosecutors almost never grant use
immunity for that purpose. Prosecutors shun use immunity as a means to
allow confrontation of hearsay declarants, not because immunity will
handicap a later prosecution, but because the prosecutor gets nothing
out of it. To the contrary, the law of evidence tells a prosecutor she cannot use the hearsay if she exercises her immunizing powers to allow for
confrontation.339 She is caught in a Catch-22 that will not allow hearsay
and confrontation.34o
lf we eliminated that Catch-22 and created new incentives under the
Confrontation Clause, then prosecutors would look harder at use immunity and compelled testimony as a means to promote real confrontation. 341 Use immunity for legitimately self-incriminating cross-examination is an appropriate exchange for accomplice hearsay. It is a lower
price than the government typically pays for the polished, in-court testimony of a cooperating accomplice. 34 ~ And it is a small price to pay for
defendant's right of confrontation.
CONCLUSION

In most cases, the conflict between an accomplice's Fifth Amendment rights and the confrontation rights of the defendant is more limited
than we presume it to be. Defendants seldom question that presumed
conflict because the law of confrontation gives them no reason to ask.
Sometimes at least, they do not ask because they would prefer not to
know the answer. For their part, prosecutors seldom use their immunity
granting power to resolve that conflict because, ironically, the law of con339. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(l).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 236-237.
341. Even without changes in the rules of evidence, court~ could take steps to
encourage confrontation of the reluctant accomplice. Federal Rule of Evidence 807 and
comparable state "residual" hearsay exceptions allow courts to admit hearsay having
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" which are "equivalent" to those which
support the traditional hearsay exceptions. One relatively easy way to encourage
confrontation would be for court~ to rule that an out-of-court accomplice confession is
admissible when the government puts the declarant on the witness stand for crossexamination. There, the "equivalent" guarantee of trustworthiness would be crossexamination it~elf. In effect, this approach would represent a judicial circumvention of the
Catch-22 that now prevent~ prosecutors from immunizing declarant~ as a means of
allowing hearsay and confrontation. In addition, court~ might promote more effective
confrontation by conditioning the admissibility of accomplice hearsay on more complete
disclosure of information potentially useful to impeach the accomplice. ·Douglass,
B;ilancing Hearsay, supra note 43, at 2174-87.
342. See supra text accompanying notes 204-210.
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frontation gives them no incentive to make confrontation possible.
Stranger still, by prohibiting the use of hearsay from an available declarant, the law of evidence can penalize a prosecutor who seeks to turn a
reluctant accomplice into a testifying witness. As a result, our courts have
become all too familiar with Confrontation Clause debates that have little
to do with confrontation. Lilly v. Virgi,nia is merely the latest chapter in
that story. It will not be the last.
The current approach to confrontation promotes two equally unsatisfying outcomes. One is an empty debate over hearsay labels, like we see
in Lilly. The other is a forced marriage of prosecutor and accomplice,
like we see in the growing parade of cases featuring transmogrified accomplices as government witnesses. Neither is an attractive choice, if our
aim is to promote truth-finding by juries and effective truth-testing by
defendants.
In this Article, I have outlined an approach that promotes a different
kind of choice: a choice that allows for hearsay and confrontation. On a
constitutional level, the foundation for this approach is simple. We
should apply the Confrontation Clause to hearsay declarants in the same
manner it applies to testifying witnesses. After all, the Court has told us
repeatedly that they are all "witnesses against" the accused. 343 We should
treat them like witnesses and allow defendants an adequate opportunity
to test their stories. On a more practical level, this approach rearranges
the perverse incentives that currently dominate pretrial decisionmaking
by prosecutors and defendants. It makes confrontation matter in the debate over hearsay. And if it matters to courts, then prosecutors and defendants will value confrontation when shaping their pretrial strategies
for dealing with the reluctant accomplice.
I do not pretend that this approach will solve the confrontation-hearsay dilemma in every case involving a reluctant accomplice. But we can at
least limit the price our system must pay for the accomplice's testimony
by making hearsay-coupled with unvarnished confrontation-a viabie
option. And in many cases, we can resolve the clash of competing interests that creates the dilemma in the first place.
343. E.g., V\'nite v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-54, 353 n.5 (1992).

